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ABSTRACT 
The nature of conflict in Africa has changed from the Cold War to the post-cold War 
era. This is evident in the internal and external factors and actors involved within the 
conflict dynamics. During the Cold War era politics and the quest for control of the 
state formed the basis for conflicts in Africa, from anti-colonial wars of independence 
and liberation struggles to secessionist attempts. In the post-Cold War era with the 
loss of external superpower support, this has changed with the growing significance 
of identity politics, and conflicts based on the differences of ethnicity, religion and the 
quest for the control of resources and land, characterised by extreme violence and the 
rise of actors other than the state, within failed and collapsed states. These conflicts 
have thus presented challenges to the United Nations (UN) in relation to its traditional 
means of maintaining international peace and security, and the internal dynamics of 
the decision-making processes, political will and accompanying resources and 
financial factors within the organisation. The challenges faced by the UN in Africa 
therefore lie not only within the nature of conflict and the nature of the African state 
but also within the internal constraints inherent within the organisation itself. The 
conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda respectively represent how the nature of 
conflict has changed in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era and both 
illustrate the challenges the UN has faced in light of the changing nature of African 
conflict. While Mozambique offers an example of a typical Cold War conflict, based 
on the quest for control of the state and exacerbated by superpower support, Rwanda 
represents an example of a typical post-Cold War internal conflict based on identity 
politics and extreme violence manifest as genocide. By comparing and contrasting 
these two conflicts, and the subsequent involvement of UN peace maintenance 
operations in these conflicts, this thesis offers a comparative study of "old" and "new" 
wars in Africa in order that a better understanding of the nature of conflict in Africa 
can be reached and to illustrate the challenges faced by the UN in light of this 
changing nature of conflict. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die aard van konflik in Afrika het vanaf die tydperk van die Koue Oorlog tot die na-
Koue Oorlog tydperk aansienlik verander. Dit is in die innerlike en uiterlike faktore 
en akteurs wat by die konflik betrokke is waarneembaar. Gedurende die Koue Oorlog 
tydperk was interstaatlike konflik 'n hoofkenmerk. Dit was ook die fase van anti-
koloniale oorloe wat dikwels met eksterne steun geveg is . In die na-Koue Oorlog 
tydperk met die verlies van uiterlike supermoondheid ondersteuning, het interne 
konflik binne swak state dikwels oor die beheer van skaars hulpbronne, of oor 
identiteit en griewe gegaan. Die konflik het uitdagings aan die Verenigde Nasies (VN) 
gestel wie se vredesregime kwalik vir rebelle en kindersoldate voorsiening gemaak 
het. Dit het ook eise gestel aan die politieke wilskrag van lede van die Veiligheidsraad 
om in dergelike konflikte betrokke te raak. Die uitdaging vir die VN in Afrika le dus 
nie net in die aard van konflik en die aard van die staat in Afrika wat verander het nie, 
maar ook in nuwe eise vir vrede. Die twee gevallestudies van die konflik in 
Mosambiek en Rwanda demonstreer hoe hierdie aard van konflik verander het, en hoe 
moeilik dit is om vrede te maak waar akteurs (rolspelers) kwalik binne konvensionele 
raamwerke hanteer kan word. Waar Mosambiek 'n voorbeeld van 'n tipiese Koue 
Oorlogse konflik was - stryd vir die beheer oor die staat en aangevuur deur 
supermoonhede, is Ruanda weer 'n meer eietydse voorbeeld van 'n tipiese na-Koue 
Oorlogse interne konflik, gebaseer op identiteitspolitiek wat met ekstreme geweld en 
volksmoord gepaardgegaan het. Hierdie tesis bied 'n vergelykende studie van sulke 
"ou" en "nuwe" oorloe in Afrika en bied moontlik 'n beter begrip van die aard en 
oplossing van sulke konflikte wat by uitstek nuwe uitdagings aan die tradisionele 
opvattings van die VN stel. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
In the post-Cold War era, Africa remains a continent struggling with the existence of 
conflict, yet it faces increasing reluctance by the international community to become 
involved to prevent or resolve these conflicts. However, since the end of the Cold 
War, it is noticeable that the nature of conflict is changing as African states have 
become more vulnerable to civil wars and increasingly fallen victim to the struggle 
for power and competition over control of scarce resources (Goodhand and Hulme, 
1999: 13-24, Tshitereke, 2003 : 82). The traditional "old war" conflicts of anti-colonial 
wars of independence and liberation struggles based on the quest for control of the 
state, fought during the Cold War era have evolved into what Kaldor calls "new 
wars". Here, rather than being about the traditional notions of national interest and 
state power within the international arena, these wars are about internal 'identity 
politics ' in that the exclusive claim to power is on the basis of movements that 
mobilise around identity of tribe or ethnicity, nation or religious community (Kaldor, 
1999: 76, 2000: 4). Although these conflicts have been mainly internal in nature, the 
support of external actors in one form or another, as well as the movements of arms 
and populations across national and regional boundaries has added an international 
dimension to these conflicts (Booth, 1991: 340, Jackson, 1993: 144, Clapham, 1996: 
29). 
Resolving these conflicts in Africa remams imperative within the context of 
international peace and security, as Kofi Annan (1998 : 2) has stated: "Preventing such 
wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies. It is a matter of 
defending humanity itself'. However, the internal and external dynamics within the 
nature of these "new wars" and within the framework of the African state, have 
presented challenges to the United Nations (UN) within the framework of its 
traditional principles and means of international peace and security maintenance. 
Preventing and solving such wars has been a difficult endeavour because while new 
conflicts in Africa are mainly internal in nature, the established UN framework 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
assumes that conflicts have an interstate dimension. New wars thus pose a major 
challenge to the UN in its efforts to maintain international peace and security because 
although the UN was intended to deal with inter-state conflict, it is increasingly being 
called upon to respond to internal conflict in Africa (Annan, 1998: 2). In dealing 
solely with states as the primary focus of conflict in the UN Charter, new security 
issues are ignored and thus the UN is unable to effectively regulate its involvement in 
contemporary African conflict. This is so because there are no provisions within the 
Charter relating to conflict involving non-state actors such as rebel groups, private 
military companies, warlords or humanitarian groups which have alike become 
important parties to the conflicts in Africa in the post-Cold War era. 
Traditionally, security has been focused on states and military concerns, and war 
fought between states for the definable political goal of state interest (Kaldor, 1999: 
15-22, Ngubane and Solomon, 2002: 60). There is however a growing movement in 
the post-Cold War era away from the traditional notions of the international system 
being a "war system" and the institution of interstate war being the dominant factor 
within this (Booth, 1991: 337). This is especially evident within the African context 
of "new wars" where traditional security threats have evolved into newer non-
traditional threats such as small arms proliferation, environmental degradation and 
mass migrations across state and regional boundaries (Ngubane and Solomon, 2002: 
59). This new conflict paradigm is characterised as internal as opposed to inter-state, 
non-statutory in that it involves irregular forces and militias who employ guerrilla and 
counterinsurgency doctrines rather than traditional state armies, and civilians have 
become both the perpetrators and the victims in such conflicts involving the 
widespread violation of human rights, the mass displacement of people and the 
destruction of physical infrastructure (Kaldor, 2000: 4-6, De Coning, 2002: 48). 
The significant consequence observed from these new conflicts has been the 
considerable impact on the individual and the threats to the human security of the 
African people, as civilians have increasingly become the targets within these 
conflicts. People and their safety and protection have thus become the primary focus 
within the framework of these new wars, rather than the exclusive focus on the 
security of the state and national security (Booth, 1991: 341 , Solomon, 1998: 7). 
Nowhere else is the idea of new security thinking more relevant than in Africa where 
2 
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many factors undennine the idea of the state itself where people ' s well-being is 
threatened, and the state becomes a direct threat to its own citizens (Ngubane and 
Solomon, 2002: 60-61). "New wars" are thus related to the disintegration or erosion 
of weak and failed states (Kaldor, 1999: 78). Jackson (1993 : 145) contends that Africa 
is an international region consisting of pre-eminently and uniformly weak 
governments and failed states, which may even constitute 'stateless ' jurisdictions. 
This has been problematic for the traditional means of international peace 
maintenance, as the viability of a state is based on the ability of that state to provide 
security to all its citizens and thus a security dilemma has arisen, because with the 
collapse of state institutions, the state has been unable to carry out its sovereign duty 
of providing justice and security to its people (Mal an, 1999: 11 , Reno, 200 I: 1, 
Troeller, 2001: 65). 
The UN was established as the principal organisation designed to maintain 
international peace and security based on the traditional adherence to the principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. In carrying out this duty, the UN is a collective 
security organisation on a global scale and endeavours to ensure that all its members 
take collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to international 
peace and security.' The UN is thus the world 's sole collective security organisation 
with the ability to act on behalf of the international community (Clapham, 1999: 26). 
As a collective security organisation, the UN originally endeavoured to deal with the 
prevention of conflict and the maintenance of peace and security between states. With 
the rise of internal conflicts and actors other than the state within failed and collapsing 
states in Africa, the collective security mechanisms created under the UN Charter thus 
face a dilemma in terms of the appropriate response to such conflicts. As Booth 
( 1991: 340) contends: "There is a mismatch between the problems we face and the 
structures we have to deal with them". 
Collective security was espoused within the liberalist paradigm of international 
relations in the post-World War Two era and was viewed as a co-operative method of 
ensuring mutual peace and security between states. However, in reality, the UN 
operated during the Cold War within a realist dominated international environment, 
1 These are the guiding principles of the UN as laid out in the UN Charter. 
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and as Tickner (1995 : 1 7 5) points out, collective security was "unrealistic in a world 
of self-interested and power seeking states". This is especially pertinent as the UN 
was paralysed in the arena of maintaining international peace and security, 
particularly due to the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council as "dissent by one of the permanent members [was] sufficient to make the 
execution of any enforcement measure impossible" (Morgenthau, 1960: 30). 
As collective security is based on the state, it was only applicable when borders were 
crossed, but not when force was used against peoples within a state (Rochester, 
1995:214). Collective security, therefore, does not fall in line within the contemporary 
nature of conflict in Africa as it is based on the prevention of conflict between states, 
rather than within them. While Morgenthau (1960: 298) viewed collective security as 
the "ideal solution of a problem of law enforcement in a community of sovereign 
nations", the dilemma we face in the contemporary world is that conflicts are no 
longer fought predominantly between sovereign nations, but are rather internal, 
involving actors other than the state. Therefore, in light of internal wars in Africa, 
deterrence from external attack is no longer an adequate representation of security 
goals when it is internal insecurity that is the greatest threat (Tickner, 1995: 179). 
Whilst traditionally, the concept of security has fallen within the framework of the 
realist school of thought based on the primacy of the state and interstate conflict 
(Buzan, 1991: 2-5), "new wars" in Africa are internal in nature, involving actors 
other than the state, while still maintaining a regional and international dimension; 
thus the concept of "new wars" can be viewed more within the pluralist framework of 
international relations theory which rejects the notion that the nation state is the basic 
unit of analysis, and includes a complex array of interactions at all levels within states 
and across state boundaries (Fetherston, 1994: 90). Realism thus no longer offers a 
dominant framework of analysis when examining the issue of contemporary conflict 
in Africa, as a deeper understanding is needed of the internal dynamics of such 
conflicts within the framework of international peace and security. As the notions of 
security have changed, so too should the ways and means of addressing security in the 
contemporary international environment be re-conceptualised. 
4 
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In carrying out its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, the UN 
has established a number of peace maintenance operations, namely, peacemaking, 
preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. These 
traditional concepts of peace maintenance have pointed to the notion of making and 
keeping peace between states (Clapham, 1999: 29). However, such operations 
undertaken by the UN in the post-Cold War era in Africa have evolved from the task 
of upholding a peace between warring states, to the multi-functional and more 
complex tasks of political, military, as well as humanitarian activities within a state to 
rebuild failed states and deal with the effects of complex internal conflicts (Cilliers 
and Mills, 1999: 1-3). These new tasks also include the involvement and participation 
of civilian police, human rights monitors, electoral officers, and refugee and 
humanitarian aid specialists playing as meaningful a role as the military (Bhoutros-
Ghali, 1992: 11). However, as the UN has taken on these new and 'unprecedented 
tasks ' it has continued to employ old and worn traditional doctrines in its response to 
the increasing security demands within the international system, even though the 
current global security situation demands new conceptualisations and approaches, in 
the face ofnew commitments (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 17, Knight, 1998: 19). 
Thus, Knight (1998: 19) contends that the UN security mechanisms are in a "state of 
crisis". 
Africa has experienced some of the most controversial peace operations by both the 
UN and regional organisations in the post-Cold War era (Nkiwane, 2000: 26). The 
specific problems faced by the UN where highlighted by the Brahimi Report compiled 
in 2000 as the Report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations. This report is 
significant in that the UN itself has recognised and admitted to the limitations that it 
faces in its undertakings in maintaining international peace and security and the 
changing nature of conflicts that have posed a challenge to the principles and 
implementation of peace maintenance operations. The challenges presented to the UN 
in peace maintenance lie within the nature of conflict itself as well as within the 
structures and processes of the organisation. Kaldor (2000: 15) believes that the 
difficulty of UN peacekeeping operations results in part from the misdiagnosis of 
these new wars in Africa. 
5 
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The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has noted that the inability of the 
UN to successfully launch peace maintenance also has less to do with its military 
efficiency and more to do with its political capacity (Nkiwane, 2000: 31). As seen 
with past operations the UN management of peace operations in Africa has largely 
been affected by the internal politics within the organisation, particularly those of the 
pennanent members of the Security Council (Clapham, 1999: 27) . As will be shown 
in this thesis the political will and support of UN members to peace operations is an 
important element within the framework of successful peace maintenance. The 
Brahimi Report highlighted this view in saying that there can be no lasting impact 
without the political, operational and financial support of UN members who with their 
support will enable the UN to become a truly credible force for the promotion of 
international peace (Brahilni Report, 2000: viii). Secretary General Kofi Annan has 
also expressed these sentiments in relation to the resolution of conflict in Africa, 
saying: "with sufficient political will - on the part of the international community -
peace and development in Africa can be given a new momentum ... With political will, 
rhetoric can truly be transformed into reality. Without it, not even the noblest 
sentiments will have a chance of success" (Annan, 1998: 27). 
The problem remains presently however, that the involvement of states, especially 
Western states, remains limited by the scope of their own national interests and 
foreign policy priorities (Malan, 1999: 92). As Malan (2000: 180-184) argues, as long 
as no Western power feels threatened by African conflicts, the prospects for outside 
intervention remain weak. Furthermore, the realist notion in international relations 
prevails that states are the principal actors in international affairs and thus the issue of 
state sovereignty is a guiding principle in the decision to intervene in conflict. 
Sovereignty protects the territorial inviolability of a state, its freedom from 
interference from others, and its authority to rule its own people (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 1996: 101 ). However, sovereignty in the contemporary world is not only 
about authority and a right to non-intervention, but also as much about the 
responsibility of the state to its people (J0rgensen, 2004: 97). Therefore as Troeller 
(2001: 71) points out; given the exceptionally high percentage of civilian casualties 
that characterise internal African conflicts, not to intervene is morally inexcusable and 
further undermines the validity of international human rights principles and the 
organisations established to uphold them. 
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Gelb and Rosenthal (2003 : 5) emphasise that the perception that states could invade 
the sovereign territory of other states to prevent or stop massive bloodshed caused by 
genocide or ethnic cleansing was inconceivable until the 1990's. This view is 
changing within the international community in the post-Cold War era as Malan 
(1999: 93) contends that when people deliberately kill or physically injure other 
human beings as in the case of genocide, then the Security Council should be obliged 
to declare this a threat to international peace and therefore action should follow in the 
fonn of intervention to prevent this from occurring. In 1991 then Secretary General 
Javier N:rez de Cuellar expressed the view that "it is now increasingly felt that the 
principles of non-interference within the essential domestic jurisdiction of states 
cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be 
massively or systematically violated with impunity" (Cockell, 2001: 17). The 
importance of the protection of people and the victims of complex internal conflicts is 
thus increasingly being recognised by the UN, as expressed by Resolution 1265 
passed by the Security Council in September 1999, which called for a broad range of 
measures to protect civilians in armed conflict (Malone and Wennester, 2001: 44). 
The challenges faced by the UN in peace maintenance in "new wars" in Africa are 
most notable in the attempts at peacekeeping and the failure to prevent the genocide in 
R wanda in 1994. The events that unfolded at that time have been called one of; if not 
the greatest humanitarian disasters of this generation where a conflict involving 
identity politics found its most brutal expression to date as genocide (Kaldor, 1999: 
78, Jones, 2001: 1). The misdiagnosis of the conflict, accompanied by the lack of 
political will of UN members as well as their reluctance to provide the necessary 
financial and logistical resources for more robust action is said to represent the most 
prominent sign of Western indifference to conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War era 
and furthennore the moral deficiency of contemporary global governance (Adebajo 
and Landsberg, 2000: 13 , Murphy, 2000: 791). Neethling (1999: 27, 2003 : 88) points 
out that the "perceived failure" of the UN in Rwanda highlights "the weakness of [the 
United Nations] position as diplomatic arbiter, peacekeeper and peace enforcer". Thus 
Rwanda demonstrates the challenges faced by the UN in peace maintenance process 
in the post-Cold War era. There is therefore a need to examine why the UN has met 
7 
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with such difficulty on the African continent in the prevention and resolution of such 
"new wars". 
However, in discussing the difficulties of peace maintenance in Africa, it is important 
to recognise the fact that there have also been important successful attempts at peace 
maintenance operations undertaken by the UN. Mpungwe (1999: 14) argues that by 
concentrating too hard on the negative aspects of the UN's perceived "failure", some 
positive lessons are missed that can be learned from a peace process that actually 
worked up to a certain point. Thus, in the examination of the UN's challenges in 
peace maintenance, the successful role that the UN has played in the resolution of 
conflicts in Africa cannot be ignored. An important example of this could be the role 
that the UN played in Mozambique in facilitating the consolidation of peace in that 
country after a sixteen year long civil war. Conflict in Mozambique is typical of an 
"old war" in Africa, not necessarily based on any particular regional or ethnic identity 
but an example of a postcolonial struggle for power and the involvement of external 
actors in the context of the Cold War superpower scuffle for influence on the 
continent. (Macqueen, 2002: 165). 
Contrary to the operations in Rwanda, the peace operations in Mozambique occurred 
with the support of the regional and international community, as well as sufficient 
financial and personnel resources to ensure a successful peace operation (Malaquias, 
1997: 87, Aldrich, 2000: 4-5). The UN thus was able to maintain a strong presence in 
the country with a clear mandate of managing the entire peace process (Malaquias, 
1997: I 0 I). Another element that contributed to the success of peace operations in 
Mozambique was the co-operation between the UN and regional states ensuring a 
more effective peace operation (Clapham, I999: 28). Thus, Mozambique may 
demonstrate that when certain conditions both internally within a conflict itself, as 
well as within the UN are met there may be the possibility of successful peace 
maintenance. While Mozambique was not without its challenges, the ability of the UN 
to eradicate and solve these problems serves as an illustration of the ability of the UN 
to resolve "old war" conflicts in Africa. 
The end to the conflicts in Rwanda and Mozambique were both implemented through 
peace accords signed by the conflicting parties involved in each conflict respectively 
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and both called for a significant role to be played by the UN in consolidating the 
peace. The task of implementing peace agreements has at times fallen to the UN by 
default (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 23). This has happened because during the 
signing of a peace accord, while the UN may not have had a role to play in the 
production of the peace agreement, the parties call upon the UN as a part of the 
agreement to consolidate the peace through peace operations. While in the case of 
Mozambique, the peace was implemented through UN peacekeeping, accompanied by 
comprehensive peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts; peacekeeping and unilateral 
peace enforcement in R wanda did not facilitate and end to conflict and rather 
contributed to the resumption of conflict, and ultimately the outbreak of genocide. 
From the examination of the nature of conflict in Africa and the UN responses to such 
conflict, the question may be formulated of what kind of peace maintenance methods 
work best in the prevention and resolution of contemporary African conflicts. Every 
conflict is unique in its origins and consequences and thus a "greater knowledge about 
the internal dynamics of civil wars would undoubtedly help in assessing the utility of 
intervention" (Malan, 2000: 167). There is thus a greater need to ensure that the 
appropriate response is carried out within a conflict and whether that response forms 
part of peacekeeping, peacebuilding or peace enforcement should depend on the 
nature of the conflict itself. Guehenno (2002: 20) contends that peacekeeping remains 
a very specific and limited fonn of treatment that is not suitable to treat all of the 
world's conflicts. While peacekeeping has been the main peace maintenance 
operation utilised by the UN, there is a greater need to incorporate peacebuilding tasks 
into such operations as there is the increasing need to rebuild failed states affected by 
conflict. Thus peacebuilding efforts need to play a more prominent role within the 
framework of UN peace maintenance operations. 
1.2 Purpose and Significance 
In order for there to be a clear path for the future, the mistakes of the past need to be 
examined in light of how these mistakes have lessons that can be learnt. As Deng 
( 1995: 207) points out: "Understanding the causes leading to the collapse of the 
system is critical to developing workable, long-tenn solutions" (Deng, 1995: 207). 
Thus understanding the dynamics of a conflict is an important aspect in ensming an 
efficient and adequate response to that conflict. This thesis therefore aims to examine 
!::'','' '•··-··· . . 
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and provide an explanation of the changing internal and external dynamics of the 
nature of conflict in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and how the 
UN has responded to such conflicts within the framework of its established means and 
traditional principles of peace maintenance. 
This thesis will examine to what extent the changing nature of conflict in Africa has 
presented challenges to the UN in terms of its traditional means of international peace 
and security maintenance. However, these challenges do not only stem from the 
nature of conflict itself, but also from within the nature of the UN in terms of its 
structure, decision-making processes and the accompanying political will and 
financial resources provided for peace maintenance operations by UN members. Thus 
the internal dynamics within the UN will be examined within the framework of its 
established means of international peace maintenance. 
In order to do this, a comparative study will be presented of UN peace maintenance in 
Mozambique and UN peace maintenance in Rwanda to illustrate how lessons can be 
drawn from both successes and failures within both these operations. The similarities 
and differences between the conflict dynamics as well as the UN response to these 
conflicts will be examined. It is particularly the differences that will be looked at in 
order to understand how and why the UN was more successful in Mozambique as 
opposed to Rwanda. This will be done in order to attempt to illustrate how the UN 
was successful in peace maintenance in an "old war" conflict fought within the Cold 
War context, and how the organisation has faced increasing challenges in peace 
maintenance within "new wars" in the post-Cold War era. 
The aim of this thesis is not to offer solutions to the problems that the UN has faced in 
Africa, but rather to attempt to reach a better understanding of how and why Africa 
has posed such a challenge to the UN. By comparing and contrasting UN involvement 
in Mozambique and Rwanda, this thesis will attempt to provide a better understanding 
of the challenges facing the UN and point out what lessons can be drawn from the 
possible mistakes made within peace operations in these two countries. This thesis 
will attempt to show that when the conditions both within a conflict as well as within 
the UN organisation are conducive there is a possibility of a successful peace 
maintenance operation in Africa. 
10 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis will be qualitative rather than quantitative. Secondary sources in the fonn 
of books and joumal articles relating to the topic will be consulted. Policy documents 
and occasional papers written by organisations such as the South African Institute of 
Intemational Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies are also important sources 
of information used in this thesis. Primary documents such as UN policy documents 
and Security Council Resolutions will be analysed and incorporated into the research. 
The various libraries on the University of Stellenbosch campus as well as the South 
African Institute of Intemational Affairs, have been consulted. There is sufficient 
information to carry out this research. 
This thesis will be descriptive as well as analytical in examining the changing nature 
of conflict in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, and the structures 
and processes within the UN as an intemational organisation that have been set up to 
deal with intemational peace maintenance. A comparative study of the UN peace 
maintenance operations in Mozambique as opposed to the UN peace maintenance 
operations in Rwanda will be presented in order to illustrate how the nature of conflict 
has changed in Africa and the challenges that the UN has faced in light of these 
changes. The conflict in Mozambique provides a typical example of a post-colonial 
African state that descended into conflict within the context of the Cold War and 
superpower extemal support. Mozambique thus falls within the ambit of an "old war" 
conflict and has thus been chosen as the case study for this thesis to represent the 
nature of conflict in Africa during the Cold War. Rwanda, on the other hand, offers a 
typical example of a post-Cold War "new war" in Africa based on the primacy of 
identity politics and inequality that descended into the most brutal form of violent 
intemal conflict, namely genocide. Thus, the conflict in Rwanda has been chosen as 
the case study in this thesis to illustrate the nature of conflict in Africa in the post-
Cold War era. 
The comparative study of the conflicts in Mozambique and Rwanda and the 
subsequent UN involvement in these conflicts will provide an examination of the 
similarities and differences between the two conflicts and the role that the UN played 
in attempting to resolve them in order to attempt to reach a better understanding of 
where and why the UN has struggled in its attempts to bring peace and secmity to the 
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African continent. This will be examined within the context of the nature of African 
conflict and the impediments that it has presented to the UN's principal mandate of 
maintaining international peace and security. 
In Chapter Two, this thesis will examine how the nature of conflict in Africa has 
changed and how "new wars" have become contrary to the traditional notions of 
conflict. This will be discussed within the context of the factors and actors involved 
within these conflicts and how they have changed from the Cold War to the post-Cold 
War era. While conflicts have become more internal in nature, this chapter will show 
how they have maintained a regional and international dimension. Within this 
analysis, the nature of the African state will be examined and it will be demonstrated 
how the African state has degenerated into what have been termed "failed" and 
"weak" states. 
Chapter three will examine the UN as an international collective security organisation 
and the traditional means that it has employed to maintain international peace and 
security, including peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement 
as well the provision of regional arrangements for peace maintenance. Within this 
context, the internal dynamics within the organisation will be examined, including the 
decision making processes, the political will of UN members and the financial and 
resource constraints within the organisation and how they impact on the success or 
failure of UN peace maintenance operations, particularly in Africa. 
Chapter four will examine the role of UN peace maintenance in Mozambique and the 
importance of peacebuilding within the framework of the peacekeeping operation to 
restore peace to the country. This chapter will be descriptive in explaining the 
background to the conflict and the role that the UN played. It will also be analytical in 
examining the UN involvement in the conflict and show how when the necessary 
conditions are in place, there is the possibility of successful peace maintenance in 
Africa. 
Chapter five will examine the role of UN peace maintenance in Rwanda and how the 
failure to prevent the genocide in the country marked a great blemish on the UN's 
ability to carry out peace maintenance within the context of "new wars" in Africa. 
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This chapter will also be descriptive and analytical in its examination of the role that 
the UN played in the country and how the lack of political will and the accompanying 
resources were decisive factors in the failure of UN peace maintenance in the country. 
Chapters four and five will create the scope for the concluding chapter that will offer 
a comparative analysis of the two case studies of UN operations in Mozambique and 
Rwanda and examine what lessons there are to be learnt from both successes and 
failures within these two conflicts and what peace maintenance methods work best in 
light of the changing nature of conflict in Africa. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CHANGING NATURE OF CONFLICT IN AFRICA 
2.1 Africa and the International Dimension 
One of the central goals of the African state smce independence has been the 
preservation of the inherited system of state boundaries in order to maintain order on 
the continent and prevent secessionist attempts and border disputes (Herbst, 1992: 
1 05). Therefore conflict in Africa has not essentially been along the traditional lines 
of the pursuit of political interests within the international arena by autonomous 
states, and direct conflicts between African states such as that between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea have been rare (Clapham, 1999: 29, de Waal, 2000: 25). The nature of conflict 
in Africa in the post-Cold War era has shifted from anti-colonial wars and border 
conflicts to intrastate and civil wars fought within states or across state boundaries by 
non-state actors (Tandon, 2000: 187, Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 229). The nature of the 
African state and the internal factors inherent within it as well as the external 
environment within which these states operate have thus decreased the occurrence of 
traditional conflicts in Africa as African wars in the post-Cold War era have become 
"highly irregular [internal] conflicts" involving a mixture of both politics and 
economics (de Waal, 2000: 25) . 
Although African conflicts have been mainly internal in nature, Kaldor (2000: 4) 
asserts that the term ' internal ' conceals the global nature of these conflicts. The 
support of warring parties by external actors in one form or another, such as other 
states, entrepreneurs, finns and private security companies, rebel movements, traders 
in guns and drugs as well as international organisations, aid workers and human rights 
monitors, has added an international and indeed global dimension to these conflicts 
(Jackson, 1993: 144, Clapham, 1996: 29, Kaldor, 2000: 5, Jackson, 2002: 34, Buzan 
and Wrever, 2003: 229). These external players, especially the former colonial and 
superpowers have not necessarily started conflicts in Africa as much as they have 
"fuelled the fires already burning", particularly in supplying armaments, financial and 
political support and expertise, and in developing military doctrines in Africa (de 
Waal , 2000: 48, Buzan and Wrever, 2003 : 251). Within this context, it has been the 
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Cold War that has had the most significant impact in tenns of the international 
dimension within the African security arena. From the Cold War to the post-Cold War 
era, the nature of conflict and the African security regime has changed and the actors 
concerned have evolved as these conflicts have become more internal in nature, while 
still maintaining an international dimension. 
The Cold War and the external actors involved have not only impacted on the nature 
of conflict on the continent, but also on the nature of the African state. Therefore it 
has not only been the internal failings of African regimes that have been the foremost 
factor contributing to the weakness of the African state, but the role of external 
players in African politics and conflicts have impacted on the functioning of the 
African state as well. Private military intervention in Africa is argued by Musah 
(2002: 911) to be a key external factor that undennines the state-building process on 
the continent as this hinders efforts to create accountable governance and entrenches 
the culture of violence. The impact of external constraints on the political economy 
of the African state have also had a major effect on the strength and power of the state 
as the control over informal economies offsets the corrosion of state capability and 
power, arising from the debt crisis, structural adjustment programmes and decaying 
tenns of trade (Tshitereke, 2003 : 83). Therefore, as Macqueen (2002: 23) asserts: 
"interlocked with the internal dynamics operating within the African state [have been] 
a number of processes at the level of the international system that were also conducive 
towards conflict". 
African conflicts are varied in origin and intensity and many factors have played a 
part in starting as well as escalating them. African conflicts in general have been a 
consequence of internal divisions and inequality, the weakness and collapse of 
African states and the struggle for control of a country's natural resources . These 
conflicts have been carried out by a variety of different actors based on a range of 
different objectives. This chapter will examine the evolving nature of conflict in 
Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. This will be done in light of the 
different actors and factors that have evolved to make African conflict what it is 
today. The internal as well as external dynamics will be examined in light of the 
impact that they have on the nature of African conflict as well as the nature of the 
African state. The weakness and failure of the African state is a central theme within 
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the context of African conflict that will be discussed at length in this chapter and the 
evolving nature of conflict from political motivations to economic motivations is an 
impmtant element that will form part of this discussion. 
2.1.1 The Effects of the Cold War- 'Old Wars' in Africa 
During the Cold War the superpowers, as well as China and the former colonial 
powers pursued their rivalries on the continent and intensified African conflicts as 
these provided convenient "playgrounds" for the Eastern and Western blocs to display 
their dominance against one another (Osaghae, 1994: 89, Adebajo and Landsberg, 
2000: 13, Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 250). The security situation in Africa was thus 
influenced during the Cold War by the superpowers as they provided the necessary 
ingredients for certain African factions to enrich themselves by providing large 
financial subsidies as well as armaments and military support to favoured regimes or 
insurgent groups of appropriate political leanings (Tshitereke, 2003: 82). This support 
in Africa intensified African conflicts as it was based upon the desire to spread 
superpower influence and contain rivals, rather than prevent or resolve African 
conflicts. Thus African conflicts were left to flourish without regard for the African 
people and the development of the African state. 
The Cold War was a major factor in the internationalisation of African conflicts. This 
was due to the superpower's objective of accumulating clients and allies in all parts of 
the world and the desire to maintain order and stability among friendly states and 
allies in Africa (Annan, 1998: 4 ). Therefore the superpowers facilitated in the 
maintenance of African state boundaries by assisting African states in suppressing 
ethnic rebellions or threats from neighbours in order to maintain a balance of power 
and influence on the continent (Herbst, 1992: 1 06). Thus, internal conflicts during the 
Cold War were less prominent due to superpower intervention. However, the 
superpowers also distorted the nature of peace and security problems in Africa as they 
encouraged the separation of the continent into pro-Western and pro-Marxist states 
and support was given to one state or insurgent group respectively based on these 
divisions (Gambari, 2001: 15). Buzan and Wrever (2003 : 251) contend that these 
superpower security dynamics have had a substantial and lasting impact on the 
African security map. This is especially evident in African conflicts that could be 
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sustained far longer than they should have been without superpower support, such as 
in Mozambique and Angola. 
During the Cold War, the behaviour of many regimes was ignored in favour of 
sustaining that regimes support within the international bi-polar politics of the time, as 
Reno (1998 : 20) states: "global society tolerated behaviour that patently did not 
conform to conventional notions of sovereignty, accepting deviations from 
conventional rules ... " . Therefore the weakness of the African state was in many 
respects obscured during the Cold War as those states with weak political and 
economic structures, such as Somalia benefited from considerable support from one 
or other superpower (Troeller, 2001 : 65). African states became reliant on such 
support, without which they were very weak and economically unsustainable. With 
the financial help of the superpowers, African states were able to function (albeit on a 
very superficial level) as the underlying problems facing these countries were ignored 
at the expense of the people and the gain of the elites in power. As Annan (1998: 4) 
points out: "Across Africa undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and 
sustained by competing superpowers in the name of their broader goals" . These weak 
and corrupt regimes were held in power through the support of the superpowers as the 
West and Soviet blocs ensured that the other was unable to influence their respective 
clients on the continent, even if this was to the detriment of the African people. 
In the Cold War period, African conflicts centred on the three main issues of border 
disputes, secessionist attempts and liberation struggles (Oyebade, 1998: 145). De 
Waal (2000: 30) explains that the previous generation of wars in Africa during the 
Cold War such as in Mozambique were 'dirty wars', in which racist, colonial or Cold 
War powers - whether directly or indirectly through the support of African rebels or 
regimes - used irregular insurgency or counter-insurgency methods. Whereas these 
conflicts in the Cold War period in Africa were fought as 'wars by proxy ' on behalf of 
the superpowers, post-Cold War conflicts have evolved into internal conflicts fought 
as 'wars by proxy ' dominated by warlords and elitist state leaders using agents to 
fight their war for them (J0rgensen, 2004: 1 03). 
With the withdrawal of the superpowers and their assistance to African regimes in 
power, the most notable players on the African secmity scene have become warlords 
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and rebels who have filled the security vacuum left by the retreat of external powers, 
who have taken advantage of the poor and weak position of the African state and 
secured personal gain through others suffering (J0rgensen, 2004: 1 04). Thus, with the 
new dynamics involved in African conflicts in the post-Cold War period, Oyebade 
(1998: 175) describes the end ofthe Cold War as significantly altering the landscape 
of conflicts in Africa and the dynamics of conflict prevention and resolution. 
The spread of weapons in Africa throughout the Cold War era has been an important 
contributor to the regionalisation and internationalisation of internal conflicts 
(Jackson, 2002: 33). This is seen in the fact that Africa in the post-Cold War period 
has became significantly more militarised and this has created obstacles to future 
conflict resolution efforts, as a lasting legacy of Cold War interventions has been the 
immense amount of weapons easily available across the continent (Herbst, 1992: I 06, 
Jackson, 2002: 33). Whether directly or indirectly, a great majority of weapons used 
in African conflicts - most notably in Angola and Mozambique - have come from 
Soviet shipments as can be seen by the most prominent use of the AK-47 assault rifle 
by insurgents (Baynham, 1992: 85, Schutz, 1995: 118, Clapham, 1995: 86). The 
spread of these weapons in African societies, especially in the hands of warlords and 
rebels once associated with key politicians or once loyal associates and paramilitary 
commanders has led to the continuation and intensification of conflicts and has 
allowed these insurgents to arm themselves and directly challenge their now largely 
undefended former patrons and vulnerable regimes (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 
13, Naidoo, 200 I: 2, Reno, 2001: 2). Once such weapons enter a conflict region they 
attract regional smuggling and trade networks that feed into the economic gains to be 
found in conflict areas, and in this way contribute to the regionalisation of internal 
conflict in Africa (Studdard, 2004: 4). Thus, an important element in any attempts to 
prevent or resolve African conflict must involve the elimination of sue~ weapons and 
the financial means through which they are acquired as well as the disarmament and 
rehabilitation of those who acquire and use them. 
The Cold War has had a great impact on the political, economtc and security 
envirorunent in Africa and in the post-Cold War era, this impact is still being felt with 
the continuance of conflict and state collapse on the continent. The withdrawal of the 
superpowers left Afiican regimes in a precarious position as the great powers no 
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longer felt compelled to aid these troubled African countries and thus with the 
withdrawal of superpower support, the preservation of power by African regimes such 
as Somalia, Ethiopia and Liberia became unsustainable and collapse was inevitable 
(J0rgensen, 2004: 104 ). The collapse of the African state in many respects is therefore 
a legacy of the involvement of the superpowers in Africa and their respective support 
for illegitimate and unstable regimes. The continuance of conflict in Africa thus has 
much to do with the legacy of Cold War rivalries on the continent and the collapse of 
weak African states after the superpower withdrawal. 
2.1.2 Africa in the Post-Cold War Era - 'New Wars' in Africa 
"The primwy challenge posed by Africa 's conflict lies in their 
internally driven character" 
(Jackson, 2002: 30) 
The end of the Cold War marked a significant decline in external superpower and 
great-power interests and involvement in Africa' s security issues as superpower 
support was no longer made available to favoured regimes or insurgent groups within 
the context of the Cold War global bipolarity (Herbst, 2000: 312, Clapham, 2001 : 11 , 
Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 250). Thus the external maintenance of order and security 
disintegrated as "Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself' (Annan, 1998: 4) . In the 
post-Cold War period African rulers have therefore faced even greater insecurity and 
internal wars have become more prevalent as African regimes have become more 
vulnerable to armed insurgencies (Herbst, 1992: 107, Malan, 1999: 18, Reno, 2001: 
2). This is so as the maintenance of security on the continent is no longer within the 
scope of the superpower's interests and the external checks and balances for African 
security diminished leaving conflict able to flourish without the fear of superpower 
involvement. 
With the withdrawal of superpower support for some of the major antagonists on the 
continent African regimes and insurgents no longer have automatic supporters to turn 
to in times of threat (Herbst, 1992: 106, J0rgensen, 2004: 1 04). Sustaining a conflict 
in the post-Cold War era without the superpower financial support has therefore 
become an expensive endeavour and Tshitereke (2003: 82) contends that in the 
aftennath of withdrawal of external support many African wars have shifted away 
from the genuine grievances that initially led to the war and the importance of internal 
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natural resources has come to the fore in an attempt to finance these wars. Therefore, 
as Macqueen (2002: 28) points out, although the underlying causes of conflict remain 
in Africa from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period, they are no longer 
influenced and regulated by the powerful external forces of the superpowers. 
Ethnicity and inequality have become important factors contributing to African 
conflict in the post -Cold War era (Lodge, 1999: 4 ). A legacy of colonialism has been 
the ethnic division of the African people across arbitrarily drawn borders and the 
unequal treatment of different ethnic groups by the colonial powers. Colonisation 
significantly affected the balance of power among ethnic groups in Africa and created 
the conditions for the various ethnic grievances of the post-colonial period (Adebajo 
and Landsberg, 2000: 12, Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 221 , Gueli, 2004: 127). This was 
because a common feature of colonial rule was the polarisation of social divisions 
along communal identity lines, particularly based on religious, ethnic or tribal 
differences (Cockell, 2001: 21). Rwanda offers a prime example of this, where 
Belgium promoted ethnic division and animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi groups 
by favouring the Tutsi minority in education and in placing Tutsi elite within the 
colonial bureaucracy while the Hutu were treated as second-class citizens, thus 
contributing to animosity between these two groups (Oyebade, 1998: 159). 
Such conflicts based along ethnic lines can have particularly devastating 
consequences as hostility becomes manifested along the "violent politicisation of 
ethnicity" (Annan, 1998: 4) and can involve the "systematic violation ofhuman rights 
and endemic personal security" (Cockell, 2001: 20). Therefore in these conflicts of 
ethnic or national identity, Tshitereke (2003: 85) contends that minorities are often at 
risk of total annihilation - as was the case in Rwanda with the genocide in that 
country. These ethnic conflicts are related to the weakness and failure of the African 
state as Tshitereke (2003: 89) argues that it is only the breakdown in law and order 
within the African state that can sustain violence at the levels that have plagued many 
African conflicts. 
A major concern with the nature of conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War period is 
the increasing vulnerability of the African people and the "consistent pattern of 
human rights violations" occurring within these conflicts (Copson, 1994: 11 ). 
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Whereas civilian casualties have previously been an expected indirect consequence of 
conflict in Africa, innocent civilians have increasingly become the main targets of 
hostilities in post-Cold War African conflicts, as violence has become deliberately 
targeted at civilians or entire groups of civilians as the aim of one group (based along 
political, religious, ethnic or regional lines) is to displace or in the extreme, wipe out 
another group - as was the case in Rwanda (Annan, 1998: 13, Troeller, 2001: 68, 
Jackson, 2002: 31). 
Actions to instil fear and terror in innocent civilians have become commonplace in 
African conflicts and have been used to the extreme. Although classified as more of a 
Cold War conflict, Mozambique offers an example of this where Renamo engaged in 
methods of terror and destruction to commit atrocities against civilians, such as 
summary executions, forced labour, mass kidnappings and torture (Copson, 1994: 11 , 
de Waal, 2000: 30). Angola serves as another example were anti-personnellandmines 
were used as a means of spreading terror and preventing people from living on and 
using their own land (de Waal, 2000: 30). The extreme case of such violence in the 
post-Cold War era is Rwanda, where violence was carried out in its most intense form 
as genocide. Thus we can see how terror methods have been used in a most 
destructive and extreme way in African wars. A major consequence of such actions in 
African conflict has therefore been the growing number of refugees and internally 
displaced people fleeing such atrocities. 
The forced migratory movements of people are not only an internal issue for African 
states, but fit within the greater regional security arena in the post-Cold War era. Not 
only do refugees constitute a strain on the resources of neighbouring African states, 
but refugee camps have also become ideal breeding grounds for military mobilisation 
(de Waal, 2000: 36). States may be unable to control anned factions outside their 
territories, as insurgents have often been able to find a neighbouring state willing to 
turn a blind eye to their conduct, even supplying financial support, logistical aid, 
troops or a base of operations for their activities (Clapham, 1995: 83 , Studdard, 2004: 
4) . Macqueen (2002 : 24-25) calls the relationship between these insurgents and host 
neighbouring states a "symbiotic relationship" as each uses the other in pursuit of 
their respective political and economic agendas. Examples of this type of behaviour 
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include the borders between Mozambique and South Africa and between Angola and 
Zaire (Macqueen, 2002: 24-25). 
On the other hand, the presence of these insurgents may not be desirable for a state as 
the host state may not be able to control insurgent forces from other countries in their 
territory. For example, the Sudanese government was unable to control Chadian 
factions on its western borders in the late 1980s and early 1990s (de Waal, 2000: 36). 
In the Horn of Africa, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia have all tacitly supported 
insurgents in neighbouring territories at one time or another (Clapham, 1995: 83-84). 
This leads to further destabilisation within the greater region as conflict may spread 
across borders as the state attempts to rid itself of such factions, thus bringing in 
neighbours into what began as an internal conflict to become a regional conflict. Thus 
the outflow of refugees and the support of insurgents by neighbouring states 
contribute to the regionalisation of African conflict. 
A notable feature in African conflicts in the post-Cold War period is the rise of actors 
other than the state as many formidable non-state actors have arisen on the African 
security scene (Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 226). This is especially apparent as the 
collapse of the state, and the resultant lack of African state or institutional 
management has created opportunities for the rise of insurgents who have taken 
advantage of this and have been able to assert power and control over a specific 
region within a state and establish commercial activities within it, while keeping the 
weak central authorities at bay through armed opposition (Tshitereke, 2003: 84). 
Thus, the link is drawn between military and economic interests in the post-Cold War 
era as African military power has shifted away from fonnally constructed armies 
under central state organization towards rural-based groups that exercise direct control 
over local economic resources (Clapham, 2001: 12). 
Although not a factor within all African conflicts the most prominent among non-state 
actors within internal post-Cold War conflicts, have been warlords (Macqueen, 2002: 
25). Warlords frequently emerge from elite origins, with previous close ties to rulers, 
often formerly having held a high office in a government that they later attacked 
(Reno, 2002: 841-842). Examples of this are, Charles Taylor, who ran the state 
procurement agency for Liberian President Samuel K. Doe, and Somalia ' s 
22 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Mohammed Farah Aideed who was a defence minister for President Siad Barre 
(Reno, 2002: 842). These warlords are filling the power vacuum left by the weak 
African states ' lack of organisational and participatory capacity as well as the state's 
inability to address security threats and assert control over the legitimate use of 
violence (Zartman, 1995: 8, J0rgensen, 2004: 99). Thus they exist in a "situation of 
anarchy in which they can threaten the local population and engage in illegal 
business" (Pate) and Tripodi, 2001: 144 ). Warlords and their followers have 
accumulated significant commercial, territorial and military assets and connections 
during their tenure in the government and have used these to further their quest for 
power (Reno, 2002: 841, Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 229). They have attained their 
weapons mainly across the borders of friendly states or through the informal weapons 
networks that have proliferated in the post-Cold War period, thus playing a part 
within the regionalisation of African conflict (Clapham, 2001 : 12). 
The leader is the most visible expression of the warlord phenomenon as Clapham 
(200 I: I4) contends that he is the embodiment of the "big man" syndrome that 
encompasses many African political systems. The most typical followers of warlords 
are young men and women - who fonn one of the most vigorous, yet marginalized 
segments of society in collapsed states - who use warfare as a means of enriching 
themselves (Reno, 2001: 4, 2002: 854). The reward for following warlord leaders has 
become an economic rather than a political one, as these insurgents seek to enrich 
themselves rather than fighting for any particular cause. Warlords and their followers 
are therefore increasingly recognised as having no real ideological or political goal as 
they are armed actors seeking control of resources rather than control of the state 
(Macqueen, 2002: 25, J0rgensen, 2004: I 02). Thus, the resolution of such conflicts 
involving warlords in the post-Cold War era is more difficult as these actors often do 
not have any incentive or interest in participating in any serious peace process, 
especially if it will result in a loss of influence and economic power on their part 
(Pate) and Tripodi, 200I : 144, J0rgensen, 2004: I 02). 
Afiican conflicts in the post-Cold War era are thus ' post-modern' conflicts in which 
political groups no longer seek or even need to establish territorial, bureaucratic or 
consent based political authority in the traditional sense based on some common 
ideology or specific goal (Tshitereke, 2003: 84). De Waai (2000: 33-34) contends that 
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contemporary wars in Africa have generally not initially started based on issues of 
ideology, as these elements have rather been introduced later on in the conflict. He 
cites the example of Sudan, were religious fundamentalism became a much greater 
factor later in the conflict and was not an initial causal factor of war. Another example 
cited by de Waal is that of Rwanda, where the extremist philosophy of Hutu power 
had existed from the 1950's, but it was only during the civil war in 1990-93 that it 
was developed into a mass killing force culminating in genocide (de Waal , 2000: 34). 
Thus African conflicts in the post-Cold War era are contrary to the traditional factors 
of conflict in that they are not necessarily fought between states, but are rather 
internal in nature, involving players such as rebels and warlords who view the 
ultimate goal in conflict not as state control or being part of an organised political 
institution, but rather as power and personal wealth creation and enrichment. These 
conflicts have for the most part expanded into regional conflicts, involving many 
different internal, regional and international players. The devastation caused by 
insurgents in African conflicts is a particularly critical factor to note, especially in 
relation to the impact on human security and the human rights of the African people. 
Another important element gaining increased attention in African conflicts in the 
post-Cold War era is the role of resources in prolonging and escalating African 
conflicts. This economic dimension to African conflict is one that cannot be ignored. 
2.1.3 The Economic and Regional Dimension 
The economic dimension to conflict in Africa is one that has perhaps had the most 
important impact on the changing nature of conflict and the African state in the post-
Cold War era. This is because the control of natural resources has emerged as a 
prominent factor of African conflict as the concerns of those involved - both 
internally and externally- have shifted from political interests during the Cold War to 
economic interests in the post-Cold War era. With the elimination of external 
financial support in the post-Cold War era, Reno (200 1: 1, 2002: 83 7) contends that a 
new trend in African internal conflicts is the extent to which economic interests 
appear to predominate. This is especially so as the absence of superpower support has 
forced belligerents to develop and seek alternate means of economic sustainability 
(Naidoo, 2001: 2). Such alternatives come in the fonn ofthe utilization of the natural 
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resources that are available in a country, such as diamonds, timber, oil, narcotics, or 
the capture of illicit networks and informal economies (Studdard, 2004: 3). 
These resources offer insurgents an easy source of income as they are location 
specific and can be managed within a controlled area and plundered systematically 
when needed to be sold to international markets; thereby enabling insurgents to ann 
themselves and further intensify their war effort (Tshitereke, 2003 : 84-86). Thus the 
control of resources within a country has become an important element within the 
context of Afiican peace and security in the post-Cold War era. As insurgents have 
gained enormous wealth through the exploitation of these resources, they become less 
inclined to reach a peaceful settlement to conflict, as they would lose their control and 
economic power. 
The economic factors that have become inherent within Afiican conflicts have 
become a growing cause for concern for any attempts to prevent or resolve such 
conflicts as profits, rather than political power, seem to be the growing motivation for 
violence and wars in Africa as the point of the war has shifted from winning it, to 
prolonging it so as to continue engagement in lucrative criminal operations under 
cover of war (Tshitereke, 2003: 89). In Afiica, the most notable players within the 
economic sphere of conflict have been warlords, who have waged war and seized the 
opportunity to enrich themselves, having access to resources that they would not 
nonnally have had in peaceful times (Gambari, 2001: 14, Tshitereke, 2003: 82). Thus, 
despite the devastation caused by conflicts in Afiica, an overriding economic agenda 
predominates as those who profit from such conflict have an interest in prolonging the 
conflict, rather than pursuing peace (Annan, 1998: 5, Gambari , 2001: 14). Naidoo 
(2001 : 2) argues that the initial motivation of conflict has therefore become secondary 
to whether the warring factions can sustain their war effort financially and this 
"predatory behaviour" may not be the initial objective of the insurgents but becomes 
the means of extending their war effort. This can be seen in the cases of war in Sierra 
Leone, Angola and the later Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conflict in which 
genuine concerns or grievances initially forming part of the outbreak of conflict have 
been overtaken by the rewards of the lucrative and rapidly increasing "booty futures 
market" (Tshitereke, 2003 : 88). 
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The phenomenon of economic motivations within African wars is linked to the 
weakness of the African state as these states are characterised by an external 
vulnerability to international actors and weak regimes have been forced to align 
themselves with foreign companies to trade their resources globally in order to fund 
their war effort (Jackson, 2002 : 39, Tshitereke, 2003 : 86). Therefore, it is not only the 
rebels and warlords that exploit resources and the international market for them to 
their advantage, but also states, or the regimes that control those states that take 
advantage of the exploitation of natural resources in enabling them to continue 
conflict. After state collapse and the collapse of external support networks, those 
generally with the most well established commercial connections from the previous 
regime have become the most well armed insurgents (Reno, 2002: 854). African post-
Cold War conflicts therefore now tend to revolve around the desire to control natural 
resources as they have come to mean personal wealth and power for those who 
acquire them (Tshitereke, 2003 : 82). Therefore, rather than the old conception of war 
being the continuation of politics by other means, Tshitereke (2003: 89) contends that 
war in Africa is the reverse, as it is increasingly becoming the "continuation of 
economics by other means". 
It is important to note that the role of resources in African conflicts is not only an 
internal factor of concern, but the role of regional and international actors is another 
factor that must be addressed, as the availability of natural resources and the lack of 
central control within African states has attracted a number of foreign and regional 
players to the field of African conflicts (Tshitereke, 2003 : 82, 89). There is a 
prominent link between the exploitation of resources in African conflict and the 
international actors involved in these conflicts. As mentioned above African warlords, 
weak regimes and insurgency movements have drawn financial support for their war 
effort from the availability of global markets for their resources which have sustained 
their ability to wage war (Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 251). 
Private Military Companies (PMC's) and mercenaries are a particularly major set of 
international actors that have benefited from resource exploitation in African 
conflicts. PMC's are private "corporate entities comprising military and intelligence 
entrepreneurs whose activities incorporate the provision of multi-purpose security-
related products and services" (Musah, 2002: 913). These actors have become 
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entwined within the economic dimensions of African conflicts as the close corporate 
and operational ties with extraction and finance companies represent a key feature of 
PMC activities in Africa (Musah, 2002: 913). PMC's have also played a large part in 
shifting the military balance in a number of African conflicts, such as in Angola, 
Uganda and Sierra Leone (Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 251). 
International actors have thus become involved both directly and indirectly in the 
exploitation of these resources and the international trade of them has had a 
significant impact on the longevity of African conflicts. Such mercenary networks 
also contribute to the "entrenchment of regional conflict complexes" as they attract 
African ex-combatants who have not been successfully reintegrated into formal 
society and are rather enticed to join mercenary forces in neighbouring states 
(Studdard, 2004: 5). These "floating indigenous mercenaries" are often ex-soldiers 
who have deserted their warlords or national armies in search of better conditions and 
economic rewards (Musah, 2002: 914). Thus they contribute to the further 
regionalisation of internal African conflicts. 
Related to the economic dimension to internal African conflict is the growing factor 
of the regional dimension in which the spread of conflict from one state to a 
neighbouring state has become "part of a systematic regional conflict complex" 
(Studdard, 2004: 3). This can be seen because as Studdard (2004: 7) explains: 
"Conflict economies are embedded in a complex web of regional social, economic, 
political, and military networks that profoundly impact the behaviour of conflict 
actors". Within the regional dimension therefore are the related factors of arms 
movements, mercenaries and the flow of refugees across neighbouring borders as well 
as the support of neighbouring states for insurgent groups, which not only exacerbate 
the conflict in the one state but also lead to the destabilisation of the region in general. 
The outbreak of internal conflict in one state may therefore result in the 
destabilisation of neighbouring states as it can spur regional movements and conflicts 
within neighbouring states for territory, resources and power (Studdard, 2204: 3). 
Studdard (2004: 9) therefore contends that the failure to take into consideration the 
effect of regional economic linkages may undennine the effective management of 
conflict and peacebuilding initiatives. 
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2.2 The Nature of the African State and Conflict in Africa 
"The security problem in Africa since decolonisation has been dominated by the 
widespread failure of postcolonial weak states" 
(Buzan and Wrever, 2003 : 252). 
A fundamental factor related to the nature of conflict in Africa in the post-Cold War 
era is the nature of the African state. Jackson (2002: 35) contends that the internal 
conflicts that plague African states are the direct result of a particular fonn of state 
politics rooted in the structures and processes of what have become known as 'weak 
states ' in Africa. It is the decay and failure to produce viable and stable states in 
Africa that has given rise to the destructive and extreme political violence on the 
continent as seen in the extreme cases of Liberia and Somalia and most notably in 
Rwanda (Clapham, 2001: 14). The failure of the African state can be seen as both a 
cause and a consequence of conflict as the nature of the state and conflict are both part 
of the same cycle of endemic failure of the African continent to develop as well as 
prevent and resolve its security problems. It is the failure of these states that have thus 
been said to constitute one of the biggest problems to African security (Breytenbach, 
1994: 31). However, although the concept of a failed state is a worldwide 
phenomenon and not unique to Africa, it is here that the phenomenon is most 
prominent (Gambari, 1995: 221 , Zartman, 1995: 1, Tshitereke, 2003: 84). 
In order to understand what constitutes a weak state it is important to examine how it 
differs from a strong state. A strong state possesses high levels of social-political 
cohesion and strong national identities, the ability as well as the willingness to 
maintain social control, devise and implement effective policies, provide basic 
services, encourage public participation in state institutions as well as maintain state 
legitimacy (Jackson, 2002: 38). As will be shown in this section, weak states in Africa 
do not possess such characteristics, as Jackson (2002: 38) points out "weak states are 
defined by a mirror set of opposite characteristics". The weakness of the African state 
or 'state collapse' as Zartman calls it, refers to a situation in which the structure, 
legitimate authority and political order have fallen apart resulting in the state 
becoming "paralysed and inoperative" thus no longer able to perform the functions 
required for it to be regarded as a state (Zartman, 1995: 1-5). 
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Buzan and Wrever (2003: 219) argue that the African state has been weak both as a 
state and as a power in absolute terms as well as compared to non-African states. This 
is because the African state has had little of the political, social or economic reality of 
a functioning state and has never had a chance to be fully institutionalised (Buzan 
and Wrever, 2003: 219, Tshitereke, 2003 : 83). Weak African states therefore suffer 
from a lack of institutional capacity and the inability or unwillingness of the 
government to exercise regular state functions or implement policies; resulting in 
citizens of the state being deprived of basic public services that are traditionally 
associated with independent statehood (Gros, 1996: 456, Adebajo and Landsberg, 
2000: 13, Jackson, 2002 : 39, J0rgensen, 2004: 105). The occurrence of weak and 
failed states in Africa therefore results in a "security dilemma" and thus domestic 
level security dynamics have become central in the occurrence of conflict on the 
continent (Malan, 1999: 17, Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 224). This is because the basic 
functions of the state are unable to be perfonned and regimes especially lack the 
ability to protect the basic human security and human rights of their citizens. 
The collapse of a state therefore results in that state as a decision-making, executing 
and enforcing institution no longer being able to take and implement decisions and 
therefore unable to satisfy the demands of different groups within society, resulting in 
the poverty and discontent of such groups as they feel repressed and may 1ise up 
against this (Zartman, 1995: 6-9). This spells an inevitable disaster for the African 
state as Tshitereke (2003: 84) asserts, "When the social contract between the state and 
its citizenry fails , war becomes inevitable", thus resulting in internal conflict within a 
state. This is especially a concern as Musah (2002: 916) contends that a particular 
feature of the African state has been the fact that the state has at times been the 
primary source of violence against its own people, as can be seen in Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone. This stems from the failure of the first generation of African leadership 
and the "inability to overcome the contradictions of the colonial legacy and to 
transform inherited structures to meet popular aspirations for human security and 
peaceful transfer of power" (Musah, 2002: 916). Conflict in Africa has thus resulted 
from the collapse of state political, economic and social institutions, the absence of 
legitimate means for political change, and subsequently the failure of opposition or 
resistance groups to build alternative institutions (Reno, 2001: 1 ). Because of this 
weakness of the state, a variety of non-state actors, such as warlords have stepped in 
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to play a vital role as alternate sources of social and political authority and economic 
activity (Zartman, 1995: 1-11, Buzan and Wrever, 2003: 220). 
State collapse is a long-term degenerative development and therefore needs to be 
understood within the context of the creation of the state in Africa (Zartman, 1995 : 8). 
Related to this, the framework within which the African state was created is also 
imperative as a starting point in explaining contemporary African conflict (Tshitereke, 
2003: 83, J0rgensen, 2004: 97). Although we cannot generalise about the African 
state, there is a common thread running through most post-colonial African states in 
that they share arbitrary boundaries dividing ethnicities and nations, extractionist and 
exploitative production relations with the colonial powers and repressive internal 
security apparatuses (Musah, 2002: 915). These African states share the legacy of 
colonialism and the struggle to build viable states in the aftermath of withdrawal of 
the colonial powers. The primary purpose of colonial rule in Africa was for the 
colonial powers to secure resource enclaves for raw materials (Musah, 2002: 915). 
This exploitative relationship between the African people and their colonial masters 
resulted in the formation of African states described by Clapham (2001: 8) to be the 
product of "an arbitrary colonial partition, lacking internal coherence and raison 
d 'etre, failing, dysfunctional, even collapsed". The development of the African state 
in terms of political, economic and social cohesion during this era was neglected. The 
existence of the African state can therefore be seen as contrary to the existence of 
most European states which exist as an expression of the identity of the groups of 
people inhabiting them as African states were formed as a colonial construct and had 
no other raison d 'etre, other than as a source of wealth for the colonial powers 
(Clapham, 2001 : 8-9). 
The post-colonial African state system has been described as one that has been 
"hijacked by rulers whose policies were both economically disastrous and often 
politically horrifying" (Clapham, 1995: 92). This is because in the absence of 
legitimate mechanisms for the transfer of power following colonialism, the trend in 
Africa has been towards highly personalised, non-patrimonial regimes that have had 
no interest in developing the state or uplifting the people (Buzan and Wrever, 2003 : 
219-220). The power structure of these states is often centred around a 'winner takes 
30 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
all ' arrangement in which political , social and economic life is under the central and 
personalised control ofthe ruling elite ofthe country (Annan, 1998: 4, de Waal, 2000: 
32, Tandon, 2000: 174, Cockell , 2001 : 23, Jackson, 2002: 38) . Examples of such 
states include Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire. These states have emerged 
as one-party states in which leaders become preoccupied with assuring personal 
power and regime security as they retreated into a state of "security paranoia" 
(Musah, 2002: 916). Musah, (2002: 917) contends however that the nature of such 
states and the notion of personal power and regime security, are not unique to Africa 
and have been observed as far and wide as the former Soviet Union, Argentina, Brazil 
and South Korea to name a few, who all relied on extreme state sponsored violence to 
project the state' s power. 
It has been argued by Tshitereke (2003: 84) that the African state has nothing within it 
that is 'uniquely African' as the state was an artificial construct of its Western 
counterpart. The Westphalian style state in Africa was largely created through 
protracted low intensity struggles and violent conflicts and anti-colonial wars waged 
by liberation movements against the colonial powers (Malan, 1999: 18, Tshitereke, 
2003 : 83). Once independence was attained, however, the postcolonial African state 
has in many cases been unable to sustain the unity of the different ethnic groups that 
emerged in the colonial period as there was no longer a common goal of defeating the 
colonial masters to unite the people and thus competition for control of the state 
emerged within different ethnic, regional, national or religious groups (Gambari, 
2001 : 14). Thus weak post-colonial states in Africa have typically lacked a cohesive 
national or ethnic identity (Jackson, 2002: 39). Rwanda offers a prominent example of 
this where conflict arose based on ethnic competition for control of the state between 
the Hutu and Tutsi (Lodge, 1999: 5). As the example of Somalia demonstrates 
however, the existence even of a strong common ethnic identity within a state does 
not provide a sufficient basis for the formation of a viable and legitimate state 
(Clapham, 2001: 1 0). Thus, as can be seen, contending power factions within the 
same ethnic, national or religious groups within African states have emerged all vying 
for power and control of the state and its resources . 
The nature of the African state has thus become a prominent feature contributing to 
the occurrence of conflict on the continent as Osaghae (1994: 87 -89) contends that 
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intense political conflicts are largely structural in that they tend to be endemic, and 
predisposed by the inherent nature of the African state. This inherent nature of the 
state, as discussed above, consists of "weak postcolonial states oscillating between 
dictatorship and civil war, and having their internal instabilities spill over into, and be 
played into by, their neighbours" (Buzan and Wrever, 2003 : 244). Thus, weak states 
in Africa have not only been a cause of internal conflict in Africa, but also a factor in 
the spread of regional conflict. It is especially the nature of political power in these 
weak African states that Annan (1998: 4) believes to be a major contributing factor to 
conflict in Africa as he states: 
"The nature of political power in many African states, together with the 
real and perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a 
key source of conflict across the continent . . . Where there is insufficient 
accountability of leaders, lack of transparency in regimes, inadequate 
checks and balances, non adherence to the rule oflaw, absence of peaceful 
means to change or replace leadership, or lack of respect for human rights, 
political control becomes excessively important and the stakes become 
dangerously high . . . leading to an often violent politicisation of ethnicity 
.. . Conflict in such cases becomes virtually inevitable" 
Related to the phenomenon of weak states and the issues of ethnic exclusion and 
inequality within African states is poverty. Many of the issues upon which African 
conflicts are fought arise from poverty, as poverty creates grievances and 
dissatisfaction. These can be grievances against the state for not fulfilling its duty, as 
well as grievances over the unequal distribution of natural resources and inequalities 
of wealth and political power (Tshiterke, 2003 : 87 -88). As a result of this, people will 
seek a means to reverse the situation and express their grievances often through 
violent means and such grievances arising out of such issues have tended to influence 
and exacerbate internal wars in Africa (Tshitereke, 2003: 87). The individual poverty 
of the African people is not the only issue to consider, but the poverty of the African 
state as a whole is an issue pertinent to African conflict as Tandon (2000: 187) 
contends that a significant reason for the persistence of conflict in Africa lies in the 
continuing pove11y that is created by the manner in which Africa is integrated into the 
global economy; African states have to a large extent been marginalised within this 
arena. Thus, not only is poverty an internal issue within African states, created 
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through the actions of the state, but it is also a factor for African states as a whole as 
they interact within the global political economy. Poverty is therefore an important 
factor that must be addressed within the context of preventing and resolving African 
conflict. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The nature of conflict in Africa in many respects can be seen as a consequence of 
fierce responses to the nature of the African state that comprises a lack of freedom, 
political accommodation and transparency, as well as corruption and the misuse of 
public resources for the private interests of those in power within the weak and 
inefficient African regimes (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 12, Gambari, 2001: 14). 
All these factors lead to the impoverishment and the disillusiomnent of the African 
people, which fonns an integral factor within the grassroots of African conflicts as 
different groups have reacted to their exclusion within the political and economic 
spheres within the state and the struggle for control of resources. The nature of the 
state in Africa and the underlying factors within this therefore need to be addressed 
within the context of African security in order to prevent and resolve African 
conflicts. These grassroots causes must fonn a major factor to be addressed within the 
context of international attempts by the UN in maintaining peace and security in 
Africa. As Koffi Annan (1998: 13) states: "In Africa as elsewhere, the changing 
nature of conflict requires new responses" . 
Internal conflicts in Africa in the post-Cold War era have been multi-causal and have 
been founded on political, military, economic and social factors and thus Stedman and 
Rothchild ( 1997: 28-29) argue that measures have to be implemented to address all 
these factors . Internal conflicts in Africa have proved to be much more complex than 
traditional interstate wars and have therefore required multifunctional responses 
ranging from the use of military force to humanitarian assistance (Knight, 1998: 21). 
As the causes of conflict in Africa stem from a long-term degenerative process within 
the African state, it is unrealistic to expect short cuts to secure a quick and easy 
transition from civil war to normal relations (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 33). This 
is especially evident in the African context were deep-rooted ethnic tensions and 
suspicion have fonned an integral part of the conflict. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect 
the complex conflicts that have plagued Afiican states in the post-Cold War era to be 
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resolved by short-term military interventions (Malan, 1999: 14). Cockell (2001 : 20) 
contends that since African conflicts are both dynamic and multi-causal, incorporating 
not only internal dynamics, but regional and international dynamics as well, effective 
preventive responses will have to address both the particular phase that the conflict is 
in as well as the particular causes that have characterised that phase of conflict. 
While the nature of conflict has changed in Africa, the traditional means of 
maintaining international peace and security by the United Nations tend to still be 
focused on the traditional "old war" notions of conflict and have thus not adequately 
managed to prevent or resolve African conflicts. The following chapter will examine 
the UN and the traditional ways and means that it has established to maintain 
international peace and security based upon the traditional concept of collective 
security. 
34 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER THREE 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND PEACE MAINTENANCE 
3.1 The UN as a Collective Security Organisation 
The primary purpose of the United Nations at its establishment was to deal with 
disputes and conflicts between states and threats or acts of aggression by states 
against other states (Urquhart, 1993: 1 0). The basis of this has been the concept of 
collective security. Collective security is an agreement between states to fonn an 
alliance to renounce violence and the use of force in settling disputes, while agreeing 
to joint efforts to use force against an aggressor within their group who breaks this 
agreement (Gordenker and Weiss, 1993: 4, Malan, 1999: 11). Ayoob (1993: 50) 
defines collective security as "the legitimate enforcement of the will of the 
international community by coercion where necessary against recalcitrant states". 
Collective security therefore provides for the creation of a self-regulating state system 
that aims to deter promptly, or at least end quickly, any form of destabilising military 
conflict within the international arena (Chipman, 1996: 13). Thus the emphasis of 
collective security falls within the realist paradigm in international relations based on 
the centrality of the state and conflicts among or between states. This form of 
maintaining international peace and security is ingrained within the UN Charter as 
Article 39 of Chapter VII provides for the Security Council to decide when a situation 
requires collective security action and what form that action should take (Macqueen, 
2002). 
The establishment of the UN therefore made it possible for international politics to 
move from balance of power politics, based on order and stability, to collective 
security, based on peace and security (Schoeman, 2000: 74). However the hope for a 
triumphant regime of collective security was distorted by the bipolar Security Council 
politics of the Cold War, especially manifest through the veto power of the permanent 
members (Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93: 97, Urquhart, 1993: 9). This however changed in 
the i1mnediate post-Cold War period, as there was great promise for improvement in 
the perfonnance and effectiveness of the organisation in its endeavours of maintaining 
international peace and security due to the disintegration of constraints on Western 
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action created by the countervailing power of the Soviet Union (Urquhart, 1993 : 9-10, 
Clapham, 1995: 92). The end of the Cold War is therefore viewed to have opened up 
many new opportunities for the UN in the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflict (Goulding, 1999: 161 ). The constraints placed on the UN during the Cold 
War have however been replaced by what Richmond (2001: 32) claims to be a "basic 
tension between human security and sovereign state claims and interests that are 
inherent to the international system" of the post-Cold War era. 
Gordenker and Weiss (1993 : 3) argue that the central concept of collective security 
emerged within an international political system so different from the present one that 
questions arise over the current relevance of the idea and the plausibility of its 
assumptions. This is especially relevant in relation to the contemporary nature of 
conflict in Africa and the means to prevent and resolve conflict within the paradigm 
of the failed state. The resolution of conflicts that have a distinctly domestic and 
internal nature are still within the scope of the UN Security Council, however this will 
only be the case if such a conflict according to Chapter VII of the Charter, has 
international implications in terms of a threat to international peace, a breach of the 
peace or an act of aggression (Mal an, 1999: 11 ). There is a growing need to realise 
that African internal conflicts do constitute a threat to international peace and security 
and therefore the collective security mechanisms provided for in the UN Charter 
should be extended to prevent and resolve internal African conflicts. This should be 
extended to include the renunciation of violence by states within their own borders 
and the rejection of the use of violence by states against their own people. 
3.2 Principles of UN Peace Maintenance 
"For the United Nations there is no higher goal, no deep er commitment 
and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict " 
(Annan, 1998: 2) 
Peace maintenance has been used as a "unified concept" to describe the different 
types of peace operations undertaken by the UN in its efforts to maintain international 
peace and security (Chopra, 1998: 3). The UN has established a number of peace 
maintenance methods and actions to prevent and resolve conflict. Fonner UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in his An Agenda for Peace in 1992 identified four 
main areas of action through which the UN attempts to do this . These are conflict 
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prevention and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
Another method of peace maintenance introduced in An Agenda for Peace is peace 
enforcement. 
Due to the changes within the international arena in the post-Cold War era, peace 
maintenance operations and the tasks involved have taken place under very difficult 
circumstances and have become more intensive and politically intrusive than those 
carried out during the Cold War (Chipman, 1996: 17). This has been due to the 
evolving nature of conflict and the decline of bipolar splits within the Security 
Council which has meant that the type of peace operations have also evolved in the 
post-Cold War era to include not only the military element, but also a civilian and 
humanitarian element as the tasks required have emerged to include the prevention of 
violence against individuals (Neethling, 2003: 103). Peace maintenance operations 
have therefore often called for the UN to intervene directly in the internal affairs of a 
state, essentially intervening in the relationship between the government and its 
people, and in many cases supporting popular legitimacy rather than the traditional 
claims of state sovereignty (Bertram, 1995: 392). Within this context, the UN has 
increasingly been called on to help revive failed states and thus is placed within the 
domestic politics of a state (Chipman, 1996: 19). 
This has been a controversial endeavour that has led to the debate over the issue of 
sovereignty versus the importance of human rights within the commitment of the UN 
to international peace and security. The UN Charter upholds the principle of 
sovereignty by the inclusion of Article 2, which states: "nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members 
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter". Thus, the question 
surrounding the issue of intervention in preventing conflict within a state emerges 
relating to the question of whether intervention should be endorsed in a society of 
states governed by the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and the non-use of 
force (Wheeler, 2000: 26). 
Sovereignty has in the past provided a mechanism through which states, especially in 
Africa, have claimed the right to manage their domestic power structures as they 
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wished, and thus increased their bargaining power m the international system 
(Clapham, 1995: 92) . However the question must be asked whether the traditional 
claims to sovereignty and the legitimacy of a regime are relevant in the face of the 
phenomenon of failed states in Africa. In Rwanda, Macqueen (2002: 9) argues that 
the failure of the UN to oppose ' state authority ' underlay what has subsequently come 
to be seen as one of the major failures of the entire peace maintenance endeavour -
the adherence to the concept of state sovereignty regardless of the atrocities that a 
state may be committing. 
Sovereignty protects the territorial inviolability of a state, its freedom from 
interference from others, and its authority to rule its own people (Kegley and 
Wittkopf, 1996: 101 ). In order to enjoy sovereignty however a government should be 
in control of both its affairs as well as its behaviour (Gueli, 2004: 125). Therefore 
sovereignty involves not only a right but also a duty as the violability of a state is 
based on the ability of that state to provide justice and security to all its citizens and 
thus a security dilemma has arisen within the African context as the collapse of state 
institutions has meant that the state is unable to carry out this sovereign duty (Malan, 
1999: 11 , Reno, 2001: 1, Troeller, 2001: 65). Sovereignty in the contemporary world 
is thus no longer a fixed concept based on authority and a right to non-intervention, 
but also as much about the responsibility of the state to its people (Hansen, 2000: 10, 
J0rgensen, 2004: 97). Therefore the doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty 
should no longer be a banner behind which regimes can hide, as the breakdown of the 
state' s capacity to provide for its citizens and its failure to meet its fundamental 
obligations to the whole or significant parts of its population, should also constitute a 
breakdown in that state ' s sovereignty (Deng, 1995: 214, J0rgensen, 2004: 108). 
The Security Council is the principle international organ with the legal right to 
override the claim to sovereignty according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, if it 
deems there to be action that constitutes a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace or 
an act of aggression (Malan, 1999: 11 ). This legal right should therefore be invoked in 
the face of grave human suffering as one of the core responsibilities of the UN is to 
assist people in times of crisis, especially innocent civilians as ensuring human 
secmity is one of the founding principles of the organisation (Annan, 1998: 2, 
Hansen, 2000: 20). In fulfilling this duty the Security Council should therefore be 
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obliged to declare a threat to international peace and security when people or specific 
groups deliberately kill or injure other people or specific groups on a massive scale -
as was the case in Rwanda - and to authorise effective intervention in order to end 
such atrocities (Malan, 1999: 93). This should especially be the case when a regime 
has committed atrocities against its own people as no state should be allowed to 
invoke the principle of sovereignty when it has been accused of such serious human 
rights abuses (Gueli, 2001: 141 ). This is particularly relevant within the context of 
African wars as the internal nature of these conflicts; the extent of human tragedy and 
the increased role of non-state actors belie the international threat that they constitute 
and the weakness of the argument of sovereignty when so many lives are being 
threatened. Therefore in a humanitarian emergency, especially within the African 
context of failed states, the UN cannot simply stand by and do nothing, as it is 
arguably better to try and fail than not to try at all (Clapham, 1999: 43 , Malan, 1999: 
88). 
In line with the traditional concepts of conflict and sovereignty, UN peace operations 
have typically been "state-centric, not people oriented" as the organisation has in the 
past appeared more successful in dealing with interstate rather than internal conflicts, 
and has been accused of being ill equipped to deal with internal conflicts in which 
"value differences" are the primary cause of the problem (Jett, 1999: 59, Malaquias, 
2002: 419). However, in response to the changing nature of conflicts, especially in 
Africa, traditional peace operations have undergone fundamental changes in the post-
Cold War era due to the unlocking of the Security Council as a decision making 
forum (Hansen, 2000: 8). This has facilitated the expansion and redefinition of the 
traditional concepts of security within the UN and the focus is shifting from state 
security or even regime security to include human security as regimes are increasingly 
being faced with the prospect of being held accountable for the crimes committed 
against their own people while they were in power (Richmond, 2001 : 43 , J0rgensen, 
2004: 97). Humanitarian and moral imperatives have therefore assumed a more 
prominent role in the decisions of policy makers regarding the issue of intervention as 
military force has increasingly come to be justified on humanitmian grounds (Berdal , 
2001: 56-57). This has especially become a legitimate international concern through 
the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Accords 
(Malan, 1999: 90). 
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The success of peace maintenance operations has been based on a number of 
principles and requirements. Two questions have been put forward to assess the 
success of a peace operation: firstly whether the operation prevented the occurrence of 
a violent conflict and secondly whether it helped to resolve the fundamental causes of 
the conflict (Richmond, 2001 : 34). In order for these questions to have a positive 
outcome there are certain factors that should be present. Peace maintenance 
operations require the international community to understand the complexities of a 
conflict and to promote a stable framework for a peace operation that will address the 
underlying causes of that conflict, prevent a degeneration into more violence and 
promote development as part of an overall conflict resolution strategy within the 
broader regional framework (Hansen, 2000: 25 , Tandon, 2000: 168, Guehenno, 2002: 
15). As Chipman, (1996: 11) states: "domestic conflicts present complex problems 
that ask for innovative solutions". This has been a particular concern with peace 
maintenance in Africa as operations aimed at resolving African conflicts have tended 
to focus more on the symptoms, rather than the causes of such conflicts, especially 
when these have involved civil war or genocide (Malan, 1998: 3). 
In order for a peace operation to succeed there needs to be a commitment by the 
majority, if not all the parties to the conflict to reach the conclusion that they can no 
longer achieve their objectives through military means and are committed to the 
implementation of a ceasefire and the settlement of the conflict through peaceful 
means (Carey, 1998: 26, Guehenno, 2002: 15). In line with the guiding principles of 
peace maintenance, all the key parties to the conflict must therefore consent to the 
involvement of the UN in helping resolve their dispute and they must have confidence 
in the UN being a neutral and unbiased actor (Bertram, 1995: 395, Hansen, 2000: 14, 
Guehenno, 2002: 15). 
A UN peace mission therefore requires on the one hand the co-operation and consent 
of the parties and on the other a clear and realistic political strategy and operations 
mandate by the UN, alongside the continued support and agreement of the Security 
Council, who should provide adequate financial and physical resources (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992/93 : 90, Carey, 1998: 26, Anyidoho, 2000: 90, Guehenno, 2002: 15). As 
will be shown in this thesis, these conditions were in place for the most part in 
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Mozambique, but they did not exist in Rwanda. Within the African context, UN peace 
operations in the past have been hampered by the absence of one or more of the above 
principles on the ground as well as the organisational constraints within the UN itself. 
These are factors that will be examined in more detail within the framework of the 
internal dynamics of peace maintenance operations in the following sections. 
3.2.1 Conflict Prevention, Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter provides for the pacific settlement of disputes. Article 
37 of Chapter VI indicates that the Security Council may detennine whether "the 
continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 
or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate." Conflict 
prevention and preventive diplom.acy fall under this chapter and are actions aimed at 
seeking to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict 
and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger and ease tensions 
before violence erupts and escalates into conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 3-5). Thus, 
this type of action seeks to contain and resolve the underlying causes of conflict using 
both political and diplomatic actions to diminish the likelihood of an outbreak or 
recurrence of conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 5, Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15). 
Conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy may be used in conjunction with 
peacemaking, whereby action is taken through diplomacy, limited military forces and 
civilian personnel to bring hostile parties to agreement (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 4, 
Chopra, 1998: 3). 
Peacemaking aims at helping conflicting parties to reach a ceasefire agreement in 
order to create a framework in which they can work together in building and 
consolidating peace (Gambari, 2001 : 16). This involves fact-finding missions, the 
facilitation of dialogue and negotiations, defusing tensions diplomatically, promoting 
national reconciliation and advancing respect for human rights (Annan, 1998: 6). This 
implies a continuous search for ways to overcome problems encountered during the 
implementation of the ceasefire agreements and encouraging the parties to resolve 
these differences (Gambari, 2001: 17). A major problem however faced by mediators 
during preventive diplomacy and negotiations comes in the form of "spoilers" who 
sign agreements but have no intention of living up to their obligations. In Rwanda the 
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government refused to implement key provisions of the Arusha Accords, and when 
Habyarimana finally took steps to proceed with the peace plan he was assassinated by 
hard-line elements within his own military (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 23). Thus, 
we can see that the less committed and sincere all parties are to peace, the less likely it 
is that a preventive diplomacy or peacemaking operation will succeed (Jett, 1999: 53). 
Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking have become commonly used in the post-
Cold War era, especially within the African context, as a mechanism for conflict 
resolution (Jett, 1999: 52). Peacemaking requires the mediating party to understand 
the causes of conflict as well as the concerns and hesitation of both parties and it 
requires the commitment of adequate resources (Gambari, 2001: 17). The success of 
the implementation of any further peace operations following preventive diplomacy 
and peacemaking are dependent on a clear and balanced peace plan being negotiated 
during the peacemaking phase and this peace process being agreed to by all the main 
parties involved in the conflict (Patel and Tripodi, 2001: 14 7). Once a peace plan has 
been put in motion, and all parties have agreed to it, a coordinated effort is vital in 
that there must be communication and understanding between those who have 
mediated the settlement and those who are to implement the peace agreement 
(Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 26). 
3.2.2 Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping is not specifically indicated in the UN Charter, and has been hailed as 
the invention of the UN, as 'Chapter VI and a half action (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: I 0). 
The term peacekeeping was adopted through the establishment of the UN Special 
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations following the deployment of the UN's first 
peacekeeping force in response to the Suez Crisis of 1956 (Malan, 1997:3). Since 
then, peacekeeping has been one of the main peace maintenance methods, 
consolidating conflict prevention and resolution through the deployment of a UN 
presence in the field ; with the consent of all the parties concerned, nonnally involving 
UN military personnel, police and civilians to work to monitor and verify peace, 
however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing 
agreements achieved by peacemakers (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 3-4). 
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Since there are no provisions within the UN Charter stipulating the establishment of 
peacekeeping operations, the legal basis for each operation becomes the mandate 
given to it by the Security Council (Jett, 1999: 39). There are three important guiding 
principles upon which a peacekeeping operation should be based. These are: ( 1) the 
consent of the parties to the conflict in having the UN presence; (2) the impartiality of 
the UN within the conflict zone; and (3) the non-use of force by the UN, except in 
self-defence (Chipman, 1996: 13, Carey, 1998: 14-16, Clapham, 1999: 29, Jett, 1999: 
38-39, Malan, 1999: 86, Hansen, 2000: 8-14, Nkiwane, 2000:27-28). 
Consent to some extent confers legitimacy on a peacekeeping force as it refers to the 
acceptance of such a force by the international community as well as the parties to the 
conflict (Hansen, 2000: 9). However, consent is thought of as an absolute notion and 
is a condition that can only be granted fully by the parties directly involved in the 
conflict (Mal an, 1997: 3-4 ). Furthennore, consent is ultimately something that is 
given and can therefore be withdrawn at any time (Malan, 1997: 9) . Continued 
consent is therefore essential to the successful implementation of the peacekeeping 
operation 's mandate because without continued consent the cooperation of the parties 
to the conflict is limited and the implementation of the UN 's mandate within a peace 
operation is restricted (Carey, 1998: 15). 
Impartiality is also seen as an absolute concept meaning an absence of bias on the part 
of the peacekeepers as the UN is required to act as a neutral broker between 
conflicting parties and therefore it is essential to retain the trust and confidence of the 
conflicting parties that the UN will act in this way (Mal an, 1997: 4-10, Carey, 1998: 
16). Related to impartiality is transparency, which allows the parties to become 
involved and fully aware of the UN 's presence and mandate within a peacekeeping 
operation (Malan, 1997: 4). The major issue with impartiality is evident within 
conflict were there is no clearly defined division of adversaries and therefore the 
impartiality of peace forces is difficult to maintain in a situation in which there are no 
clearly demarcated front-lines or legitimate authorities in the area of operations 
(Malan, 1997: 1 0) . Clapham (1999: 30) contends that the state-centred nature of the 
UN renders the principle of impartiality problematic within the context of internal 
conflicts, as the organisation will inevitably lean more towards the state in conflicts in 
which one party is a state and the other is not. 
43 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The non-use of force, except in self-defence principle is closely related to consent and 
impartiality as it reinforces the acceptability of a UN force as the UN is less likely to 
be seen as a direct threat to a conflicting party or be a factor in the escalation of 
violence within a conflict if it does not use force (Malan, 1997: 5). Therefore the non-
use of force by the UN may help to reinforce the consent and impartiality principles 
within a conflict zone. The use of force however will likely affect the perceived 
impartiality of a peacekeeping force by the parties to a conflict as they may see the 
UN as a further threat (Hansen, 2000: 12). The concept of the non-use of force except 
in self-defence has been extended to some extent to include not only the protection of 
UN forces , but also the defence of UN equipment and the defence of the mission ' s 
mandate (Carey, 1998: 15, Hansen, 2000: 12). 
UN peacekeeping operations continue to be based on the abovementioned principles, 
but as Malan (1999: 86), points out, these are "extremely tenuous in the tunnoil of 
[African] interstate conflicts". Despite the fact that peacekeeping has a chance of 
being effective when these basic requirements are met, no major peacekeeping 
operation in Africa, whether undertaken by the UN or any other organisation, has met 
all three of these conditions at any one time (Stedman and Rothchild: 1997: 18, 
Clapham, 1999: 29). These principles have been significantly challenged by 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, particularly because such operations have 
encountered three major organisational constraints in the form of decision-making, 
co-ordination and funding (Hansen, 2000: 17-25). Attempts at peacekeeping in the 
absence of peace or a clear desire from all the parties for UN intervention, are where 
the UN has experienced some of its most prominent failures in Africa (Jett, 1999: 36). 
Carum (1995: 122) contends that UN peacekeeping operations have been successful 
in the past more because of luck and the goodwill of the parties engaged in peace talks 
than the because of the effectiveness of the organisation and the peacekeepers. 
In the past peacekeeping mostly involved the maintenance of an agreed peaceful 
status quo, but in the post-Cold War era in Africa it has often rather involved helping 
to aid the establishment of a peace to which the conflicting parties have not yet 
necessarily agreed to (Chipman, 1996: 12). Therefore the tenn 'peacekeeping ' in 
relation to most African conflicts is a contradiction in tem1s, as this would assume 
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that there exists a peace to be kept, which in the case of African conflicts is not 
always the desired scenario. Jett (1999: 56) cites Berdal as saying that "peacekeeping 
activities become merely a substitute for addressing the root cause of ethnic and 
communal violence and are not closely linked to an ongoing political process aimed at 
conflict resolution" in which case those activities "may prolong the war itself '. Thus, 
Jett (1999: 38) argues that the classical peacekeeping mission may not be relevant in 
dealing with contemporary internal wars as these wars have not only become more 
violent in the post-cold War era, but they are also less likely to be resolved through 
negotiation. Military solutions such as those offered by peacekeeping operations can 
only offer short-term solutions to the more complex and deep-rooted social, economic 
and political domestic problems facing Africa today (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2000: 
22). Therefore there is the need for more comprehensive means of preventing and 
resolving African conflicts and these means must be more far-reaching in addressing 
the underlying factors that contribute to African conflict within the context of the 
failed state. 
3.2.3 Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding is another peace maintenance method employed by the UN, which is 
not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, but has developed from Boutros Ghali 's 
Agenda for Peace in 1992. Peacebuilding offers a move by the UN towards a more 
multi-dimensional approach to conflict prevention and resolution and is seen by some 
to be a fulfilment of the UN's original purpose (Richmond, 2001: 36). Peacebuilding 
has been referred to as "second generation engagement" and to some extent 
constitutes all the different stages of peace maintenance, as it is a post-conflict method 
aimed at preventing, alleviating and resolving conflict or a recurrence of anned 
confrontation by identifying and supporting structures to strengthen and consolidate 
peace and promote reconciliation and development in war tom societies (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992:4, Annan, 1998: 17, Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15, De Coning, 2004: 
41-45 , Mulikita, 2005: 23-24). 
Within a peacebuilding operation, security is the principal factor that must be attained 
first, as without security, progress on other activities within an operation may not be 
attainable (Mulikita, 2005: 24). Following from this, the core activities within a 
peacebuilding operation involve the monitoring of a ceasefire, disanning and 
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demobilising one or more insurgent groups and integrating them into a new national 
military and police force, the destruction of weapons and organizing or assisting in the 
implementation of free and fair national elections, strengthening state institutions, 
promoting respect for human rights and the repatriation of refugees (Boutros-Ghali, 
1992: 12, Bertram, 1995:388-389, Annan, 1998: 17, Carey, 1998: 16). Peacebuilding 
can therefore offer the opportunity to create the conditions necessary to implement 
and manage the activities that may create an environment conducive to the 
elimination of conflict and promotion of a lasting peace. 
While preventive diplomacy and peacemaking are aimed more at avoiding a crisis, 
and peacekeeping is aimed at maintaining a peaceful status quo, peacebuilding has the 
added element of attempting to prevent a recurrence of conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 
12). In order to do this, peacebuilding involves a multifaceted approach covering 
diplomatic, political and economic factors (Annan, 1998: 17). Thus it is a 
comprehensive strategy that tries to tackle all the different factors inherent within a 
conflict by building the political conditions for a sustainable peace within a country 
divided by conflict, rather than keeping or enforcing peace between hostile states or 
armed groups (Bertram, 1995: 388). Therefore peacebuilding is particularly important 
within the context of internal wars within failed states in Africa. 
Peace is not only about the absence of political violence, as the attainment of peace 
must ensure that not only the political issues are dealt with, but also the economic, 
social, cultural and humanitarian (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 16). These factors are 
important, as deficiencies in the functioning of these are often what constitute the 
underlying causes of conflict and the resultant violence, especially in Africa. 
Peacebuilding thus aims to ensure the long-tenn stability of agreements and the 
creation and enhancements of existing institutions that provide incentives for, and an 
environment in which the parties may resolve their conflicts without resorting to 
violence. Peacebuilding therefore is not only focused on the military aspect of conflict 
and the insurgents involved in the direct conflict, but also on the presumption that 
peace requires social transfonnation and development not only in the short-tenn, but 
as something that must be consolidated over time (Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15-
16). 
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Therefore an important element within peacebuilding is the promotion of 
development as a long-tem1 scheme that can be implemented before, during and after 
a conflict to ensure a more sustainable peace (Ginifer, 1997: 5). In line with this 
peacebuilding offers a longer-tenn engagement aimed at fostering conditions for 
economic and political refonn and human and social development, as well as 
deterring violence as a means of political competition (Ginifer, 1997: 3, Annan, 1998: 
17, Chopra, 1998: 6). This is done through the refonn of institutional and socio-
economic infrastructure at the local and national level to promote the resumption of 
nonnal economic activity and address the underlying causes of conflict, rather than 
just reacting to the symptoms (Ginifer, 1997: 5, Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 33 , 
Goodhand and Hulme, 1999: 15). UN peacebuilding activities in Mozambique under 
UNOMOZ offer a positive example of the success of a mission grounded on the 
assumption that the stimulation of development was central to a lasting peace process 
(Ginifer, 1997: 4) . 
Goodhand and Hulme (1999: 16) contend that peacebuilding is not one specific 
activity with a beginning and an end, but rather a process that can occur throughout all 
phases of a conflict. Therefore peacebuilding can commence at different stages within 
the peace maintenance process, such as at the stage of peacemaking or when the 
peacekeeping operation is being conducted or after its termination (Gambari, 2001: 
19). As peacebuilding offers a more multifaceted approach to peace maintenance, 
there has arisen an increasing need to address the relationship between short-term 
peacekeeping and long-term peacebuilding and development to ensure sustained 
peace (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 18). Ann an (1998: 17) believes that 
peacebuilding must be integrated into the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. This 
is especially important because peacebuilding may contribute to the short-term 
implementation of a peace settlement to provide the means of maximising the long-
term commitment of parties to those agreements and fostering development in the 
long run (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 18). In this way peacebuilding should 
provide a bridge between preventive diplomacy and peacemaking on the one hand and 
peacekeeping on the other hand. Peacebuilding offers an opportunity to create the 
conditions necessary for the creation of a successful peacekeeping operation as the 
root causes of conflict can be addressed, the combatants can be dismmed, and the 
possibility of the UN becoming actively involved in the conflict are reduced as the 
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Peace enforcement is therefore the "offensive application of coercive measures" 
(Carey, 1998: 15). The significant difference therefore between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement is that while the notion of impartiality remains an important 
element, there is a notable absence of consent in peace enforcement and the 
introduction of force into the equation (Malan, 1997: 8, 1999: 96). With the absence 
of consent, Malan (1999: 96-97) contends that peace enforcement inhabits the grey 
area between peacekeeping and war. In peacekeeping the military acts as a support 
force, assisting diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful settlement, while in peace 
enforcement the military acts impartially (without designating an enemy) as an active 
combatant with the objective of forcibly (and without consent) coercing warring 
parties to cease fighting (Corum, 1995: 131 , Berdal: 2001 : 56). Thus peace 
enforcement doctrine emphasises that force can be applied impartially if the focus of 
military action is finnly aimed at ensuring compliance with a given mandate (Berdal , 
2001 : 62). 
Corum (1995 : 130) believes that peace enforcement as a concept has failed due to the 
unsound nature of the concept itself. A major problem with peace enforcement is that 
it borders too closely on the side of war and the UN becoming an active participant in 
a conflict in which it is supposed to be an impartial player aiming to prevent and 
resolve the war rather than contributing negatively to it. Thus, Berdal (200 I: 59) 
contends that enforcement in its political and military consequences cannot be 
impartial. The use of force by the UN can in many instances become 
counterproductive, as the use of violence to essentially stop violence is by no means a 
rational action within the context of maintaining international peace and security. 
3.2.5 Regional Arrangements for Peace Maintenance 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter upholds the provision for regional arrangements for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. According to Article 52 of the 
Charter: "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional 
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that 
such arrangements and agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes 
and Principles of the United Nations". According to Article 53 it is however further 
required that" ... no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or 
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by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council". The UN has 
therefore sought to encourage cooperation with regional organisations as Malan 
(1997: 1), asserts it never intended to be the sole provider of collective security efforts 
as it aimed to include provisions for regional organisations and agencies to play a part 
in peace maintenance. 
Although regional arrangements are gaining strength within the international realm of 
peace maintenance, none has established the same legitimacy as the UN (Hansen, 
2000: 12). This is especially apparent as regional players, particularly within Africa, 
bring into the spotlight the question of impartiality as they are often a part of the 
problem, because they are directly or indirectly a party to the conflict and therefore a 
clash of interests arises within the framework of regional intervention for the 
maintenance of peace and security (Guehenno, 2002: 13). Furthermore, the UN 
Security Council has conferred upon itself the primary responsibility of maintaining 
international peace and security, and by passing on this task to regional or non-UN 
multilateral arrangements, runs the risk of losing control of an operation, and 
ultimately threatening the legitimacy of the UN in the process when things go horribly 
wrong, as was the case in Somalia (Cilliers and Malan, 1996: 340). 
3.3 The Decision-Making Processes within the UN 
According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the power to 
decide what measures shall be taken if a situation arises that it deems to be a threat to 
international peace and security. In line with this the decisions taken by the Security 
Council with regards to peace maintenance are on a consensual basis in that according 
to Article 27 of the Charter: "Each member of the Security Council shall have one 
vote". In order for the UN to carry out the decisions and recommendations of the 
Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security Article 43 of the Charter 
stipulates that UN members " . .. undertake to make available to the Secmity Council, 
on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, 
assistance, and facilities .. . necessary for the purpose of maintaining international 
peace and security". Therefore the decisions taken by the Security Council can only 
be as effective as its members allow it to be, as the basis of a vote detennines what 
action shall be taken, as well as the willingness of members to supply such facilities . 
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The deployment of any peace maintenance forces by the UN reqmres two-thirds 
support within the Security Council and the absence of a veto by any of the pennanent 
members (Clapham, 1999: 26). This veto power of the five permanent members 
within the Security Council has been an obstacle to the successful deployment of 
peace maintenance operations by the organisation. This was especially evident during 
the Cold War era when important decisions regarding the maintenance of 
international peace and security were stifled by the rival bipolar political ideologies of 
the Cold War superpowers and their allies. However, the post-Cold War period, as 
mentioned above, has removed this important constraint on the UN Security Council 
with the elimination of the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union (Bertram, 
1995:401). 
Corum (1995 : 128) contends that a major problem with UN peace operations lies 
within the higher levels of leadership within the organisation. This is due to the fact 
that within the UN system judicial and executive powers lie in the same hands, 
namely those within the Security Council - particularly the five pem1anent members 
(Hansen, 2000: 19). Therefore there is no division of power, and the act of deciding 
on action and legalising it, is one and the same (Hansen, 2000: 19). Another major 
problem with the implementation of peace operations comes in the form of what 
Omar (2000: 4) calls the "Security Council's failure to keep up with the times". 
Evidence of this lies in the fact that the UN still lacks the command and control 
capabilities to manage peace operations effectively due to its "arcane organisational 
structure and a set of cumbersome operating procedures" (Knight, 1998: 36). This is 
especially evident in the structure of the Security Council that no longer reflects the 
global realities of today as it was formed in the balance of power politics of the post 
World War II era. Countries in the developing world are currently filling a large gap 
in tenns of troop contributions to peace maintenance operations and therefore as they 
are heeding the call from the West for 'burden-sharing' , they understandably want 
greater 'power-sharing' within the UN Security Council decision-making processes 
(Guehenno, 2002: 19). 
In the consideration of options for conflict prevention and resolution, these should not 
only reflect the realities of today's global political environment, but they need to also 
reflect realistically the institutional capacity of the organisation (Cock ell, 2001: 21 ). 
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This should therefore be examined in line with the existing capacity of the UN in 
order to facilitate rapid assessment and decision-making at senior management levels 
(Cockell, 2001: 21 ). However, within the UN system there remains institutional 
competition, overlaps and poor co-ordination among key organisations involved in 
peace maintenance operations (Ginifer, 1997: 8). This is evident in the slow decision-
making and time delays within the UN that has become a major impediment to the 
adequate and timely implementation of peace operations. There is a considerable gap 
between the amount of discussion and the actual output of action by the Security 
Council when it comes to peace maintenance operations (Hawkins, 2003: 64). Also, 
the slow transition from decisions by the Security Council to the General Assembly 
has affected UN peace maintenance operations. From the time the Security Council 
takes the decision to deploy a peace maintenance operation to the time it takes the 
General Assembly to approve the budget for such an operation, the organisation ' s 
ability to deploy the operation in a timely and effective manner is severely affected 
(Carey, 1998: 16). The problems within the decision-making arena of the UN are 
closely related to the issue of the political will ofUN members. 
3.4 Political Will of UN Members 
"With political will, rhetoric can truly be transformed into reality. Withou t it, not even 
the noblest sentiments will have a chance of success " 
(Annan 1998: 27) 
Clapham (1999: 26) states: "The UN is not an autonomous actor, but the expression 
of an international consensus, to the extent that it is possible to obtain". From this we 
can deduce that the UN is only as strong as its members allow it to be as a most 
notable limit of the power and ability of the UN to carry out its mandate of 
maintaining international peace and security comes through the actions of its own 
members (Bertram, 1995: 401). This is especially evident in the lack ofpolitical will 
of individual states or groups of states both within the Security Council as well as the 
General Assembly in deploying peace maintenance operations. The lack of political 
will is especially related to the notion of national interests, as states, especially the 
dominant ones within the Security Council, remain reluctant to invoke the full force 
of international law to address issues that are not directly related to their national 
interests or within the scope of their foreign policy priorities (Malan, 1999: 92, 
Neethling, 1999: 41). Therefore the lack of political will of influential UN members is 
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a prominent factor in the Security Council ' s lack of sufficient and timely decision-
making and action in peace maintenance operations as Hawkins (2003: 62-63) points 
to the timeliness with which the Security Council responds as an indicator in 
determining the interests involved and how serious it is in resolving a crisis. As Omar 
(2000: 3) states: "Unfortunately [member states] constant talk of being interested in 
robust peacekeeping is not followed by action at the critical moment". 
Hansen (2000: 24) contends that a peace operation will only be initiated if there is a 
group of states that are willing to pay the price and have a particular interest in 
managing the conflict. Therefore summoning the necessary political will is crucial to 
the successful implementation and control of a peace maintenance operation 
(Neethling, 1999: 32, Anyidoho, 2000: 92). Each time the UN creates a peace 
maintenance operation with the absence of a standing UN force, it has to build a force 
from scratch, thus relying on the good will of member states to supply the troops and 
resources required (Carey, 1998: 16). Therefore without the necessary political will 
there can be no resources, personnel or finances to fund the implementation of a peace 
maintenance operation. This has especially been evident within the context of African 
conflict as Malan (1998: 3) points out that in the absence of political will, "luke-
warm" Western commitments to resolving African conflicts are fast growing cold. 
R wanda offers the most extreme example of this, where the lack of political will and 
interests, predominantly by the leading powers within the Security Council prevented 
the organisation from fulfilling its duty of preventing and resolving conflict as it was 
the absence of political will that in essence crippled UN operations in R wanda and 
hindered the UN's ability to reinforce the poorly equipped and relatively small UN 
operation in that country (Guehenno, 2002: 13). 
The willingness of the Security Council to fulfil its duty in the restoration of peace, 
rather than just the maintenance of peace in Africa remains very low (Hawkins, 2003 : 
70). The political will of UN members is therefore not only a prominent feature in the 
decision to implement a peace maintenance operation, but also an important factor in 
the continuance of an operation to ensure lasting peace or the demobilisation of such 
an operation. The withdrawal or threat of withdrawal of personnel of a single UN 
member from a peace operation can spell disaster for an operation (Bertram, 1995: 
402). This is especially so if that member is an integral unit within the operation, as 
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was the case in Rwanda with the withdrawal of Belgium from the operation after the 
death of ten of its peacekeepers. This severely hindered the success of UN operations 
in that country. 
3.5 Financial and Resource Constraints 
"The UN is no more than the sum of its members and available resources " 
Neethling (2001 : 47) 
The issues of resources and financial constraints, as shown above fall within the 
unending cycle of political will and the contributions and interests of member states 
within the UN system. The UN relies on donations and the willingness of its member 
states to provide the necessary funds and resources to finance operations, and these 
have fallen short of providing it with the necessary "tools to address acute conflicts" 
(Neethling, 2001: 47). This is because states will only contribute as much as it is 
within their will or interests to do so. Thus, as Bertram (1995: 415) contends, peace 
operations may be doomed to fail if member states do not provide the UN with the 
necessary resources and means to carry out its duty of maintaining international peace 
and security. 
Financial constraints are said to form one of the most crippling challenges to UN 
peace operations (Hansen, 2000: 18). This is especially pertinent in relation to the 
implementation of peace maintenance operations as N eethling (2003: 1 08) contends 
that the burden of resources lies at the heart of problems faced by past peace 
operations. Securing the financial and human resources for peace operations is a 
complex task, which can influence the ability of an operation to carry out its mandate 
effectively (Carey, 1998: 16). Financial constraints lead to logistical and 
organisational problems and not only delay the implementation of the peace process 
but they also place limitations on the activities of a peace operation, preventing it 
from pursuing a more comprehensive approach (Hansen, 2000: 18, Neethling, 2003 : 
95). Within this cycle, conflict is left to escalate while the slow decisions and lack of 
political will and resources cripple the implementation of peace operations, and this 
can lead to a more complex situation than before where more funds will be needed 
than initially anticipated (Hansen, 2000: 18), thereby making operations indeed more 
costly than they initially needed to be. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Because African conflicts differ from the traditional concepts of war and state-on-
state conflicts, a new perception of conflict resolution is required in tenus of the basic 
functions of peacekeeping and the related factors of peacebuilding and peacemaking. 
The nature of such conflicts and the surrounding enviromnent in which they are 
fought therefore need to be understood and ways and means of preventing and solving 
such conflicts need to be developed accordingly. Not only does conflict need to be 
prevented and resolved, but there is also a need to ensure that it does not reoccur. In 
ensuring this, a key issue is development and the rebuilding of institutional structures 
within failed states. The notion of sovereignty is a tenuous one in terms of the nature 
of African conflict and the nature of the failed African state. Therefore the gross 
violation of human rights and the devastation inherent in African conflicts should not 
be ignored in favour of sovereignty and non-intervention. As Malaquias (2002: 433) 
states: "The main goal of UN peace operations in Africa must be to help create the 
social, political and economic conditions for the emergence of domestically stable and 
prosperous, internationally relevant African countries. Thus far, UN peace operations 
have failed to create such conditions because they adhere to increasingly irrelevant 
notions of state sovereignty". 
The UN has a self-imposed duty to maintain international peace and security and this 
duty should not be ignored when African conflicts constitute a threat to international 
peace and security and failed states in Africa have essentially lost the basis upon 
which they can claim sovereignty. Clapham ( 1999: 26) contends that there is little to 
suggest that any other organisation could have done any better than the UN in peace 
operations in Africa. It is therefore best to attempt to make the existing UN system 
work, rather than introduce alternatives, such as regional African initiatives in 
attempting to solve African conflicts (Malan, 1998: 7). Malan (1998:7) points to the 
fact that if the only global institution tasked with the mission of maintaining 
international security is incapable of doing so, then it is surely misleading to assume 
that regional organisations will fair any better. 
Boutros-Ghali (1992/93: 95) contends that peace operations and the activities 
involved within them should not be carried out at the expense of its responsibilities 
for development as he states: "it is essential that peace and development be pursued in 
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an integrated, mutually supporting way" (Boutros-Ghali, 1992/93: 95). Peacekeeping 
by itself cannot necessarily provide a lasting solution to a conflict and it therefore 
needs to be accompanied by a wide range of peacebuilding related tasks (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992/93: 90) that Guehenno (2002 : 20) argues have not received enough 
attention. Peacebuilding with its emphasis on development should therefore be the 
most important peace maintenance operation employed within the context of failed 
and weak states in Africa. The UN needs to take a more long-term approach to 
peacebuilding and it must be viewed as a critical component of a process of peace 
maintenance in order to prevent and resolve conflict in Africa (Malaquias, 1997: 88). 
The following chapter on UN peace maintenance in Mozambique will demonstrate 
how this is possible and how the UN can succeed when the necessary peacebuilding 
tasks are present along side the traditional peacekeeping operation within the context 
of an "old war" conflict in Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OLD WARS IN AFRICA: UN PEACE MAINTENANCE IN 
MOZAMBIQUE 
"Mozambique ... is the clearest example of the success of the peacekeeping process itself'' 
(Clapham, 1999: 34) . 
4.1 Background to the Conflict in Mozambique 
Mozambique is an example of a typical post-colonial state in Africa, created by the 
fonner colonial powers to further their own interests, and embroiled in long-term 
internal conflict within the Cold War bi-polar dynamics. Schutz (1995: 112) describes 
Mozambique as a country "created by Portuguese interest, expanded by Portuguese 
appetite, and, territorially configured by the interests of the international community 
of states". From the colonial to the post-colonial period, Mozambique was entangled 
in conflict from an anti-colonial and independence war led by the Frente de 
Libertar;ao de Mor;ambique (Frelimo) against Portugal to an internal civil war 
between Frelimo and the Resistencia Nacional Mor;ambicana (Renamo ), for control 
of the state after the withdrawal of Portugal. Chabal (1996: 5-6) points to the way in 
which Portugal carried out its decolonisation process and the international context of 
the Cold War and regional context of South Africa' s hegemony as key historical 
factors to explain why Mozambique was embroiled in such conflict for so long. Thus 
there has existed an internal, regional and international dimension to conflict in 
Mozambique as not only was the conflict detennined along internal factors, but also 
by the regional and international factors stirring around it, as Clapham (1999: 34) 
contends, Mozambique was a classic example of the "extremely messy kind of 
conflict - part domestic, part international, part ethnic, part ideological, and militarily 
unresolvable". 
On the 25 April 1974 a military coup occurred in Portugal and as a result, the 
decolonisation and independence of Portugal ' s colonies was to be realized. With the 
signing of a ceasefire in Mozambique between Frelimo and the Portuguese 
Govenunent on the 7 September 1974, the country was declared independent 
(Thomashausen, 2003: 273). Malaquias (2002: 423) believes that the collapse of the 
Pmiuguese colonial regime in 1974 set the scene for major transfonnations within 
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southern Africa that eventually led to the process of democratic changes within the 
region. However, as mentioned above, in the interim, the process by which this 
decolonisation occurred in the country is a major factor lying at the root of conflict in 
Mozambique. Portuguese decolonisation in Africa occurred fifteen years later than 
French and British decolonisation and it was achieved by means of anti-colonial 
struggles through guerrilla warfare, as seen with Frelimo in Mozambique (Chabal, 
1996: 6). The departure of the Portuguese had a devastating effect on the state as on 
their sudden exit the Portuguese destroyed whatever they could before dismantling the 
material base of the Mozambican state and depriving it of their much needed skills, 
ultimately leaving Mozambique in a state of "relative deprivation" (Schutz, 1995: 
1 09-115). Added to this, the agreement signed between Portugal and Mozambique 
provided for all sovereign power to be transferred directly to Frelimo with no 
provision for future elections or any other procedure to allow for a change in power 
reflecting the desire of the people in any future system of government 
(Thomashausen, 2003: 277). 
Mozambique after independence thus became a "singularly statist one party state" as 
Frelimo consolidated its power, while continuing its guerrilla strategy into the post-
independence period and ruling by the politics of exclusion (Chabal , 1996: 11 , 
Thomashausen, 2003: 277). When Frelimo came to power it relied on popular rural 
support but its influence had not yet reached the majority of the population and its 
message remained unheard by most of the people (Schutz, 1995: 113 ). Therefore 
Schutz ( 1995: 109-113) contends that while Frelimo had at that time attained a 
semblance of "revolutionary legitimacy", due to its anti-colonial anned struggle 
against Portugal, it had not yet achieved "popular legitimacy", and in order to do so 
had to reach more people to convince them that they were the legitimate government. 
Frelimo's rule was in many instances brutal and destructive, resulting in a mass 
exodus of over 200 000 mostly skilled Mozambicans, particularly of Portuguese 
descent, growing political dissent amongst the urban middleclass, boycotts and 
sabotage against government policies by the traditional leadership in the interior and 
the collapse ofthe Mozambican economy (Thomashausen, 2003: 280). 
The most visible feature in the resistance to Frelimo's rule was manifest in the 
creation of Renamo, an anti-govenunent, anned opposition group fom1ed in Rhodesia 
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that pushed Frelimo and Mozambique into an internal war almost immediately 
following independence. Although Renamo ruled over a large, populated area of the 
country, had a working political-military apparatus and an organised, although 
primitive, economy, it lacked a political tradition and military capacity 
counterbalanced by any clear ethnic or regional identity, emerging initially with no 
clear ideology or direction but that of engaging the Frelimo government in a "violent 
and destructive war" (Malaquias, 1997: 89, Oyebade, 1998: 152, Macqueen, 2002: 
165). Renamo ' s tactics throughout its period of rebellion were "brutal, insensitive and 
pointless", and the war that engulfed Mozambique has been labelled among the most 
vicious and violent within Africa (Schutz, 1995: 117, Clapham, 1999: 35, Chachiua, 
1999: 3). While Frelimo claimed that the war was the cause of all its problems, 
Renamo believed that the war was as a result of Frelimo's actions and a consequence 
of the absence of legitimate and democratic leadership and economic mismanagement 
in the country (Thomashausen, 2003 : 295). 
Renamo was ultimately challenging the authority and legitimacy ofFrelimo 's rule and 
the capacity of the state to control its territory, and in so doing, challenging the 
legitimacy of the Mozambican state (Chabal , 1996: 5, Malaquias, 1997: 89, 
Macqueen, 2002: 104). These claims were justifiable in the fact that by the end ofthe 
1980's the Frelimo regime was barely functioning, rapt by widespread corruption and 
economic mismanagement, and the concept of a 'Mozambican state ' had become a 
contentious notion as the state teetered on the verge of collapse (Malaquias, 1997: 88, 
Macqueen, 2002: 154). Frelimo was also increasingly losing legitimacy due to the 
inability of the military to fight and protect the Mozambican people (Schutz, 1995: 
117). This was a major factor for Mozambique on the path to becoming a failed state 
as without popular confidence in its military and the capacity of the state to defend the 
state as well as its population, the Frelimo government began to fail the ultimate test 
of legitimate government (Schutz, 1995: 118). 
The ' statehood' of Mozambique was a further issue in question as the Mozambican 
state was described by some as a "quasi-state" in that Mozambique's statehood was 
based on a tacit acceptance by the international system that Mozambique should be 
publicly acknowledged and treated as a state despite doubts over its level of 
"stateness" in tenns of its internal conduct and capacity (Macqueen, 2002: 24). 
59 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Conflict therefore emerged in Mozambique as a response to these factors as conflict 
derived from the "outcome of the degeneration of politics . .. [and] the outcome of a 
political process where violence has become endemic" (Chabal, 1996: 8). 
Furthennore conflict in Mozambique thus derived in part from the failure of Frelimo 
to "deliver adequately on [its] early promises and to make headway with inter-
regional , pan-ethnic 'nation-building' projects" (Macqueen, 2002: 23). 
In 1977 Frelimo adopted a hard-line radical Marxist-Leninist approach alongside an 
unequivocal alignment with the Soviet bloc and an inflexible hostility towards the 
Western powers (Schutz, 1995: 114, Thomashausen, 2003 : 281). This decision 
ultimately meant that Frelimo, on behalf of Mozambique had decided to join the Cold 
War, resulting in the disapproval and displeasure within many quarters, not least of all 
within the neighbouring governments of South Africa and Rhodesia, as well as further 
abroad within the United States (Schutz, 1995: 114-116, Barnes, 1998: 160). As a 
result of the Soviet alignment, regional neighbours reacted harshly, particularly South 
Africa who embarked on an extensive military campaign to destabilise Maputo 
through direct military attacks, tactical intelligence operations in Mozambique and 
enhanced training and support for Rename who were allowed to operate from within 
South African territory (Schutz, 1995: 116). This managed to aggravate the conflict as 
Mozambique came to be viewed by the international community as a by-product of 
South Africa's regional destabilisation initiatives in southern Africa and therefore 
gained the support of the UN and the international community who viewed 
Mozambique as a victim ofthis process (Barnes, 1998: 161). 
Within the regional context however, it was not only the South African government 
that reacted against the Frelimo regime but also the Rhodesian government who 
carried out direct attacks against Mozambican territory in reaction to Frelimo ' s 
support and provision of bases to Zimbabwean freedom fighters, and in turn the 
Rhodesian government provided covert support and training to Renamo in order to 
destabilise the Frelimo government (Barnes, 1998: 160). Conflict in Mozambique 
therefore offers a typical example of a proxy conflict in which external actors backed 
their respective clients within the civil war in the country and Mozambique therefore 
bares the legacy of both the Cold War and Apartheid destabilisation (Malaquias, 
1997: 87, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 167). Thus, coupled with the internal factors 
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inherent within Mozambique, the conflict became a "regional expression of the Cold 
War politics which dominated the international enviromnent" (Alden, 1995: 1 03). 
Thus the internal conflict in the country took on a regional dimension. 
On 8 January 1983, Mozambican President Machal announced his willingness to 
' convert' from socialism as he realised that the war that was beginning to engulf the 
country could not be resolved without the support of Western powers (Thomashausen, 
2003 : 281). Frelimo was thus prepared and able to manipulate the Cold War tensions 
between the West and East to its own advantage as and when it suited it to align with 
one side or the other. On the 16 March 1984 Mozambique and the South African 
government signed the Nkomati Accord, which was a non-aggressive pact between 
the two countries whereby Frelimo was to cease support for the African National 
Congress (ANC) against the South African government and Pretoria would cease 
support for Renamo in Mozambique (Thomashausen, 2003: 283). Chissano and Botha 
also subsequently signed the Songo Agreement, reactivating the Nkomati Accord, 
following which South Africa finally ceased providing official support for Renamo 
(Venancio, 1993: 146). 
The end of the Cold War marked a decisive turning point for the conflict in 
Mozambique. With the imminent withdrawal of Soviet aid, Frelimo was forced into a 
more serious recognition of Renamo, coupled with an ever-declining economy, which 
accentuated Renamo's military advantage (Venancio, 1993: 146). Chapman (1995: 
16) contends that the psychological impact of the cessation of the Cold War was a 
decisive factor in pushing the leaders of both Frelimo and Renamo to the negotiating 
table. Changes within the regional environment, particularly transformations in the 
governments of South Africa and Rhodesia were also significant push factors for the 
end of conflict in Mozambique (Chapman, 1995: 16). Renamo lost its former allies 
with the end of minority rule in Rhodesia in 1980 and with the added loss of South 
African support, and finally the end of apartheid, it was left with no significant 
external support and was therefore also forced to view the prospect of a negotiated 
peace settlement with Frelimo in a different light (Venancio, 1993: 146, Chapman, 
1995: 16, Oyebade, 1998: 152, Clapham, 2001 : 13). 
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Thus in the dying days of the Cold War, a climate of "war weariness" had begun to 
pervade Mozambique (Oyebade, 1998: 152-153). Both Frelimo and Romano forces 
increasingly lacked the will as well as the resources to continue fighting and many no 
longer even understood the rationale behind the war, resulting in a "mutually hurting 
stalemate" in Mozambique (Venancio, 1993: 148, Barnes, 1998: 166, Thomashausen, 
2003: 297). Added to the political changes within the region, the environmental 
factors were increasingly devastating the country further and acting as a push factor 
for both parties to move towards a resolution of conflict. In 1992 a devastating 
drought swept over southern Africa and placed additional pressure on both parties as 
they struggled to feed their civilian populations (Barnes, 1998: 162). As Oyebade 
(1998: 152) states: "starvation had killed the appetite for war in Mozambique". The 
United Nations - Southern African Development Coordination Conference (UN-
SADCC) Appeal for the Drought Emergency in Southern Africa (DESA) estimated 
that 3.1 million Mozambicans were in need of immediate relief assistance, of which at 
least half a million of these were in Rename-controlled areas to which there was little 
or no access (Barnes, 1998: 162). 
In Mozambique there were thus what Schutz (1995: 123) labels a "favourable 
confluence of external and internal factors" that forced Frelimo and Renamo into a 
negotiated settlement to end the conflict. The absence of internal natural resources in 
Mozambique and the withdrawal of support of external patrons after the Cold War 
was a major factor in the facilitation of the end to conflict. In the i1mnediate post-Cold 
War period and the end of apartheid in South Africa, no major external power had the 
desire or interest in helping to maintain the conflict (Clapham, 1999: 35). The end of 
the Cold War thus facilitated the deployment of a peace operation within the country 
as transformations within the Soviet Union and South Africa provoked a crisis for 
both Frelimo and Renamo as their ideological and logistical support from these bases 
dissipated (Alden, 1995: 103, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 167). The first initiative 
for the reform of Mozambique and the path to peace came in the fonn of proposals 
from the Frelimo government. The most significant of these proposals were the 
resolution of the civil war through a negotiated settlement and the introduction of a 
multi-party democracy (Macqueen, 2002: 154). 
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4.2 The General Peace Agreement in Rome: July 1990 to October 1992 
It was the international community that played a crucial role in the facilitation of the 
General Peace Agreement (GP A) signed between Frelimo and Renamo in October 
1992 and the creation of an environment in which a ceasefire could be signed and 
elections held (Chapman, 1995: 6). Not only was there political pressure on the two 
parties, but also financial incentives presented as Western pledges of money played a 
part in pushing Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo to sign the GP A (Malaquias, 
1997: 91 ). While the United States and South Africa formed the backbone of 
international pressure for Frelimo and Renamo to steer towards negotiations, it was 
particularly the Roman Catholic Church and the Italian government that were at the 
forefront of international efforts to ensure a location and environment were peace 
could be negotiated (Venancio, 1993: 148). 
The first set of direct meetings between Frelimo and Renamo took place in Rome in 
July 1990 with the Italian government providing most of the necessary diplomatic 
resources while the Roman Catholic Sant'Egidio community - a non-governmental 
organisation that had been involved in development work in Mozambique - provided 
the location for negotiations and played a critical role as an unofficial mediator 
(Barnes, 1998: 161, Clapham, 1999:34, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 167, Patel and 
Tripodi, 2001: 147, Macqueen, 2002: 154). In 1984 the Catholic Church, as part of a 
"coherent and calculated strategy" had begun to call for a peace based on dialogue 
and placed itself in a unique position between Renamo and Frelimo that formed the 
basis for its mutually accepted role as a neutral non-state mediator between the two 
belligerents (Venancio, 1993: 144-150). The UN did not have any major role within 
the negotiation process of the GP A and was brought in at a relatively late stage of the 
process as an official observer in June 1992, in order to decide on the role that the UN 
would play in the future verification of the agreement (Bames, 1998: 161 , Clapham, 
1999: 34, Macqueen, 2002: !55). 
During the negotiations Renamo insisted on being recognised as a political force, 
while Frelimo insisted on being recognised as the sole legitimate government 
(Venancio, 1993 : 148). Both of these wishes were addressed to some extent because 
while the GP A recognised the Mozambican government, its institutions and laws, the 
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signing of the GP A also elevated Renamo to the international stage alongside Frelimo 
and advanced the organisation to the status of an equal party with a state in an 
international agreement (Barnes, 1998, Thomashausen, 2003 : 296). Therefore as 
Venancio (1993: 151) contends; the peace talks in Rome were "no longer simply the 
government of Mozambique negotiating with a gang of renegades; now it was a 
negotiation of equals". 
The GP A addressed the causes and factors within the conflict first as a prerequisite for 
the implementation of a general ceasefire, rather than as a consequence of a ceasefire 
agreement (Thomashausen, 2003: 293 ). The GP A stipulated that a ceasefire was to 
come into effect not later than 15 October 1992 and this was to be followed by the 
separation of the Renamo and Frelimo forces and their concentration within assembly 
areas as well as their demobilisation (UNDPI, 2001: 2). The GPA also called for the 
complete demobilisation of all existing forces and simultaneously for the joint 
recruitment and establishment of a much smaller and entirely new Mozambique 
Defence Force, the holding of elections and a democratically elected government 
(Thomashausen, 2003 : 293). The Agreement was finally signed in Rome on 4 October 
1992 ending the war in Mozambique and beginning the fonnal transition of the 
country to peace. The UN was, at the request of both Renamo and Frelimo, given the 
major task as the central actor in the implementation of this agreement, providing 
technical assistance for the ceasefire and demobilisation, monitoring the elections and 
the transformation to democracy and providing humanitarian assistance (Alden, 1995: 
103, Bames, 1998: 161, UNDPI, 2001 : 1-2, Macqueen, 2002: 155). 
4.3 UN Response to Conflict in Mozambique: Internal Debate and Political Will 
Chapman ( 1995: 16) argues that by 1993 the UN was desperately looking for a 
success story following its high profile failures of peace operations in Somalia and 
Angola, which highlighted the urgent need for the UN to justify its existence as the 
maintainer of international peace and security, particularly within the African context. 
The UN reaction to conflict in Mozambique and the subsequent operations in the 
country therefore benefited from the UN's "institutional memory" of the failure of 
these operations and they thus acted as a push factor for UN involvement in 
Mozambique and the Secretary General's desire not to repeat the mistakes made 
specifically in Angola, where the electoral phase of the peace settlement began before 
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the process of full military disengagement and demilitarisation had been fully 
implemented (Alden, 1995: 106, Chabal, 1996: 5, Malaquias, 1997: 94, Nkiwane, 
2000: 30, Macqueen, 2002: 159). Thus the UN was determined to ensure that the 
electoral phase of operations was not to be implemented until all soldiers were fully 
demobilised. On the 3 December 1992 the Secretary General submitted an operational 
plan to the Security Council for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ). Here he expressed his belief that it would not be possible to create the 
conditions for successful elections in Mozambique unless the military situation was 
brought fully under control, and the GP A would not be implemented unless Frelimo 
and Renamo made a concerted effort to honour their obligations and commitments 
under the Agreement (UNDPI, 2001: 4) as he stated: "In light of the recent experience 
in Angola, I believe it to be of critical importance that the elections should not take 
place until the military aspects of the agreement have been fully implemented" 
(Alden, 1995: 106). 
Despite initial problems within the Security Council in tenns of the financing of the 
proposed operations, shortly after the GP A was signed the General Assembly 
approved a budget of$ 140 million to finance the initial stages of a peace operation 
and the first steps to deploy 5,500 peacekeepers to Mozambique (Malaquias, 1997: 
94, Macqueen, 2002: 157). According to Resolution 782 of 13 October 1992, the UN 
was to establish a team of military observers and on the 15 October 1992, the day the 
GP A came into force, the interim Special Representative Aldo Ajello and a team of 
21 military observers drawn from existing UN peacekeeping missions arrived m 
Mozambique (UNDPI, 2001: 2) . On 16 December 1992, the Security Council m 
suppmi of the Report of the Secretary General of 3 December 1992 app~oved and 
passed Resolution 797 officially establishing ONUMOZ under a Chapter VI mandate. 
This Resolution called upon the Mozambican government and Renamo to co-operate 
fully with UN operations and to respect the ceasefire and all cmmnitments entered 
into under the GP A, while calling for UN members to respond positively to the 
requests for organisational and logistical contributions towards a peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding operation (S/RES/797, 1992: 1-2) 
UN members provided active and unified political support in encouragmg both 
Renamo and Frelimo to implement the GPA (Carey, 1998: 18). The international 
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community also pledged $760 million towards an economic recovery plan at a 
conference sponsored by the World Bank in December 1992 and the Italian 
government pledged a further $402 million in support of the demobilisation and 
electoral processes (Alden, 1995: 1 05). The largest donors in humanitarian and long-
term development programmes were the US, Britain, the European Community, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Switzerland (Bames, 1998: 
167). Even the financial resources necessary to carry out a number of tasks that were 
not funded under the initial budget of ONUMOZ were supplied (Carey, 1998: 18). 
These tasks such as the provision of funds to enable Renamo to participate in the 
electoral process, the reintegration of displaced persons and demobilised soldiers and 
the formation of a unified anny, were essential to the implementation of the peace 
agreement and the success of ONUMOZ (Carey, 1998: 18). Thus political and 
financial support by UN members for operations in Mozambique appears to have been 
forthcoming without any major difficulties or debates. From the negotiations of the 
GP A to the deployment of ONUMOZ, the international community was actively 
involved within all stages of the peace process. 
4.3.1 The Deployment of ONUMOZ: October 1992- December 1994 
ONUMOZ is one of the clearest examples of the success and importance of the 
multidimensional UN peace maintenance process involving the implementation of a 
Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, accompanied by the complementary programmes 
within a peacebuilding operation, and a range of diplomatic and humanitarian 
assistance initiatives that worked side by side to build and maintain a political, 
economic and social environment to consolidate a lasting peace (Bames, 1998: 159-
160, Clapham, 1999: 34 ). ONUMOZ therefore extended the boundaries of traditional 
peacekeeping both operationally and conceptually in that it was given a largely non-
military mandate within the multifunctional peace operation (Potgieter, 2000: 31 ). An 
important point to note is the fact that both Renamo and Frelimo had requested the 
implementation of the peacekeeping operation through the GP A, thus implying the 
principle of consent. Furthermore this implied that the implementation of a Chapter 
VII peace enforcement operation was not necessary. 
The UN played a key role in all aspects of the peace process in Mozambique, as 
ONUMOZ was able to establish a central controlling and co-ordinating position in the 
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country (Clapham, 1999: 34, Malaquias, 2002: 423). In being in charge of all aspects 
of the peace operations from the military through to the political and humanitarian 
aspects, this meant that co-ordination and co-operation of all aspects were therefore 
more easily maintained and ensured. To do this ONUMOZ planners pooled the 
resources, knowledge and already established networks of the different NGOs and 
foreign development assistance projects already at work in Mozambique in order to 
carry out the humanitarian assistance programmes effectively without duplicating or 
overlapping responsibilities between all the agencies involved within the country 
(Alden, 1995: 109). 
The UN Secretary General 's Special Representative (UNSGSR) Aldo Ajello was able 
to call on the support of a "remarkably united international community" (Clapham, 
199: 35). Up to thirty-five states provided troops, military observers, civilian police 
and election monitors, with Italy, Bangladesh, Uruguay and Zambia providing the 
most substantial contingents (Macqueen, 2002: 158). However, there were internal 
delays within the UN system in the deployment of these forces as difficulties arose in 
securing these troops from member states and deploying them in a timely manner 
(Carey, 1998: 18). Military personnel were not deployed in significant numbers and 
the military infrastructure of ONUMOZ was not fully established until May 1993 - six 
months after the resolution for ONUMOZ was passed - and only coming to its full 
initial strength of 6000 in late July of that year (UNDPI, 2001: 7, Adebajo and 
Landsburg, 2001: 168, Macqueen, 2002: 157). 
Related to the internal delays, was the fact that the Frelimo government was slow and 
reluctant to conclude the customary status of forces agreement with the UN, which 
allowed for the necessary immunities for ONUMOZ personnel and operations, and 
despite pressure from New York, the agreement was only finally concluded in May 
1993 (Macqueen, 2002: 157). However, these initial obstacles have been viewed as 
not essentially a problem because as much as time is a critical element in 
implementing a peace operation quickly, it can also be a positive factor as the delayed 
response to a situation may affect the operation positively. Aldo Ajello believes that 
the seven months it took the UN to field substantial numbers of troops was useful 
because it gave Renamo time to organise as a political party and to lay a foundation 
and create the conditions necessary for implementing the GP A (Jett: 1999: 56). 
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ONUMOZ sought to ensure that the conditions for a lasting peace were put in place 
and that peace could be sustained long after the elections. In carrying out this task, 
ONUMOZ had a relatively simple mandate including within it the interrelated tasks of 
military, political, electoral, humanitarian and administrative components, as well as a 
Technical Unit on Demobilisation (Barnes, 1998: 164, Aldrich, 2000: 5, UNDPI, 
2001: 4). As called for in the GPA, ONUMOZ had a wide-ranging military role in 
monitoring and verifying the ceasefire, the separation, concentration and 
demobilisation of the armed forces , the collection, storage and destruction of 
weapons, the monitoring of complete withdrawal of foreign forces and disbanding of 
all private and irregular armed groups, the provision of security in the four transport 
corridors, as well as providing security for UN and other international activities in 
support of the peace process (UNDPI, 2001: 5). The UN insisted on flexible 
mechanisms to help carry out this mandate and when it became apparent that the 
timeframe set forth for the operation would not be met, the deadlines for ONUMOZ 
were extended without having to expand the mandate (Malaquias, 1997: 94, Aldrich, 
2000: 5). Thus ensuring adequate time and the necessary attention to fulfil all tasks set 
out within the mandate. 
Humanitarian activities formed a major part of ONUMOZ's overall responsibilities in 
Mozambique as it became clear that the maintenance of peace would be closely linked 
to the effectiveness of the humanitarian programmes and thus the military factors of 
the UN operations corresponded directly alongside the humanitarian efforts (Barnes, 
1998: 163, UNDPI, 2001: 5, Macqueen, 2002: 158). This was because as the 
disarmament and assembly of the soldiers occurred, they were immediately in need of 
food and other relief support (UNDPI, 2001: 5). Added to this was the need for 
ONUMOZ to respond to the reintegration needs of all Mozambicans, especially those 
returning to resettle in their original communities, as the failure to do so could 
increase tensions amongst the people and place additional strain on resources within 
the country (UNDPI, 2001: 12). In order to achieve this, the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, especially to Renamo controlled areas was a critical element in the "side-
payments" needed to keep Renamo on board the peace process so that the UN could 
have access to these areas and continue its efforts throughout the country (Clapham, 
1999: 34). 
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Therefore a unique factor within ONUMOZ was the involvement of humanitarian 
assistance agencies within the different aspects of the demilitarisation process (Alden, 
1995: 1 09). ONUMOZ was the first major UN operation in which the Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs could be included within the apparatus along side the 
Department of Peacekeeping (UNDP) and the Department of Political Affairs 
(UNDPA) (Barnes, 1998: 163). The key agency on the humanitarian side of UN 
operations in Mozambique was the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance Co-
ordination (UNOHAC), which was established at the international donors conference 
in December 1992 under the Declaration on Guiding Principles for Humanitarian 
Assistance signed between Frelimo and Renamo on the 16 July 1992, and was 
administratively under the control of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (Alden, 
1195: 11 0). Thus humanitarian assistance co-ordination was placed "firmly within a 
peacekeeping context in which neutrality and impartiality [in the assessment of need 
and the delivery of assistance] were part of the modus operandi" and thus the 
"humanitarian programme concretised the peace for many rural Mozambicans" 
(Barnes, 1998: 162-167). 
The UN worked closely and personally with both parties to the conflict and included 
them in all the different aspects of the peace process. This was done through the 
creation of different commissions set up for the implementation of the GP A 
(Malaquias, 1997: 94). The two key commissions were the Supervision and Control 
Commission (CSC) and the Ceasefire Commission. The CSC held primary 
responsibility for the implementation and interpretation of the GP A, the everyday 
management of the transition process, the settlement of disputes that might arise 
between the parties and it was to direct and co-ordinate the activities of the other 
commissions (Alden, 1995: 104, Malaquias, 1997:3, UNDPI, 2001: 3). Related to the 
CSC, the Cease-Fire Commission was set up to deal with incidents, complaints and 
alleged violations of the agreement from both sides and charged with the task of 
approving the location of the assembly areas, the procedures for cantomnent as well 
as troop movements and conduct within the assembly areas (Alden, 1995: 106, 
Malaquias, 1997: 95, Bames, 1998: 171). Other Cmmnissions included the 
Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilising Military Personnel and the Joint 
Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force. These 
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Commissions were chaired by the UN and included within them Renamo, Frelimo 
and representatives of other external states. 
4.3.2 Demobilisation and Peacebuilding 
The demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration processes were an extremely 
important factor for the future of peace in Mozambique. This fonned perhaps the most 
important element within the peacebuilding role of the UN, as the demobilisation and 
reintegration of soldiers were preconditions for the holding of elections, the social and 
economic development within Mozambique and the future of political peace within 
the country, as Ajello commented: "Lesson number one: no elections without 
demobilisation" (Bertram, 1995 : 399). The first component of the demilitarisation 
phase was to begin with the introduction of UN forces to monitor the phased pull out 
of Malawi an and Zimbabwean troops from the transport corridors across Mozambique 
(Alden, 1995: 116). The UN also had primary responsibility for the management and 
implementation of the registration, encampment and demilitarisation of up to 100 000 
Frelimo and Renamo troops as well as the creation of a new national anny with equal 
numbers drawn from both Frelimo and Renamo forces (Alden, 1995: 105, Malaquias, 
1997: 95). Added to this, the UN had the task of monitoring the ceasefire agreement 
between Renamo and Frelimo. However, the majority of reported violations of the 
agreement did not concern accusations of shooting or attacks but rather the movement 
of troops as both Renamo and Frelimo 's regular shifting of troops was in anticipation 
and response to uncertainty within the peace process, particularly within the context 
of the upcoming demobilisation and elections (Alden, 1995: 117). 
In November 1993, Renamo and Frelimo forces where to be concentrated in the 
assembly areas and final demobilisation was to begin in January 1994, with half the 
process to be completed by March and the rest by May, with the new national army to 
be deployed by September (Macqueen, 2002: 160). Because of the reluctance of both 
Frelimo and Renamo, all areas were not opened to the UN until late February (Jett, 
1996: 4) . This was due to the reluctance of both Renamo and Frelimo to disarm fully 
due to their need to "preserve their recourse to military force" if war resumed after the 
elections (Jett, 1996: 4) . Therefore demobilisation only fonnally began in April 1994 
and by July 1994, two months later than anticipated; the demobilisation process was 
virtually complete (Barnes, 1998: 171 , Macqueen, 2002: 160). 
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The demobilisation process was one of the most closely monitored elements of 
ONUMOZ, especially due to the fact that this had to take place before the national 
elections were held (Bertram, 1995: 399, Malaquias, 1997: 95). ONUMOZ was 
therefore the first time that it was recognised within a UN operation that 
demobilisation was not solely the responsibility of the military component of the 
operations, as the military had the task of disarming the soldiers and verifying the 
process, while a Technical Unit assumed responsibility for the overall organisation of 
the process (Bames, 1998: 164). The Technical Unit thus had the responsibility for 
the "delicate set of procedures entailed in demilitarisation" (Alden, 1995: 1 07). 
Troop cantonment commenced on the 30 November 1993 (UNDPI, 2001 : 1 0) . The 
Technical Unit recognised that the period of cantomnent was an important time to lay 
the foundation for the psychological, economic and social reintegration of the ex-
combatants into society and thus it planned a number of social adjustment 
programmes and activities to keep the combatants entertained and informed 
throughout this process (Alden, 1995: 108, Malaquias, 1997: 95). The GPA set up a 
Commission on Reintegration (CORE) chaired by the UN to undertake the planning, 
organisation, supervision and monitoring of these programmes, covering three phases 
of the process; namely the demobilisation phase, the reinsertion phase and the actual 
reintegration phase (Bames, 1998: 171-172). 
The reinsertion phase in general, begins with demobilisation and runs through to the 
moment when the demobilised soldier and his family are transported and settled into 
their home area (Bames, 1998: 173). In Mozambique, the Technical Unit was to co-
ordinate the activities within this phase alongside the International Organisation for 
Migration and these activities included the transport of ex-combatants to their chosen 
destination, provision of civilian clothing, seed and agricultural tool kits, and financial 
assistance provided by the government for when they left the assembly area and 
returned home (Alden, 1995: 108-120, Bames, 1998: 173). Programmes set up for the 
social reintegration and development of soldiers included; civic education 
programmes that consisted of health education, literacy classes, sports and cultural 
activities as well as infonnation for soldiers concerning the nature of the peace 
process and their tights, duties and entitlements within this process (Alden, 1995 : 108, 
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Bames, 1998: 172). Programmes were also set up to provide vocational and 
entrepreneurial training and supply kits for self-employment, thus teaching ex-
combatants the skills needed to encourage the transition from the life of a soldier to 
that of a civilian away from the conflict (Alden, 1995: 119, Barnes, 1998: 173). 
The UN through a Trust Fund administered by the UNDP aimed to provide soldiers 
with reasonable assurance of financial support for an extended period of time during 
which they could be reintegrated back into their communities (Alden, 1995 : 119). 
Therefore once home, the ex-combatant received a three months food ration, another 
three months pay cheque from the government, and after four months started 
receiving a further subsidy for another eighteen months (Barnes, 1998: 173). These 
financial incentives were recognised as an important factor in persuading the two 
parties to increase troop movement into the assembly areas in order to speed up the 
demobilisation process (Barnes, 1998: 172). The success of this initiative was 
demonstrated in the fact that once soldiers knew the benefits of demobilisation, ninety 
seven percent of them were willing to be demobilised (Barnes, 1998: 173). However, 
as much as this was a success in the direction of demobilisation for ONUMOZ it 
created problems in the formation of the new army, as the benefits of demobilising 
appeared to far outweigh the benefits of remaining in the army. Therefore substantial 
delays occurred regarding the selection of troops for the new national army as despite 
the desire by the government and Renamo to have a large anny, the vast majority of 
soldiers wished to rather demobilise than become a part of this (Alden, 1995: 117-
120, Carey, 1998: 18). 
Not only was the reintegration of soldiers an important element within the peace 
process, but also the reintegration of civilians who had fled the conflict, formed an 
important part of ONUMOZ activities in Mozambique. The repatriation of refugees 
was viewed as an important factor as the influx of returning exiles once peace was 
attained was likely to place strain on the already stretched capacity of the existing 
resources and institutions designed to cope with emergency situations (A1den, 1995: 
I 09). While officials were still negotiating agreements and developing programmes 
for the return and repatriation of refugees, many had already began to return in large 
numbers with 150, 000 Mozambicans making their way back in the year following the 
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signing of the GP A and by April 1994 almost I ,5 million refugees and over 2 million 
internally displaced Mozambicans had returned home (Alden, 1995: 122). 
While ONUMOZ was successful in the demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers, 
the demilitarisation process was not entirely successful, as there still remained a vast 
number of anns within the country. This was especially due to the fact that ONUMOZ 
failed to negotiate an anns embargo on Mozambique at the time of the 
implementation of the GP A and therefore while the UN was attempting to implement 
disannament, arms were potentially still flowing into the country via external sources 
to Frelimo and Renamo as they feared the outcome of a failed GP A implementation 
(Oosthuysen, 1996: 42, Leao, 2004: 14). Furthermore, ONUMOZ concentrated on 
disannament in traditional tenns of disarming distinct military and politically 
organised groups, whereas the situation in Mozambique had escalated beyond this to 
include armed civilian groups and others who thus fell outside of the disarmament 
process (Chachiua, 1999: 1). 
Thus many weapons continued to circulate throughout the country and remained in 
the hands of former combatants and civilians, posing a threat to regional peace and 
security (Oosthuysen, 1996: 39, Chachiua, 2000: 197, Potgieter, 2000: 50). This is 
especially evident in the fact that there have been estimates of between 250 000 to 1 
million landmines laid out throughout the country due to the war (Sherman and Stott, 
2000: 2). Therefore one of the weakest factors of ONUMOZ was mine clearance, as 
Alden (1995 : 122) quotes Aldo Ajello as saying that the de-mining programme had 
been 'a disaster'. This was particularly due to the abundance of these mines along 
important transport routes and the reluctance of both Renamo and Frelimo to reveal 
the locations of minefields, as well as Renamo's reluctance to allow access to areas 
under its control (Alden, 1995: 109, Malaquias, 1997: 97) . 
The lack of adequate demining and demilitarisation throughout Mozambique has left 
a lasting legacy of armaments within the region. This has especially posed a problem 
for South Africa, as Mozambique has become the largest source of small anns for the 
South African domestic market, conttibuting to the increase in violent crime within 
the country (Potgieter, 2000: 50). The Mozambican people themselves have thus 
taken a lead in the process of demining and the detennination of the South African 
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and Mozambican governments to eradicate these weapons has formed the basis for 
important initiatives within the region. In 1995, South Africa and Mozambique signed 
the cooperative agreement of Operation Rachel. The common goal of Operation 
Rachel for South Africa and Mozambique was to join forces and undertake combined 
police and military operations into Mozambique to search for and destroy arms caches 
before they are seized by smugglers operating across the border (Oosthuysen, 1996: 
52, Chachiua, 2000: 201, Leiio, 2004: 17). These operations have proved successful, 
especially due to the cooperative gathering and analysis of information between the 
two countries (Oosthuysen, 1996: 52). Since the initiative has been implemented, over 
600 arms caches have been discovered and several tons of armaments and 
ammunition destroyed (Leiio, 2004: 17). 
Mozambique has also shown its commitment to the control and elimination of 
landmines within its borders and the greater region. On 25 February 1997 
Mozambique put forward a proposition for a landmine ban to the OAU and SADC at 
the International NGO Conference on Landmines (Sherman and Stott, 2000: 4). 
Following from this, various coalitions of NGOs and concerned civil society groups 
within Mozambique began campaigns to ban landmines (Shennan and Stott, 2000: 6). 
Mozambique signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction on the 3 
December 1997 and ratified it on the 2 June 1998 (Sherman and Stott, 2000: 15); thus 
committing itself to the elimination and destruction of such weapons within the 
region. 
4.3.3 The Electoral Role of the UN 
The GP A stipulated that elections would take place within one year of the signing of 
the Agreement. However, by mid 1993 it was evident that this would not be possible 
due to delays within earlier phases of the peace process and the timetable for elections 
was changed accordingly, postponing them to the end of October 1994 (Barnes, 1998: 
160). Once the demobilisation phase was successfully completed, ONUMOZ was 
then able to turn its full attention to the electoral phase (Jett, 1996: 5). The UN had 
been given a central role in the organisation of the elections and was to monitor the 
logistical components of the democratic process; the registration of voters, the manner 
in which the electoral campaign was carried out as well as monitoring the casting and 
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counting ofvotes in order to guarantee the validity ofthe outcome (Alden, 1995: 111 , 
Macqueen, 2002: 161). 
In line with this, the National Electoral Commission was established to get all parties 
to the conflict involved in the peace process, and encouraging the Mozambicans 
themselves through the Commission to administer the electoral process such as the 
registration of voters, the establishment of polling stations, the counting of votes and 
the creation of a legal framework for the electoral process (Alden, 1995: Ill, 
Malaquias, 1997: 95). However, Frelimo and Renamo took many months to agree on 
the make-up of the National Electoral Commission and it took the personal 
intervention of the Secretary General in October 1993 and a subsequent intervention 
by Aldo Ajello to get discussions back on track (Alden, 1995: 125, Carey, 1998: 18). 
The path to elections on the part of the Renamo and Frelimo was thus eventually 
paved by the approval and passing of the Electoral Law on 9 December 1993, which 
was circulated by President Chissano, coming into force on 12 January 1994 (Barnes, 
1998: 171, UNDPI, 2001: 12). The National Electoral Commission in close co-
operation with ONUMOZ worked hard to ensure that complaints submitted about 
irregularities were fully investigated (UNDPI, 2001: 19). Accordingly, ONUMOZ 
also established an Electoral Division composed of 148 international officials, which 
was to monitor and verify all aspects and stages within the electoral process (UNDPI, 
2001: 5, Macqueen, 2002: 161). On the eve ofthe elections around 2,300 international 
electoral observers were also deployed to observe and verify the elections throughout 
the country (UNDPI, 2001 : 18). 
Alden (1995: 124) contends that the elections were in fact "subject to a number of 
near fatal postponements". On the eve of the election, Afonso Dhlakama placed the 
entire electoral process in jeopardy, threatening to pull out of the elections and calling 
for a boycott by his supporters, alleging irregularities and refusing to demobilise his 
troops or accept the result if Renamo lost unless more funds were provided for 
transforming his organisation into a political party (Chapman, 1995: 17, Malaquias, 
1997: 97, Carey, 1998: 18, Adebajo and Landburg, 2001: 168). The role of Aldo 
Ajello, was crucial in defusing this situation as his efforts combined with regional and 
international pressure, were critical in persuading Dhlakama to implement the peace 
agreement, stating that his actions would not be tolerated by the international 
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community and military action would be taken if necessary (Chapman, 1995: 17, 
Malaquias, 1997: 97, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 168). 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki 
were two important individual regional players who played an important role in 
personally persuading Renamo not to withdraw from the elections (Schutz, 1995 : 
120). The Secretary General agreed that a trust fund be established by the sponsors of 
the peace process towards Renamo 's efforts to transfonn itself into a political party 
and US$ 12 million was contributed towards this endeavour and a further US$ 300 
000 was paid to Dhlakama as ' election expenses' by the Portuguese government 
(Macqueen, 2002: 163). Following this, Dhlakama agreed to Renamo 's reintegration 
into the electoral process and the elections were extended for another day to 
accommodate the delay and confusion caused by Dhlakama's actions (Macqueen, 
2002: 164). 
Despite a tense atmosphere during the run up to the elections, voter registration was 
successfully carried out from June through September, and the elections took place 
from 27 to 29 October (Bames, 1998: 171 , UNDPI, 2001 : 17). The results of the 
elections were announced on 19 November 1994. President Joaquim Chissano won 
the presidential election with 53 ,3 percent, amounting to 2,633 ,740 votes, to Afonso 
Dhlakama's 33,7 percent, amounting to 1,666,965 votes (Jett, 1996: 6, UNDPI, 2001 : 
20). Frelimo won the legislative election with 44.3 percent, and Renamo got 37.8 
percent (Malaquias, 1997: 90). Frelimo won a narrow parliamentary majority, 
winning 129 of the 250 seats, with Renamo winning 112 seats, and a coalition of 
minor parties winning nine seats (Jett, 1996: 6). 
The success of the elections is evident in the fact that voters turned out in massive 
numbers with almost ninety percent of registered voters casting their ballots in the 
first ever legislative and presidential elections in Mozambique (Jett, 1996; 5, 
Malaquias, 1997: 90). The election results were welcomed and endorsed by the 
Security Council through Resolution 960 on the 21 November 1994 and called on all 
parties to abide by their obligation and accept the results and continue the process of 
national reconciliation (UNDPI, 2001: 20). Although Renamo asserted that the 
government had manipulated the electoral campaign, they did accept the results and 
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Aldo Ajello was able to declare that the elections in Mozambique reflected the will of 
the people and thus were free and fair (Jett, 1996: 6-7). Even though he insisted the 
elections were not free and fair, Dhlakama did accept the results and committed 
Renamo to playing a peaceful role as Frelimo's political opposition in parliament, 
thus putting Mozambique on the path to further consolidating peace (Malaquias, 
1997: 90). The success of the elections and the subsequent acceptance of all parties of 
the elections in Mozambique thus marked the success of the peace process and UN 
peace operations in the country. 
4.3.4 Initial Problems for ONUMOZ 
The success of UN operations in Mozambique by no means looked inevitable at the 
time (Clapham, 1999: 35). Although the UN was able to overcome the initial 
logistical problems, political difficulties still persisted and slowed down the peace 
process (Jett, 1996: 3). There were many issues still surfacing between Frelimo and 
Renamo even after they had signed the GP A as mutual accusations abounded based 
on a "deep mistrust" between the two groups (Jett, 1996: 4, Carey, 1998: 18). There 
was the issue of the 'missing 12,000 Frelimo troops' whereby the government had 
claimed that its army was 12,000 smaller than previously believed, causing suspicion 
on the part of Renamo (Malaquias, 1997: 96). Alternately, Frelimo accused Renamo 
of hiding away its most sophisticated weapons as it observed that the weapons 
Renamo soldiers were handing in were old and obsolete and did not correspond with 
the principle of one man, one weapon (Malaquias, 1997: 96). It also became clear to 
UN observers from the pattern of registration that both sides were withholding their 
best troops and weaponry (Alden, 1995: 119). 
Added to this were the disputes between Frelimo and Renamo over the location of 
assembly areas since both sides sought to retain effective control of their respective 
territory (Alden, 1995: 11 7). These issues resulted in reluctance from both sides to 
begin assembly and demobilisation of troops and contributed to the initial delay in the 
deployment of UN military observers and troops (UNDPI, 2001: 6). Logistical and 
legal problems also arose for ONUMOZ due to the absence of a status of forces 
agreement from the Mozambican government, which further delayed the deployment 
of UN troops (UNDPI, 2001: 6). However the UN demonstrated its ability to deal 
with and overcome these delays and still implement its mandate successfully. 
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Although the financial contributions from UN members were generous and eventually 
put forward, they were by no means always easily obtained as the financial factors of 
the operation where a recurring issue within the Security Council as reluctance set in 
to supply such funds (Macqueen, 2002: 157). The final budget for ONUMOZ was not 
confirmed until well into 1993 and this climate of financial rigidity and uncertainty 
affected the military side of operations as this further affected the concerns and 
reluctance of potential troop contributors (Macqueen, 2002: 157). Added to this the 
GP A initially put forth unrealistic timeframes within which ONUMOZ had to work as 
such political, administrative and logistical delays and difficulties impeded the initial 
implementation of the GPA (UNDPI, 2001 : 6). The political and military components 
of ONUMOZ therefore came into effect slowly and the first military cease-fire 
observers only arrived four months after the cease-fire came into effect (Barnes, 1998: 
165). However there had been very few significant violations of the cease-fire during 
this period that would have significantly affected the peace process (Barnes, 1998: 
165, UNDPI, 2001: 11). 
One aspect of the success of peace operations in Mozambique did in fact cause initial 
problems. The speed with which ONUMOZ was able to encamp most of the soldiers, 
meant that they were not able to demobilise them quickly enough (Malaquias, 1997: 
96). The time delay meant that many soldiers became involved in mutinies and riots 
within the camps as uncertainties abounded about their future and they demanded a 
return to civilian life immediately (Jett, 1996: 5, Malaquias, 1997: 96). Such 
disturbances involved attacks on UN officials, blocking major roads in assembly areas 
and looting in neighbouring towns (Alden, 1995: 119). 
Despite the humanitarian declaration in July 1994, access to civilians in Renamo 
controlled rural areas was also still difficult until the cease-fire was agreed (Bames, 
1998: 165). This was manifest in the slow and delayed disbursement of food and 
medical assistance across these areas due to the refusal by Renamo officials in some 
areas to allow international relief workers into affected areas to assess the needs of the 
Mozambican people as well as disagreements between Renamo and relief agencies on 
distribution procedures (Aiden, 1995: 121 , Barnes, 1998: 166). Added to this, the 
humanitarian assistance programme was "dogged by controversy" manifested in 
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disagreements between agencies and governments on the ground, the international 
donor community, NGOs, components of ONUMOZ and UNOHAC over a range of 
practices and procedures (Alden, 1995: 121 , Goulding, 1999: 162). 
4.4 Assessment of UN Peace Maintenance in Mozambique 
Mozambique offers an example of an African Cold War 'old war' conflict in which 
external powers fuelled the flames already burning in the country and who 
subsequently had the political will to assist in ending the conflict in the initial post-
Cold War optimism to end conflicts on the continent. The end to conflict in 
Mozambique and the success of the subsequent UN peace operations in the country is 
therefore due to a number of internal and external factors and is based within the 
context of the nature of the conflict and the international context within which it was 
fought. Thus Mozambique demonstrates that the resolution of Cold War 'old wars ' in 
Africa have been much easier to resolve from a UN standpoint. The confluence of 
these internal as well as regional and external factors all merged to guarantee an end 
to the conflict in Mozambique and the push towards democracy and development in 
the country. 
Internally, both Renan1o and Frelimo had lost the desire to continue fighting due to 
increasingly dire environmental factors , a lack of resources and a lack of will on the 
part of the soldiers themselves to continue the war. Both sides were therefore ready 
for peace and with the incentives offered from the international community, peace 
seemed a more rewarding prospect than the continuation of war, and both sides were 
able to form the necessary will to negotiate for peace and implement the subsequent 
peace agreement. Within the regional context, Mozambique 's transition had been part 
of a movement of democratic change that had engulfed the sub-region, most apparent 
with the end of apartheid in South Africa. 
With the additional elimination of regional and international support for the conflict 
the prospects for peace were increased. With the end of the Cold War there was a 
move towards peaceful resolution of disputes and a desire to assist in finding a 
resolution to the conflict in Mozambique. Furthermore, the involvement of civil 
society, particularly the Catholic Church facilitated a move towards peace. The 
international community' s active involvement in the peace process and its political 
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and financial support for UN operations in the country thus played a decisive role in 
bringing the conflict to an end and guaranteeing the success of the peace process 
(Malaquias, 1997: 88, Carey, 1998: 18, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001 : 167). 
Operations in Mozambique proved to be one of the most costly peace operations 
(Barnes, 1998: 160); thus demonstrating the commitment of the international 
community and a much greater regional and international engagement (Malaquias, 
1997: 87). The UN experiences in Mozambique thus demonstrate that the "unanimity 
of purpose and willingness to act in a coherent manner can enhance the authority of 
the international community" (Annan, 1998: 9). 
ONUMOZ managed the entire peace process, thus ensunng conformity and co-
ordination of all aspects of the peace process from the military to the humanitarian 
factors . The UN integrated the use of a multidimensional peace operation 
incorporating the complimentary activities of conflict resolution and peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as the use of humanitarian and social 
development initiatives. Barnes (1998: 159) contends that an important element of 
ONUMOZ was this interplay and consolidation of the political and military hardware 
of peacekeeping and the software of peacebuilding in the form of humanitarian 
assistance, demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Thus, the co-ordination of 
all aspects in the resolution of the conflict meant that peace was more strongly 
consolidated. The success of peace operations in Mozambique was thus made possible 
because of the complementary programmes of peacebuilding in the country, which 
occurred along side the traditional military apparatus. Thus, peacekeeping was 
sustained through peacebuilding, which created and sustained an enabling political 
and social enviromnent to consolidate the peace (Barnes, 1998: 160). Thus the focus 
was not only on the military aspects of the conflict, but also on the political, social 
and economic. 
In order to assess whether ONUMOZ was a success or not we must ask the question 
of whether the mandate of ONUMOZ was fulfilled. The most important elements 
within this being whether the UN was able to create an environn1ent conducive to a 
lasting peace and whether the country has been fully demobilised, soldiers 
reintegrated into society and free and fair elections successfully held. Although 
ONUMOZ did face many obstacles in fulfilling its mandate we can answer in the 
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affirmative to all the above questions. The war in Mozambique ended through the 
cmmnitment of both the combatants to the conflict and the international community to 
a negotiated settlement. The vast majority of both Frelimo and Renamo soldiers have 
been disanned and reintegrated into society and despite delays a new anny was 
established incorporating Frelimo and Renamo forces. Lastly, elections were held and 
accepted by all parties allowing for the fonnation of a multiparty democratic 
government. These are therefore the measures of success within the country, in that 
the combatants agreed to cease fighting, the underlying causes of conflict were 
addressed and the path to peace was paved with development strategies and renewed 
political participation. As Jett (1996: 3) claims, ONUMOZ thus allowed Mozambique 
to begin rebuilding the nation and the state. 
Not only did ONUMOZ have a clear mandate as well as the resources to ensure the 
success of the mission, the UN also showed the flexibility needed to pursue the peace 
process, extending the mandate of ONUMOZ and the timeframes within which it 
operated when necessary (Malaquias, 1997: 101, Carey, 1998: 18). ONUMOZ for the 
most part enjoyed the confidence and co-operation of the Mozambican people and the 
parties to the conflict, particularly due to the UN's constant dialogue with the parties 
both on the ground, especially through individuals such as Aldo Ajello and even UN 
Secretary General Boutros-Ghali (Annan, 1998: 9). Added to this, ONUMOZ 
remained neutral and impartial throughout its entire operation and did not become 
involved in the conflict (Aldrich, 2000: 4). Thus, it is important to observe that 
ONUMOZ adhered to the three guiding principles of UN peace maintenance of 
consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. This behaviour was an important factor 
in strengthening the UN ' s influence in the country and acquiring the trust of both 
Frelimo and Renamo in order to successfully carry out its mandate. Thus, ONUMOZ 
demonstrates that the adherence to these principles, accompanied by a clear and 
flexible mandate and the political will and related commitment of adequate resources 
are important factors that can contribute to the success of a peace maintenance 
operation. ONUMOZ demonstrates the need to gain the trust of the combatants and 
provide programmes and incentives for peace in order to show those fighting that 
there is a better way of life. 
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With the conclusion of the elections, the peace agreement was fully in place and the 
mandate of ONUMOZ fonnally came to an end on the 9 December 1994, with the 
swearing in of Joaquim Chissano as the elected president. The last ONUMOZ 
contingent left at the end of January 1995. Since the end of the operation, 
Mozambique has continued to liberalise its economy, while the Frelimo party and 
their former adversaries appear to have settled into a stable, albeit uneasy (as can be 
expected from former adversaries within a conflict) relationship as political opponents 
(Paris, 2001: Ill). Frelimo remains an important actor at the international level and 
the continuing party of choice at the domestic level while Renamo has "subordinated 
its "bandit" image and has gained credibility as an opposition party" (Schutz, 1995: 
119-121). 
Although ONUMOZ has been hailed as a success, there are still challenges that 
remain in terms of disannament within Mozambique. The end of the conflict has left a 
large amount of weapons in the hands of demobilised soldiers and civilians, as 
ONUMOZ failed to recover many weapons supplied to the combatants (Oosthuysen, 
1996: 52, Chachiua, 2000: 197). Because of this, arms proliferation has flourished and 
remains a major threat to peace and security within the southern African region 
(Oosthuysen, 1996: 39, Potgieter, 2000: 50). However, regional peacebuilding 
initiatives following the withdrawal of ONUMOZ, such as the Mine Ban Treaty and 
the cooperative efforts of Operation Rachel, which is still ongoing today between 
South Africa and Mozambique, have gone a long way to support and control the 
implementation of disarmament within Mozambique and the region. The importance 
of demobilisation and the destruction of weapons within a post-conflict state are thus 
extremely important within the context of regional and international peace and 
security and should form an integral part of any peace maintenance operation 
undertaken by the UN. 
This chapter has shown that UN peace operations in Mozambique were not without 
their problems, but the ability of the UN to resolve these initial problems proved the 
dete1mination and capability of the organisation to resolve and prevent African 
conflict fought within the context of the Cold War arena. ONUMOZ proves that UN 
peace maintenance can be successfully implemented when the basic conditions both 
within a conflict as well as within the UN are present. Granted the conditions within 
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every conflict are different, there are important lessons to be learnt from the success 
of UN peace maintenance operations in Mozambique that should be used in the future 
and which could have been drawn from for the subsequent conflict and peace 
operations in R wanda. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NEW WARS IN AFRICA: UN PEACE MAINTENANCE 
INRWANDA 
"It was within the borders of Rwanda ... that the United Nations faced perhaps 
its most serious crisis of credibility" 
(~acqueen, 2002 : 61) 
5.1 Background to the Conflict in Rwanda 
Rwanda offers an example of a typical "new war" in Africa in the post-Cold war era. 
This conflict was characterised by the extreme radical politicisation of ethno-classes 
and political identities, where the state became the main instigator of violence against 
its own people, culminating in genocide in a state that was reaching the point of 
political and economic collapse. Massive refugee flows and internally displaced 
people, as well as the support of regional and other external states contributed to the 
regionalisation and indeed internationalisation of war in R wanda as the conflict 
moulded within the regional conflict sphere within the entire Great Lakes Region. 
Significant factors therefore to note in trying to understand the background to the 
conflict and the subsequent genocide must take into account the manipulation of 
external forces , domestic pressures, the manipulation and politicisation of ethnic, 
racial and political identities through stereotyping and the construction of imagined 
truths by elites, the physical exclusion and elimination of different groups and the 
enormous refugee flows throughout the region resulting in an enviromnent favourable 
to the easy proliferation of arms and the mobilisation of militias that continue to 
contribute to the instability of the entire region (Hintjens, 1999: 241, Alusala, 2005: 
2) . 
Rwanda was a Gem1an colony until after the First World War when it was handed 
over to Belgium by the League of Nations under the Trusteeship Council (Macqueen, 
2002: 62). Rwanda achieved independence from Belgium on the 1 July 1962 and by 
this time, had undergone a dramatic alteration in its external and internal relations 
(Bamett, 2002 : 52). The Rwandan population is divided into the three groups of Hutu 
(about 85%), Tutsi (about 14%) and the Twa (about 1 %) (UNDPI, 1996: 341) . These 
three categories predate colonialism and deep-rooted class and political tensions, 
suspicions and hatred, particularly between the Hutu and Tutsi , have defined the 
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R wandan society, despite the fact that they all share a cmmnon language, culture and 
customs and lived within the same areas in relative peace together for centuries before 
colonialism (Lemarchand, 1994: 587, Mpungwe, 1999: 14-15, Mamdani, 2001: 52, 
Bamett, 2002: 49-51 ). Mamdani (200 1: 74) contends that while Tutsi may have 
existed as an ethnic identity before the establishment of the state of R wand a, Hutu did 
not exist as an identity outside of the state, and emerged as a trans-ethnic identity of 
subjects within the Rwandan state. The Tutsi identity has been porous in that through 
intermarriage, rulers were able to assimilate the most prosperous of their subjects 
from other identities such as the Hutu into their ranks, and thus the Tutsi too emerged 
as a more trans-ethnic identity (Mamdani, 2001: 74). Therefore the two groups of 
Tutsi and Hutu were not distinct ethnic identities within the Rwandan state, but rather 
an amalgamation of the different identities. Thus Mamdani (2001: 73) suggests that 
Hutu and Tutsi be seen not as ethnic identities, but rather as historical political 
identities that have changed with the changing history and nature of the Rwandan 
state. 
It was colonialism that institutionalised the perception of an "ethnic" division of the 
Rwandan people, as state-enforced identities within the emergence of the Rwandan 
state materialized when Belgium introduced an identification system distinguishing 
Tutsis, Hutus and Twa with all Rwandan citizens issued identity cards depicting their 
membership to one or the other group (Mamdani, 2001: 74, Bamett, 2002: 50, 
Alusala, 2005: 2). The possible social elevation from a Hutu to a Tutsi or vice versa as 
seen in the precolonial period was no longer possible as Belgium in essence 
concretised the identities of Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani, 2001: 101 ). Belgium thus took 
an existing socio-political distinction within Rwanda and "racialised" it by 
considering the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as distinct races, thus distorting the existing 
realities and historical relations between these three groups (Mamdani , 2001 : 99, 
Rusagara, 2005: 21-22). 
Belgian policies reinforced and solidified Tutsi supremacy and conferred on them 
privileges and power, as they were treated favourably, and become the colonial elite 
with superior ideological , political and economic status (Mamdani, 2001 : 101 , 
Bamett, 2002: 50-51 , Macqueen, 2002: 62). Animosity between the Hutu and Tutsi 
was thus entrenched within the colonial history of Rwanda and the mutual suspicions 
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between the two groups became further exacerbated after independence and exploited 
from that point on by ambitious elites (Oyebade, 1998: 159). Thus not only was the 
division between Hutu and Tutsi created and extended during the colonial period, 
these divisions became further exacerbated and exploited after independence, 
culminating in the attempted elimination of the Tutsi by the Hutu in 1994. Thus, 
Mamdani (2001 : 34-102) argues that the Hutu/Tutsi violence in Rwanda lies in the 
way in which Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial 
state with the Hutus perceived to be an identity of indigenous "nativised" subjects and 
the Tutsi as a non-indigenous identity of "subordinate power". He further asserts that 
the continued violence within the country is a result of the failure of Rwandan 
nationalism to transcend the colonial construction of Hutu and Tutsi as native and 
alien (Mamdani, 2001: 34). 
Due to the Tutsi being the political and economic elite, there was an assumption that 
they would be the beneficiaries of the transfer of power from Belgium at 
independence (Macqueen, 2202: 62). However it was the Hutu majority that gradually 
took complete political power under Gregoire Kayibanda and the Democratic 
Republican Movement (MDR) (Hintjens, 1999: 248, Bamett, 2002: 52, Macqueen, 
2002: 62). This transfer of power began with the "Hutu Revolution" from 1959 to 
1961 where a series of violent outbreaks in R wanda ended the elite Tutsi monarchy 
and led to the flight of over a hundred thousand Tutsi to neighbouring countries 
(UNDPI, 1996: 341, Bamett, 2002: 52). Tutsi power was dismantled at the local 
administrative level and broader constitutional and political developments led to the 
complete transfer of governmental power from the Tutsi elite to a Hutu elite and the 
diminished role of the Tutsi within the political sphere (Mamdani, 2001 : 104-134). 
During this time Kayibanda used terror to sow divisions and maintain power, and 
ethnic and political violence became a central feature within Rwandan politics as an 
uneasy coexistence developed between the newly developed administrative Hutu elite 
and the existing economic Tutsi elite (Hintjens, 1999: 257, Bamett, 2002: 52). 
Therefore the Revolution not only left in place, but also reinforced, the political 
identities and divisions created during the colonial period (Mamdani , 200 I : 1 04 ). 
In 1973 Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a French speaking northern Hutu took 
power in a military coup against the Kayibanda regime (Bamett, 2002: 52-53). 
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Habyarimana declared Rwanda to officially be a one party state and everyone to 
belong to the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND), 
centralising his control using all means at his disposal, from the bureaucracy to the 
party, church and military (Barnett, 2002: 53). Habyarimana maintained a tight rule 
over the state and amongst non-communist states; Rwanda became arguably the most 
tightly controlled state in the world (Melvern, 2000: 25). He also further reinforced 
and exacerbated the divisions of the Hutu and Tutsi and further marginalized the role 
of the Tutsi within the political, military and social spheres. 
During this time the Rwandan economy appeared well managed with the lowest debt, 
the lowest inflation and the highest rate of growth of any country in the region 
(Hintjens, 1999: 256, Mamdani, 2001: 144). However, in 1986 coffee prices fell and 
coffee sales plummeted to almost a third of what they had been previously and the 
availability of land for crop expansion was depleted and soil fertility was decreasing 
as Rwanda approached an economic crisis (Hintjens, 1999: 256, Mamdani, 2001 : 
146). Added to this the southern parts of Rwanda were suffering from famine, with 
major food shortages resulting from a crisis in agricultural production in early 1994 
(Hintjens, 1999: 257 -258). Thus, the dependence on a single export commodity 
accompanied by drought and a decrease in international demand left Rwanda with a 
heavy debt burden (Barnett, 2002: 53). Added to the looming economic crisis was a 
deteriorating human rights record and it was becoming increasingly evident that the 
government could no longer provide for or protect its own citizens (Hintjens, 1999: 
259-261). Thus the government was not meeting its sovereign obligations as Rwanda 
moved closer to becoming a failed state. 
On the 1 October 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from its 
bases across the Ugandan border (Macqueen, 2002: 64, Mpungwe, 1999: 15). The 
RPF was established in Uganda in 1988 as a predominantly Tutsi political and 
military organisation with the support of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni with 
the aim of repatriating Tutsi refugees and establishing a power sharing agreement 
with the Rwandan government (Melvern, 2000: 26, Barnett, 2002: 55 , Macqueen, 
2002: 63). This group, under the leadership of Paul Kagame, was formed 
predominantly from the children ofTutsi refugees who had fled Rwanda in the 1960s, 
but was not exclusively Tutsi as the Habyarimana regime had driven a significant 
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number of moderate Hutu across the border due to its extreme Hutu nationalism 
policies (Bamett, 2002: 55, Macqueen, 2002: 63). The RPF formed the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) with its recruits coming from armed forces within Uganda who 
were well trained, disciplined and experienced in combat (Melvem, 2000: 27). 
The RPF invasion ultimately exacerbated divisions within Rwanda and "set the stage 
for [the] further radicalisation of politics" and the redefinition of national identity 
along exclusively racial and ethno-political lines, becoming the catalyst for racial 
subversion and a prelude for the later implementation of genocide (Lemarchand, 
1994: 589, Hintjens, 1999: 242, Bamett, 2002: 55). This was due to the fact that the 
invasion displaced up to three hundred thousand Hutus into informal camps, which 
later became potential breeding grounds for Tutsi resentment (Bamett, 2002: 55). 
Resulting from the invasion was the rise of "Hutu Power" based on the ideology and 
perception that the Tutsi were a race alien to Rwanda and not an indigenous ethnic 
group (Mamdani, 2001: 190). The RPF and their Tutsi allies, and later all Tutsi (who 
had by this time achieved great economic and professional success) and moderate 
Hutu who were suspected of supporting the RPF and later the Arusha Accords were 
blamed for the spectrum of economic and political crisis gripping the country from 
the colonial period and since independence (Hintjens, 1999: 256-263). 
Habyarimana consequently used the RPF invasion as an excuse to move against his 
enemies, exploiting the race card by denouncing all Tutsis and their allies as traitors 
(Bamett, 2002: 55). It was argued that in order for the Hutu to be safe, all Tutsis 
should be removed from society (Hintjens, 1999: 262). Immediately following the 
invasion, Congo, Zaire, Kenya and especially France sent military assistance in 
support of the R wandan government, becoming intimately involved in the military 
training and expansion of the Rwandan armed forces (Melvem, 2000: 30, Bamett, 
2002: 56, Macqueen, 2002: 64). This active support for the Rwandan regime in tenns 
of such military and financial assistance added an international dimension to the 
conflict and constituted a major hindrance later on for the government to make 
concessions to the opposition within the framework of peace initiatives (Lemarchand, 
1994: 603). 
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The external military pressure from the RPF, coupled with internal political pressure 
for multiple political parties finally pushed Habyarimana, albeit reluctantly, to 
undertake political reforms and embrace the concept of multiparty democracy m 
December 1990 (Mpungwe, 1999: 16, Barnett, 2002: 54). However these measures 
are argued to have been too little too late as the war raged on while the internal 
political pressures and resistance further intensified with the continuation of the 
radicalisation and violence of Rwandan politics (Mpungwe, 1999: 16, Barnett, 2002: 
54). The move towards democratic reforms elicited strong reactions from within the 
ruling elite and the MRND began to form the radical youth militia group the 
Interahamwe ("those who work together" or "those who attack together") (Mamdani, 
2001: 204, Barnett, 2002: 54). The Presidential Guard also became increasingly 
opposed to the idea of power sharing with the Tutsis, becoming actively involved in 
the recruitment and political and military training of the Interahamwe in early 1992 
and the systematic massacres of civilians; predominantly Tutsis became a common 
feature of Rwandan politics during this time (Lemarchand, 1994: 601 , Barnett, 2002: 
54-55). 
It appears that Habyarimana had increasingly lost power or control over hard-line 
elements within his regime and although he appears to have been making 
compromises with the RPF in some areas, he was not representing all those under the 
name of the government, as the Presidential Guard, Interahamwe and the political 
elite actively worked to sabotage any moves towards peace. Thus Habyarimana was 
stuck in the nexus between the Rwandan government, military, RPF and external 
states pushing for peace. The death of Habyarimana on the 6 April 1994 in a plane 
crash triggered the start of mass killings and violence against the Tutsi, culminating in 
genocide and arguably the "fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth 
century" (Power, 2001: 84). The genocidaires included members of the Rwandan 
government forces, the Presidential Guard and the Interahamwe (UNDPI, 1996: 346). 
Their first task was to assassinate moderate Hutu political rivals within the 
government (I ones 2001: 162). Therefore it was not only Tutsi that were killed, but 
Hutu as well. However, while Hutus were killed as individuals, Tutsis were killed as a 
distinct group demonstrating that they were the targets of genocide in R wanda 
(Mamdani, 2001: 5). Between five hundred thousand and a million people died during 
the months of the genocide (UNDPI, 1996: 346). Once this began, the peace process 
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collapsed, and Rwanda descended into a "full-scale conventional conflict between the 
RPF .. . and the Hutu army around the capital" (Macqueen, 2002: 72). 
As our observations in previous chapters have shown, the nature of the state in Africa 
is pivotal in understanding the nature of a conflict. Rwanda offers no exception to 
this, as Hintjens (1999: 241) asserts, "The nature of the Rwandan state must be seen 
as absolutely central" in understanding the conflict in the country. She further (1999: 
241-251) contends that the genocide in R wand a was rooted in the reaction to a deep 
structural crisis of state legitimacy as racialist ideologies mainly served as a disguise 
for the more fundamental goals of a regime grappling to hold onto power in the face 
of growing political opposition, economic recession and social tension as genocide 
represented a "last ditch attempt at survival" by the Rwandan regime. Thus genocide 
was a result of both planning and participation and not the result of spontaneous 
fighting between two competing groups, but rather a premeditated mass killing of one 
group by the regime in an attempt to cling to state power (Hintj ens, 1999: 246-24 7, 
Mamdani, 2001: 7). This is evident in the extent of ideological and military 
preparation and hate propaganda prior to the genocide and the systematic use of 
conspiracy theories and myths to justify covert plans for killing innocent people 
(Hintjens, 1999: 242, Melvem, 2000: 56). 
Both sides to the conflict, especially the government, were the recipients of large 
amounts of post-Cold War weapons sales from former Warsaw Pact countries 
(Alusala, 2005: 3). Rwanda was therefore becoming increasingly more militarised and 
the Rwandan government became the third largest arms importer in Africa with 
France, Egypt and South Africa reportedly being the main suppliers of arms 
shipments to the Rwandan army at this time (Melvem, 2000: 32, Bamett, 2002: 56, 
Alusala, 2004: 138). Prior to the genocide, the government had been stockpiling 
weapons - particularly machetes and agricultural tools - for some time and then 
passing them on to Hutu militias as part of the planning for the killing of the Tutsi and 
by the time the genocide occurred, up to eighty five tons of armaments are said to 
have been distributed throughout the country (Melvem, 2000: 64-65 , Tshitereke, 
2003 : 85 , Alusala, 2004: 138). The impending genocide therefore appeared an "open 
secret" as plans for the genocide were openly broadcast; yet a deceptive air of 
nonnality was maintained within the country (Hintjens, 1999: 267). 
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In exammmg the conflict in Rwanda it is imperative to observe the regional 
enviromnent in which this conflict occurred as neither the 1990 RPF invasion, nor the 
1994 genocide can be understood outside the regional context (Mamdani, 2001: 36). 
Macqueen (2002: 60-61) contends that Rwanda in respect of its neighbours lies at the 
"nexus between Anglophone and Francophone central Africa" with the former British 
colonies of Uganda and Tanzania to the north and east and the former French colonies 
of the DRC and Burundi to the south and west. The conflict in R wand a thus falls 
within the greater regional and ethnic sphere of conflict within the entire Great Lakes 
Region where nowhere else in Africa is the issue of the arbitrary division of 
ethnicities, or identities across colonial boundaries more apparent than between 
Rwanda and its neighbour Burundi (Macqueen, 2002: 61). Thus Lemarchand (1994: 
585) asserts that Rwanda and Burundi cannot be looked at in isolation from each 
other. 
Within the Great Lakes Region, it was only within Rwanda and Burundi that the 
distinctions between Tutsi and Hutu as separate identities were realised (Mamdani, 
2001: 36). In Uganda and the Congo Hutu and Tutsi tended to belong to a single 
political identity known as the Banyarwanda (Mamdani, 2001: 36). Rwanda and 
Burundi have presented an "inverted mirror image of each other" as while Rwanda 
was controlled by Hutu elites, Burundi was controlled by Tutsi elites and each state 
was administered in such a way as to benefit one particular social group (Hintjens, 
1999: 276). Thus both countries have had a "dominant minority situation" in which a 
specific ruling minority has used the powers of the state to maintain its political and 
economic control over subordinate majorities (Alusala, 2005 : 2). 
Hintjens (1999 : 276) contends that since 1962 each country's domestic politics has 
affected the perceptions of socio-political conflict within its neighbour. Events in one 
country thus have had an effect in the other, as the persecution ofHutu in Burundi has 
been used to justify the persecution of Tutsi in Rwanda and vice versa (Lemarchand, 
1994: 585, Hintjens, 1999: 277-279). In Rwanda an important catalyst therefore for 
the genocide in relation to Burundi was the assassination of the first Burundian 
popularly elected Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993 by the 
predominantly Tutsi army (Lemarchand, 1994: 585, Hintjens, 1999: 277, Melvem, 
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2000: 83-84, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 174, Mamdani, 2001: 215-216). The 
Hutu extremists in Rwanda took advantage of the tragedy in Burundi, blaming the 
assassination on "progressive politics" and proof of the consequences of attempting to 
reconcile with the Tutsi (Melvern, 2000: 84). The genocide thus had immediate 
regional implications as the neighbouring states of Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania and 
Uganda were drawn into the crisis (Furley, 1998: 252). Following the genocide there 
was also a mass exodus of refugees across Rwanda's border into Tanzania, Burundi, 
Uganda and the DRC - said to be one of the largest and quickest refugee movements 
ever seen (Furley, 1998: 240). The huge concentration of these refugees on the 
Zairian side of the border following the conflict was a catalyst of enduring and violent 
cycles of conflict throughout the entire Great Lakes Region and the outbreak of civil 
war in Zaire in October 1996 has further compounded the problem (Furley, 1998: 
253-254, Macqueen, 2002: 79). 
The war finally ended with the complete victory of the RPF (Furley, 1998: 258). 
Mamdani (2001: 185) points out that the RPF invaded Rwanda as an army of 
liberation and came out as an army of occupation. The RPF established military 
control over most of the country in July 1994, taking control of Kigali on the 4 July 
(UNDPI, 1996: 353). On the 19 July 1994 a Broad-Based Government of National 
Unity was formed in Rwanda and subsequently extended its control over the whole 
national territory (UNDPI, 1996: 353). However, the RPF, though victorious, was still 
considered to be a Tutsi minority force and therefore doubts remained as to the 
sustainability of its potential control over the Hutu who fonned the majority of the 
population (Mpungwe, 1999: 17). 
5.2 The Arusha Peace Agreement: July 1992 - August 1993 
In the second half of 1992 Habyarimana was under great pressure from the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Tanzanian government to steer towards 
the negotiating table with the RPF and the OAU arranged for peace talks to take place 
in Arusha in Tanzania (Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 173, Macqueen, 2002: 64). 
The Arusha peace talks thus took place in the period July 1992 to August 1993 
between the Rwandan government and the RPF under the guidance of international 
mediation to lay out a clear process for the "implementation of a new political order" 
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and called for a UN operation to help assure security while the transitional 
arrangements were being put in place (Clapham, 1999: 38, Jones, 2001: 165). 
As with the Rome Agreement for Mozambique the Arusha Agreement similarly 
called for the creation of a new transitional government to be installed by the 8 April 
1994, and the disannament, assembly, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-
combatants into a new anny, the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced 
people, the creation of transitional institutions as well as elections for a new Rwandan 
power-sharing government to be held before the end of 1995 (Hintjens, 1999: 262, 
Melvem, 2000: 53 , Bamett, 2002: 62, Macqueen, 2002: 65). The Arusha Peace 
Agreement was signed on the 3 August 1993 and Mpungwe (1999: 18) contends that 
at the time this was heralded as the most strategic and successful response to an 
African conflict as an entirely African initiative. 
The UN had no significant role to play in the negotiation phase; rather sending a 
"goodwill mission" acting on behalf of the UN Secretary General, as an observer to 
the talks (Bamett, 2002: 61 , Macqueen, 2002: 64-65). Like Mozambique the UN was 
called in at a relatively late stage of negotiations to help implement the agreement 
(Clapham, 1999: 38, Macqueen, 2002: 65) . The UN was called upon to provide an 
observation and peacekeeping presence to play a central role in carrying out the 
agreement and to be the guarantor and monitor of the process, as well as to assist in 
the maintenance of public security and the delivery of humanitarian aid, disarmament 
and search for weapons caches and to oversee the demobilisation of existing armed 
forces and all aspects of the formation of the new army (UNDPI, 1996: 343, 
Macqueen, 2002: 65). Macqueen (2002: 65) contends that the UN was called upon to 
carry out these tasks without it having even assessed the feasibility of such an 
operation for itself. 
On the surface the Arusha Accords promised change in R wanda and appeared to work 
temporarily, but soon proved to be flawed (Furley, 1998: 258, Bamett, 2002 : 62). 
Melvern (2000: 53) contends that the trouble for Arusha did not stem from the 
Accords themselves but the unwillingness of the parties to Arusha to allow it to work. 
The mere signing of a peace agreement does not imply that the parties themselves are 
necessarily committed to peace and prefer a peace settlement to continuing the war 
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and with the mere signing of Arusha, the UN too readily assumed that the agreement 
was ready for implementation (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 20, Jones, 2001: 103). 
Both the Rwandan government and the RPF were compelled by external forces to go 
to the negotiating table in the first place and the Arusha process was conducted under 
extreme external pressures - particularly from the OAU, France, Tanzania, the US 
and Belgium - and thus the "transition bargain" of Arusha was arguably doomed from 
the start as it was signed more because of external pressure than an internal 
willingness for peace (Lemarchand, 1994: 591 , Bamett, 2002: 57). Furthermore, 
while the international cmmnunity pushed the parties to peace, there appeared no 
willingness on their part to help implement the agreement that had been built around 
the prospect of future external management that looked unlikely to be forthcoming 
(Macqueen, 2002: 67). 
There was little enthusiasm for Arusha from the Rwandan government and hard-line 
Hutu elements within the government ranks opposed the agreement outright, calling it 
and the concessions offered to the RPF a 'sell out' that would bring a reversion to 
Tutsi domination, and as will be shown later became "spoilers" to the process 
(Lemarchand, 1994: 591, Macqueen, 2002 : 68). The insincerity of the Rwandan 
government towards the Arusha process is demonstrated in the fact that while the 
negotiations were taking place, the regime entered into a massive anns deal with a 
French company to the value of US$12 million, and there were further anns deals 
with Egypt even after the ceasefire had been signed (Melvern, 2000: 55), thus 
demonstrating that the government was not disanning or aiming to confinn a 
dedi cation to peace. 
Furthermore, the Rwandan government refused to comply with important conditions 
of the Arusha Accords. While there were moves to include political opposition parties 
within the interim government, there were no moves to incorporate RPF forces into 
the army (Hintjens, 1999: 258). Therefore, instead of ushering in and providing a 
stable platform for peace in R wand a, the Arusha Accords became the focus of violent 
disagreements between the government and RPF, becoming a catalyst of the radical 
polarisation of politics in Kigali , greater demonization of the RPF and its allies and 
the mobilisation for the massive rejection of Arusha, culminating in the genocide 
(Lemarchand, 1994: 592, Jones, 2001: 103). Hence, Stedman and Rothchild (1997 : 
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18) contend that many more people died after the peace agreement failed than during 
the war years that preceded it. 
5.3 UN Response to Conflict in Rwanda: Internal Debate and Lack of Political 
Will 
On the 22 June 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 846 establishing the 
United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) to observe 
movements on the Ugandan side of the common border with Rwanda in order to 
monitor the ceasefire between the RPF and government forces and to verify that the 
transit of arms and supplies to the RPF had ceased in line with undertakings made to 
facilitate the Arusha process for an initial period of six months (UNDPI, 1996: 342, 
Barnett, 2002: 61, Macqueen, 2002: 66). Following from this, during and after the 
signing of Arusha, the UN had received a joint request from both the Rwandan 
government and the RPF for further UN involvement to resolve the conflict within 
Rwanda' s borders and to oversee the implementation of Arusha (Jones, 2001 : 109). 
The Security Council, along with the international community viewed the situation in 
Rwanda as a "civil war", "ethnic conflict" and a "failed state" (Barnett, 2002: 103). 
These simplistic views ultimately influenced the response to the conflict as diplomatic 
responses from within the Security Council became incompatible with the emerging 
realities on the ground (Jones, 2001: 117). This was seen in the fact that for the UN 
there appeared to be a "two track of events in R wand a" of simultaneous war and 
genocide that confused policymakers who had very little prior knowledge of the 
country (Power, 2001: 89). Furthermore, Bamett (2002: 58) contends that UN 
decision makers were labouring under superficial and often incorrect perceptions of 
some of the most basic features of Rwandan politics and thus were not ascribing 
Rwanda any high-profile attention. This is evident in Western perceptions of the 
conflict as an "ethnic conflict" between the Hutu and Tutsi, when in fact the conflict 
was much more deep-rooted in terms of the dynamics between these two groups. 
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was approved 
through Resolution 872 as a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation on the 5 October 
1993 with the proviso that it would be extended beyond the initial ninety days only 
upon a review by the Security Council (S/RES/872, 1993: 2). UNOMUR was to be 
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incorporated into UNAMIR. This Resolution was passed two days after eighteen 
American Special Forces troops were killed in Somalia, an event that fundamentally 
changed American perceptions of peacekeeping in Africa and thus essentially shaped 
the way in which the UN Security Council responded to the further crises in Rwanda 
(Macqueen, 2002: 67). 
The Rwandan crisis occurred at a time when the UN's resources were at "full stretch" 
and suffering from excessive wear, with almost 70 000 military personnel from 
seventy countries engaged worldwide in seventeen operations (Barnett, 2002: 68, 
Macqueen, 2002: 65 -66). At the time of the genocide, the UN peacekeeping capacity 
was as a result already stretched to its limits and UN members within the Security 
Council were increasingly concerned over the high cost of peacekeeping, and the 
potential for failure following the Somalia debacle (Bamett, 2002 : 66). Thus Carey 
(1998: 20) contends that UNAMIR was established in "an atmosphere of caution and 
fiscal austerity" and provided with a modest mandate, and very little manpower and 
resources. 
There was a notable lack of commitment on behalf of UN members, particularly 
concerning the provision of the necessary resources to carry out an appropriate 
response to the conflict in Rwanda (Macqueen, 2002: 263). Therefore bureaucratic 
procedures within the UN delayed approval for the operation until nearly three 
months after the signing of the Arusha Agreement and the number of soldiers sent to 
carry out the mission was half the amount requested by the warring parties (Stedman 
and Rothchild, 1997: 27, Mpungwe, 1999: 20, Macqueen, 2002: 67). These delays in 
the establishment of the operation ultimately had a negative ripple effect on the 
implementation stages in terms of the adherence to time schedules and delayed the 
establishment and the implementation of transitional structures within R wanda 
(Mpungwe, 199: 20). 
Once the genocide began in April, the Security Council "was groping for a response" 
and it took nearly six weeks to resolve to do something following the massacres, as 
the organisation failed to condemn the genocide immediately and to urge the 
international community to do the same (Furley, 1998: 241-248). The Rwandan 
government even maintained its rotating seat on the Secmity Council at the time and 
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there was no move made by any other UN member to expel it (Furley, 1998: 248, 
Power, 2001: 98). Within the Security Council , the acknowledgement that what was 
happening was indeed genocide would have placed an immediate moral obligation on 
its members to take robust enforcement action to prevent and punish such behaviour 
according to the Genocide Convention of 1948 (Macqueen, 2002: 73). Thus UN 
members, particularly the US were reluctant to use the word genocide in reference to 
Rwanda for fear of being obliged or pushed by public pressure to act (Jones, 2001: 
123, Power, 2001: 85-94). 
The US delegation within the Security Council actively led the opposition to a UN 
response to the genocide, demanding additional safeguards and highlighting the cost 
of a new operation (Herbst, 2000: 309, Adebajo and Landsburg, 2001: 173). This was 
especially due to Washington' s memory of the disastrous operations of UNOSOM II 
in Somalia that in essence impacted on the 'permitted' response of the UN as a whole 
to events in Rwanda (Nkiwane, 2000: 30, Macqueen, 2002: 71 ). Following the 
disaster in Somalia, staying out of Rwanda had become a specific US foreign policy 
objective as American support for peacekeeping was fading and US hostility towards 
the UN had reached a peak (Jones, 2001: 109, Power, 2001: 85-87). France on the 
other hand lobbied for a UN operation in Rwanda trying to extricate itself from the 
situation in the country and making it difficult for the Security Council to ignore the 
possibility of UN action (Barnett, 2002: 69). However, France's motives for such an 
operation were questionable particularly due to the uncomfortably close relationship 
between the French government and the Rwandan regime that they had helped to arm 
(Clapham, 1995: 83). Internal politics thus played a significant factor in Security 
Council responses to Rwanda because the US realised that if it completely objected to 
such an operation it could expect a similar reaction from France when the US called 
for UN action in another part of the world were US interests were particularly at 
stake, such as in Haiti (Barnett, 2002: 69). 
Macqueen (2002: 75) quotes Boutros-Ghali as saying: "The behaviour of !he Security 
Council was shocking: it meekly followed the United States' lead in denying the 
reality of genocide". The US thus appears to have had the upper hand within the 
Security Council in its response to Rwanda as US disinterest in resolving the conflict 
embodied "a general, embaiTassed shrugging-off of responsibility at the level of the 
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international system as a whole" (Macqueen, 2002: 70). Thus Annan (1998: 4) argues 
that the inability of the UN to restore peace to Somalia soured not only American but 
also international support for involvement in conflict intervention and produced a 
rapid retreat by the international community from peacekeeping worldwide. This 
reaction was particularly due to the reluctance of capable states to risk the lives of 
their own troops yet again in such an uncertain environment following Somalia 
(Jones, 2001: 127). Thus it was both internal as well as external factors that 
contributed to the lack of response to the conflict in Rwanda within the UN. 
The lack of political will of UN members was an important contributing factor to the 
weakness of all stages of UNAMIR and was a factor that would significantly shape 
the destiny of the operation as Jones (200 1: 11 0) contends: "At key moments the lack 
of political support within New York would place serious limitations on UNAMIR's 
ability to interpret its mandate broadly, communicate effectively with its political 
masters, respond to events and information on the ground, and in other ways help 
shape the implementation phase in Rwanda". 
5.3.1 The Deployment of UNAMIR and UNAMIR 11: October 1993 -March 
1996 
UNAMIR was premised on the implementation of a traditional Chapter VI 
peacekeeping mission based on the consent of the parties and the pacific settlement of 
disputes, without the use of force (Goulding, 1999: 163, Melvern, 2000: 93 , Jones, 
2001: 105-106, Power, 2001: 101 , Barnett, 2002: 66). UNAMIR's mandate was to 
end following national elections and the installation of the new R wandan government 
by October 1995 and not later than December 1995 (UNDPI, 1996: 344). The primary 
purpose of the UNAMIR peacekeeping force was to oversee the creation of an 
environment conducive to the implementation and operation of the Arusha Agreement 
(Carey, 1998: 20, Mpungwe, 1999: 20, Barnett, 2002: 112, Macqueen, 2002: 22). 
According to Resolution 872, the mandate of UNAMIR was to contribute to the 
security of designated areas already established as 'weapons-secure' by the Rwandans 
within the city of Kigali and to monitor the security situation during the final period 
of the transitional governn1ent's mandate, leading up to the elections (S/RES/872, 
1993: 2). To respond to instances of alleged non-compliance with the provisions of 
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Arusha relating to the integration of the anned forces, and pursue any such instances 
with the parties responsible and report thereon as appropriate to the Secretary-General 
(S/RES/872, 1993: 2). To monitor observance of the cease-fire agreement, calling for 
the establishment of cantonment and assembly zones and the demarcation of the new 
demilitarised zone and other demilitarisation procedures (S/RES/872, 1993 : 2). To 
monitor the process of repatriation of R wandan refugees and resettlement of displaced 
persons to verify that it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner and to assist in the 
co-ordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief 
operations (S/RES/872, 1993: 2). 
The UN personnel dispatched to Rwanda were selected because of their availability 
rather than their deep-rooted knowledge of the conflict (Bamett, 2002: 59). On the 18 
October 1993 Canadian Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire was appointed UNAMIR 
Force Commander and on the 12 November former Cameroon Minister for External 
Affairs Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh (a personal friend ofBoutros-Ghali) was appointed 
as the UNSGSR for Rwanda (UNDPI, 1996: 344, Melvem, 2000: 94). Although 
Dallaire had previous experience in multilateral operations, he lacked any deep or 
adequate knowledge of Rwanda or even Africa for that matter (Bamett, 2002: 65). 
Booh Booh was said to have made a difficult situation worse, as he lacked experience 
within the peacekeeping arena and was even accused of being pro-Habyarimana and 
having Hutu leanings from the outset (Melvem, 2000: 94, Adebajo and Landsburg, 
200 I : 181 , Bamett, 2002: 75). Thus unskilled and biased personnel at the top levels of 
UNAMIR contributed to the problems already facing the operation. Furthermore there 
was a lack of other important and necessary personnel with the absence of a public 
affairs officer, legal advisors and humanitarian or human rights experts (Melvem, 
2000: 85). These were all important posts that were essential within the functioning of 
the operation to fully understand the situation on the ground and what action to take. 
It was especially the humanitarian and human rights experts who would have had a 
pivotal role to play considering the human rights situation in Rwanda at the time of 
the operation. 
The Security Council struggled to recruit national contingents and eventually the 
force was built from sub-battalion units from Belgium, Ghana and Bangladesh 
(Macqueen, 2002: 67-68). UNAMIR was established with a total authorised strength 
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of 2 545 lightly armed and equipped troops, as well as 126 international and 68 local 
staff (Carey, 1998: 21). The deployment of these troops was however delayed until 
February 1994 - a full six months after the signing of the peace treaty, two months 
later than planned and without the necessary armoured units and helicopters 
authorised by the Security Council (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 27, Adebajo and 
Landsburg, 2001: 173). 
Consequently, when UNAMIR arrived in Rwanda the peacekeepers were for the most 
part unskilled and untrained and few troops had the apparel or resources to carry out 
even the most basic tasks (Power, 2001: 87, Barnett, 2002: 92). It was planned that 
UNAMIR would have a transportation unit including four utility helicopters, plus 
twenty-two armoured personnel carriers and eight military helicopters (Melvern, 
2000: 85). In fact no military helicopters arrived and only eight armoured personnel 
carriers were provided (already worn out from ONUMOZ in Mozambique), of which 
only five were operable (Melvern, 2000: 85). UNAMIR's budget was only authorised 
two days before the genocide began; yet the first funds were only received one month 
after the genocide ended (Jones, 2001: 107). Thus, every aspect ofUNAMIR from the 
personnel to equipment contributed to a financially and logistically weak operation 
from the outset (Jones, 2001 : 107, Power: 2001 : 87). 
Added to the resource, logistical and political weaknesses of the operation, Adebajo 
and Landsberg (2001: 173) contend that the Security Council made crucial changes to 
the resolution establishing UNAMIR, omitting an important request found in the 
Arusha agreement, which ultimately weakened the peacekeeping force before it was 
even deployed. While Arusha called for the UN to guarantee overall security 
throughout R wanda and to confiscate illegal anns, the UNAMIR mandate called for 
the peacekeepers to only contribute to the security of Kigali and its environs and did 
not call for a seizure of anns (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2001 : 173). Thus the mandate 
for the operation was not sufficient in terms of creating an environment in which the 
Arusha Agreement could be implemented fully. Also, the lack of any strategy for a 
seizure of anns was an important missing link in the chain of maintaining security in 
Rwanda. Therefore UN troops were insufficiently equipped to carry out an 
insufficient mandate that was doomed from the start in all respects from planning to 
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implementation. UNAMIR thus bore little resemblance to the multi-faceted 
ONUMOZ operation approved just a year before in Mozambique (Carey, 1998: 21 ). 
A voiding combat was essential for UNAMIR policy makers and neutrality was 
paramount (Power, 2001: 92). The use of force for deterrence or retaliation within 
UNAMIR was therefore strictly forbidden (I ones, 200 I: I 07), thus ruling out the 
possibility of peace enforcement measures during the operation. Yet the question must 
be asked how neutrality and the non-use of force can be maintained when it is obvious 
that one side of the conflict is deliberately eliminating innocent people in the name of 
"ethnic" differences. Added to this the issue of the use of force in protection of 
civilians was unclear and the extent of UNAMIR's operational range remained 
unresolved, as the UN headquarters did not respond to Dallaires's enquiries regarding 
this matter (Macqueen, 2002: 67). 
Not only did New York not respond to this, but communication on the whole between 
UN headquarters and the operation on the ground was sorely lacking. This was 
evident in the lack of response by New York to further enquiries by Dallaire regarding 
matters such as the clarification of the day to day mandate of UNAMIR, the 
responsibilities of UN personnel, and pennission to enforce the 'weapons secure area' 
that had supposedly been established in Kigali (Macqueen, 2002: 68-69). Dallaire had 
repeatedly conveyed to UN headquarters that a serious crisis and genocide was 
looming and he continued to press for more forceful action regarding the seizure of 
weapons, but to no avail (Melvem, 2000: I 07). In many instances what was 
communicated to UN headquarters from Dallaire was watered down when 
headquarters conveyed this information to the Security Council. An example of this is 
when Dallaire conveyed the situation in Rwanda as a "well organised plan for ethnic 
cleansing", while headquarters explained this to the Security Council as "an image of 
violence that was spontaneous, erupting from long-standing tensions and hatreds" 
(Bamett, 2002: 220). 
On the 5 April 1994, the Security Council passed Resolution 909 extending the 
UNAMIR mandate until the 29 July 1994 with a threat to pull out if the Arusha 
Accords were not implemented (UNDPI, 1996: 346, Melvem, 2000: 245) . The very 
next day the downing of Habyarimana' s plane signalled the start of the genocide. The 
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lack of planning for the prospect of such future violent opposition meant that the UN 
"security guarantee" of the Arusha Accords was increasingly becoming meaningless 
and with limited understanding of the circumstances or communication with those on 
the ground, the UN was progressively more limited in its capacity to interpret the 
sounds of increasing opposition to peace prior to the outbreak of genocide (Jones, 
2001 : 166-167). The chaos that descended on Rwanda in early April 1994 thus 
effectively ended the Arusha process, with the ceasefire forgotten, UNAMIR's 
mandate was over and the operation left without a raison d 'etre as it had been 
deployed to assist in the management of this process and therefore it was argued that 
it should be withdrawn (Bamett, 2002: 99, Macqueen, 2002: 71). Thus giving the UN 
an 'easy-out' from the situation as the mandate for the operation had in effect failed to 
be implemented in terms of the provisions of Arusha due to the conflicting parties 
themselves, by their violent actions ending this process. 
With the establishment of a peacekeeping force and the deployment of troops into a 
conflict zone the risks are inevitable. Belgian peacekeepers were particularly the 
target of hostility in Rwanda, especially due to Belgium's connection as the fonner 
colonial power (Furley, 1998: 240). The killing often Belgian peacekeepers led to the 
unforeseen and irresponsible withdrawal of its entire contingent, stranding UNAMIR 
and the Rwandan people at a critical time (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2001: 174, Power, 
200 I : 97). Once Belgium withdrew it lobbied for the withdrawal of all the 
peacekeepers "so as to avoid the historical stain on its peacekeeping record" and not 
to be seen to be withdrawing alone or the cause of UNAMIR's demise (Adebajo and 
Landsburg, 2001: 174, Power, 2001: 97, Bamett, 2002: 104). Belgium's withdrawal 
had devastating consequences for UNAMIR as it meant the loss of the operation's 
"backbone", leaving the UN with a scarce 1500 infantry troops mostly concentrated in 
the Kigali area (Power, 2001 : 98, Bamett, 2002: 104, Macqueen, 2002: 71 ). 
Following the outbreak of the genocide and the Belgian withdrawal, the UN was left 
with two choices: withdrawal of the entire operation, or a new reinforced operation 
with a new mandate to replace the one that had effectively been made obsolete 
(Mamdani , 2001 ; 213 , Bamett, 2002: 99). The UN chose to all but pull out with the 
passing of Resolution 912 on the 21 April 1994, deciding to further downscale its 
force to symbolic levels, leaving the operation with a meagre military strength of 270 
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troops with the bulk of UNAMIR evacuated from K.jgali by the 25 April (Carey, 
1998: 22, Jones, 2001 : 121 , Mamdani, 2001 : 213, Power, 2001 : 98, Barnett, 2002: 
127). The downscaled UNAMIR would act as an intermediary b~tween the parties in 
an attempt to secure a renewed ceasefire, assist in the resumption of humanitarian 
relief operations and monitor developments in Rwanda (UNDPI, 1996: 347). And 
thus apart from the small contingent left behind, Jones (2001 : 121) argues that the UN 
"left Rwanda's genocide planners a clear field to put their killing machine into 
motion", leaving the "population unprotected from the gb10cidiares" . 
On the 4 May 1994, the word genocide was finally used by the Secretary General to 
describe the situation in Rwanda and he urged the UN to act quickly or later be 
accused of passivity (UNDPI, 1996: 348). It was not until 17 May that the Security 
Council responded to this with the passing of Resolution 918, imposing a compulsory 
anns embargo on both sides to the conflict under Chapter VII and reinforcing 
UNAMIR to 5 500 troops, providing it with a more proactive mandate (UNDPI, 1996, 
350, Carey, 1998: 22, Jones, 2001: 122, Macqueen, 2002: 75). This operation was 
now to be referred to as UNAMIR II. UNAMIR II was authorised to contribute to the 
security and protection of the Rwandan people and thus was effectively mandated to 
stop the genocide by force (Macqueen, 2002: 75). However, even though these 
changes were proposed for the mission, the necessary financial, logistical and political 
support from troop contributing states within the UN was once again not forthcoming 
(Carey, 1998: 22, Jones, 2001: 122), thus rendering the operation once again weak, 
unsupported, ill equipped, and in effect useless. 
No further troops were deployed to UNAMIR 11 until the middle of August 1994, by 
which time the genocide and the civil war were well over (Jones, 2001: 122). 
UNAMIR II was thus a classic case of too little, too late on behalf of the UN and was 
inadequate and could not build a new peace militarily or politically with the 
inadequate mandate given to it by the Security Council and the subsequent lack of 
support from UN members (Furley, 1998: 248). UNAMIR 11 remained in Rwanda 
until March 1996. 
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5.3.2 Disarmament of the Parties and the Genocidaires 
As shown above, an important omission within the UNAMIR mandate was any 
reference to the primary task ascribed to the UN during the Arusha process, namely 
ensuring the overall security in the country, providing security for civilians, tracking 
anns flows, and disannament (Jones, 1999: 1 07). Therefore unlike in Mozambique, 
the UN was to play a minimal role within the peacebuilding aspects of conflict 
resolution as the implementation of a programme for disarmament and 
demobilisation, the creation of a. unified army and the gendarmerie, resettlement of 
displaced persons and the holding of elections were expected to be implemented by 
the transitional government on the basis of voluntary contributions provided by the 
international community (Carey, 1998: 21). Thus the UN did not foresee UNAMIR 
being the primary actor within these tasks and rather ascribed such tasks to the 
Rwandan people themselves who had no relevant experience or resources to carry out 
such tasks adequately, rather relying on the generosity of the international 
community, who had already shown their lack of interest or commitment within this 
arena. 
Kuperman (2003: 1 00) points out "no policy of humanitarian military intervention 
should be implemented without a sober consideration of its unintended 
consequences". In the case of Rwanda, the humanitarian consequences of the 
genocide "contained within it the seeds of renewed conflict" as the international aid 
response was deeply flawed and ultimately part of the problem (Jones, 2001: 136). 
This was evident as the gbwcidaires not only deliberately moved along side displaced 
populations as they retreated towards the Zairian border, but also moved within the 
camps set up for refugees, using them as a shield between themselves and the RPF 
forces, and recruiting many to fonn new militias (Jones, 2001 : 138, Alusala, 2005 : 2). 
Thus the genocidaires for the most part unchallenged amidst the refugees, were able 
to cross into Zaire with most of their weapons and vehicles intact (Jones, 2001 : 140). 
Thus, hindering the work of humanitarian aid workers who could not separate the 
militia from innocent refugees as these soldiers blended into the wider refugee 
population (Jones, 2001: 140, Alusala, 2005 : 2). Thus the humanitarian response to 
the conflict doubtless saved many lives, but also created a new dimension to the 
conflict in allowing the genocidaires to reinforce their strength and reengage the RPF, 
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thus not adhering to any principles of disannament or demobilisation (Jones, 2001 : 
150). 
The lack of any comprehensive disannament strategy by the UN in Rwanda still 
carries consequences for the country and indeed the entire Great Lakes Region as a 
major challenge to disarmament and reconciliation in Rwanda and the region today is 
the presence of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR forces hiding within the DRC and other 
countries in the region, who have been able to recuperate and refonn, posing a 
continuous threat to Rwanda and its neighbours (Jones 2001 : 140, Alusala: 2005 : 6, 
Baregu and Ramadhani, 2005 : 5). This is evident in the reluctance of the Kabila 
government in the DRC to disarm the Interahamwe, which was a direct motivation for 
the R wand an government support for Congolese Tutsi rebels and a joint attack on the 
DRC government in 1996 (Alusala, 2005: 6). Therefore disarmament and social 
reintegration of ex-soldiers from across all borders within the Great Lakes remains to 
this day a regional problem (Alusala, 2005: 9). 
5.3.3 The "Spoilers" to Peace in Rwanda 
While on the surface it appeared at the beginning of the peace process that both sides 
to the conflict wanted peace and a transition to a power-sharing democratic 
government, there were those within the government ranks who were opposed to this 
and worked to prevent such an outcome. These were the "spoilers to peace" in 
R wanda who complicated the peace effort throughout (Jones, 2001: 157). It was 
especially the refusal of elements within the Rwandan government to accept terms of 
the Arusha Accords that led to the massive outbreak of violence and ultimately the 
genocide (Macqueen, 2002: 30). Militant forces within Rwanda remained opposed to 
the Accords and blocked the path of implementation, deliberately playing upon the 
security fears of opponents and using them as tools of conflict rather than just the 
outcome of it (Knight, 1998: 24, Jones, 2001: 158). It was especially senior officials 
within the Rwandan army, CDR (Coalition pour la defence de la Republique) , 
Interahamwe and Presidential Guard who viewed the incorporation of RPF forces 
within the anny as an openly hostile action against the Rwandan regime and an 
association of senior military officers known as AMASASU (Alliance of Soldiers 
Provoked by the Age-old Deceitful Acts of Unarists), under the leadership of Colonel 
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Bagosora violently rejected the Arusha proposals for military integration 
(Lemarchand, 1994: 597, Hintjens, 1999: 261 , Melvem, 2000: 62-63). 
Those within the Rwandan government who had agreed to the Arusha process where 
viewed as traitors and the CDR, along with other groups worked to recruit the so 
called 'losers' of the Arusha process within the government to create an opposition 
force to peace that would nurture the growing movement towards genocide (Jones, 
2001 : 159). They all cooperated in actively killing innocent Tutsi civilians as well as 
moderate Hutu "in the hope of creating enough chaos to derail the transition" 
(Lemarchand, 1994: 597). These extremists also launched an attack on UNAMIR and 
Arusha and no measures were taken to stop these opponents and no contingency 
planning occurred with regards to this possible scenario as the threat these extremists 
posed was for the most part ignored (Jones, 2001: 117, 160). Thus the lack of 
planning for the possibility of "spoilers" in Rwanda was a major flaw within 
UNAMIR as this group managed to derail the peace process and plunge the country 
into further chaos, without any staunch response from the UN. 
5.4 Unilateral Intervention: France and Operation Turquoise 
France sought Security Council approval for the deployment of 2000 French troops 
into Rwanda to establish a 'humanitarian protected zone' in the southwest of the 
country to protect refugees, displaced persons and civilians at risk (UNDPI, 1996: 
352, Carey, 1998: 22, Furley, 1998: 243, Jones, 2001: 123, Macqueen, 2002: 76). 
Although UN members were sceptical about France's motives, the "temptation to use 
an immediately available force won the day" and Operation Turquoise was authorised 
by the Security Council through Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994 and launched within 
a week (Carey, 1998: 22, Furley, 1998: 232-244, Melvem, 2000: 210). This operation 
was not a formal UN mission, but was politically and legally legitimised by the 
Security Council as a unilateral undertaking to be authorised for a period of sixty 
days, at the end of which it was hoped that a reinforced UNAMIR II would be up to 
sufficient strength to take over (Melvem, 2000: 210, Macqueen, 2002: 76-77). 
Operation Turquoise was equipped with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter allowing it to use all means necessary (i .e. force) to achieve its 
humanitarian objectives - powers that had essentially been denied the official UN 
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forces within UNAMIR (UNDPI, 1996: 352, Jones, 2001: 123, Melvem, 2000: 211 , 
Macqueen, 2002: 79). 
Operation Turquoise was deployed while UNAMIR was still operating within 
Rwanda and would be operating out of Goma on the western Congo/Rwanda border, 
while the UN peacekeepers were mostly confined to Kigali in the centre of Rwanda, 
with the RPF frontline and government forces in between them (Melvem, 2000: 211 ). 
With Operation Turquoise authorised to use force against the belligerents, this placed 
UNAMIR in a precarious position as a Chapter VI operation directly between a 
Chapter VII operation and the belligerents (Melvem, 2000: 211 ); thus potentially 
placing UN forces directly in the line of fire and enforcement action. 
Melvem (2000: 24) contends that the Habyarimana regime would not have lasted as 
long as it did without the support of France. France by its previous actions had been 
associated with Hutu interests and had supplied anns to the Rwandan government and 
was responsible for helping the government fight the RPF invasion in 1990 (Furley, 
1998: 243 , Macqueen, 2002: 77). Subsequently, France maintained its ties with and 
continued to provide military support to the Rwandan government and anned forces 
even after the genocide began and had material interests in anns sales until May 1994 
(Hintjens, 1999: 273, Berdal, 2001: 69). France had thus exacerbated the conflict and 
was accused of prolonging the conflict in the first place (Melvem, 2000: 58). Thus the 
question of French impartiality within the operation was a question that loomed large 
not only for UN members but especially for the RPF. France' s motives for becoming 
involved in Rwanda in the way and at the stage that it did were therefore indeed 
questionable as Operation Turquoise was seen to be an attempt by the French 
government to "wash its hands in public" (Furley, 1998: 245, Jones, 2001: 125, 
Macqueen, 2002: 11). 
Despite being met with hostility and suspicion by the RPF, the French reportedly 
saved many lives and played a part in the opening up of territory for humanitarian 
agencies to operate in and allowed them to move more freely in Rwanda (Furley, 
1998: 244, Jones, 2001: 139). However, the French appeared to establish a presence 
only in a part of Rwanda where the genocide had already predominantly been 
completed and failed to prevent massacres continuing in the zone (Melvem, 2000: 
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215 , Jones, 2001: 123). Furthermore, the success of Operation Turquoise in the south 
west of Rwanda in fact compounded the problems of innocent Rwandans as the safe 
zones exposed more civilians and thus attracted the genocidaires, who were moving 
alongside and within the refugee movements (Furley, 1998: 245, Berdal, 2001: 69, 
Jones, 2001 : 124). Thus, by declaring a safe zone and threatening to respond to any 
attack within it, the French in fact created a protective umbrella for the retreating 
genocidaires, as well as some FAR units, enabling them to escape into the Congo 
(Melvem, 2000: 214, Jones, 2001: 125, Mamdani, 2001: 214), thus contributing to the 
further insecurity and instability of the region. 
While it did have some positive humanitarian outcomes, Operation Turquoise 
nevertheless did nothing to further aid any process of conflict resolution in Rwanda 
and France withdrew at the end of July, just over halfway through the two-month 
mandate given to it by the Security Council (Jones, 2001 : 126, Macqueen, 2002: 79). 
5.5 Assessment of UN Peace Maintenance in Rwanda 
The conflict in Rwanda was fought within the context of the colonial legacy of the 
arbitrary divisions of different ethno-political groups across colonial boundaries and 
the failure of the Rwandan people themselves to transcend these divisions after 
independence. The regional sphere of conflict within the Great Lakes Region 
compounded the conflict within the context of the post-Cold War era and the role of 
regional and other powers in fuelling the conflict. Rwanda during the conflict had 
reached a crisis point in terms of its economic, political and social spheres forming 
what Bamett (2002: 56) calls a "double movement of political compromise and 
reactionary politics" comprising economic crisis, political turmoil, and the RPF 
invasion. The nature of the conflict was therefore such that although there appeared an 
atmosphere within the country of a willingness to pursue political power sharing and 
reconciliation, there were those within the government opposed to this, acting as 
"spoilers" to peace, compounding the problems within the conflict. 
Thus, the failed implementation of peace in R wand a and a key obstacle to peace 
efforts stemmed from within the nature of the conflict itself with fear high and trust 
low between the RPF and government who for the most part failed to carry out their 
cmrunitments within the peace process, convinced that the other would take advantage 
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of them (Stedman and Rothchild, 1997: 20, Jones, 2001: 175). Even though the war 
finally ended with the victory of the RPF, Jones (2001 : 140- 141) points out that the 
regime responsible was not truly defeated but merely chased across the borders into 
Rwanda's neighbours, not fonning a part of any future peace or development 
strategies within the country and adding to further regional insecurity and instability. 
Policy makers within the UN had a very simplistic view of the R wandan conflict and 
did not take into consideration the dynamics of the situation on the ground, the 
historical relationships of the Rwandan people, the colonial legacy and the greater 
regional conflict sphere within which the conflict was fought. The peace process and 
the conflict were therefore misread, as the conflict was perceived to be an "ethnic 
conflict" between the Hutu and Tutsi despite the fact that they were not separate 
ethnic identities but as shown were rather different class and political identities 
originating from within the same historical ethnic identity. The RPF was not 
exclusively made up of Tutsi , as there were many Hutu among them, even within the 
top ranks of the RP A, and thus the perception of the RPF as a Tutsi organisation was 
misread and the notion that the war was fought purely between Hutu on the one side 
and Tutsi on the other was false. 
These misperceptions were a major factor in the misdiagnosis and inadequate 
response to the conflict and the implementation of an appropriate peace maintenance 
operation by the UN. Decision makers within the UN were inflexible in their 
accommodation or understanding of the shifting circumstances on the ground. As 
Clapham (1999: 38) contends; the tragedy of UNAMIR did not arise from its failure 
to carry out its original mandate, but rather from the refusal of UN headquarters to 
permit it to attempt a completely different one. The Security Council was always too 
reluctant to undertake more robust action or make important decisions regarding 
Rwanda and instead of adjusting the mandate to undertake more forceful action to 
deal with the increasing violence, the UN chose to withdraw its peacekeeping force, 
abandoning the Rwandan people at a most critical time. The warning signs of what 
could happen in Rwanda - the enormous stockpiles of weapons, the major 
militarisation ofRwandan society, and the further radicalisation ofRwandan politics -
had been ignored. 
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It is evident that the Arusha Accords had "multiple fault lines" (Jones, 2001 : 161 ). 
The Accords failed both internally and externally as the parties to the conflict 
themselves in the form of "spoilers" were not willing to implement the agreement 
fully and the international community represented by the UN was slow and reluctant 
to help or force them to implement the agreement, nor did it take into account the 
likelihood of such spoilers to the process. The fact that the Arusha process was 
heralded as a resolution of conflict by Africans themselves meant that those directly 
involved had a responsibility to ensure the implementation process was successful. 
Instead it was left to the UN to ensure this implementation. Mpungwe (1999 : 20-21) 
argues that Rwanda' s regional neighbours, particularly important players such as 
Uganda and the DRC, as well as the OAU should have maintained closer observation 
of the internal as well as regional developments immediately following the 
Agreement, instead of placing all the responsibility in the hands of the UN. Thus the 
regional actors within the peace process are as much to blame for their failure to act 
more proactively in terms of the implementation of the peace operation. There was 
accordingly no co-ordination between the mediation and implementation phases of 
peace maintenance in Rwanda. This was evident in the fact that UNAMIR 's mandate 
did not fully reflect what had been set out and requested by the parties at Arusha, nor 
did UNAMIR attempt to put in place the underlying political mechanisms that were 
essential to the long-term success of Arusha (Macqueen, 2002: 67). While Arusha 
called for the UN to ensure security throughout the country, the UNAMIR mandate 
only called for the provision of security for the city of Kigali (Melvern, 2000: 80). 
Furthermore, Arusha called for the seizure of arms, but the UN mandate omitted such 
a task (Melvern, 2000: 80). 
UNAMIR was established as a result of a compromise as a "small and cheap mission" 
(Melvern, 2000: 79). The equipment eventually supplied to UNAMIR was already 
worn out and old, having been passed on from other UN operations such as 
Mozambique and Somalia. The UN never established political authority in Rwanda 
and it has been argued that if it could have done so, the prevention of the genocide 
may have been possible (Knight, 1998: 24). However, the ability of the UN to do so 
was limited by its mandate, resources and the unwillingness of UN decision makers to 
mould the operation to the changing situation on the ground. Not only was 
UNAMIR's force level too small and not well equipped enough to take offensive and 
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effective action to prevent the violence, the international community was not prepared 
to react quickly or provide troops to do so or establish a multinational operation 
necessary to prevent the crisis (Carey, 1998: 22). UNAMIR was thus denied the tools 
that might have helped generate better options for a response to the violence that 
erupted into genocide and effectively ended the peace process (Jones, 2001 : 117). 
The inability of the UN to prevent or at least hinder the flow of anns into Rwanda was 
a major factor in the continuation and escalation of the conflict into genocide 
(Alusala, 2004: 139). The lack of disarmament or demobilisation initiatives by 
UNAMIR marked a grave error on the part of the peacekeepers as the continued 
availability of arms depleted incentives for peace and continues today to pose a threat 
to regional peace and security. The arms embargo that eventually came with 
UNAMIR II was passed far too late considering the "open secret" of the genocide and 
the mass stockpiling of weapons from both sides prior to the outbreak of the genocide. 
The anns embargo only came into effect after the genocide had already occurred and 
thus was another factor in the argument of too little, too late. Therefore despite the 
massive humanitarian response to Rwanda there was no effective conflict 
management in tenns of disarming the parties or creating incentives for peace with 
the immediate result of renewed hostilities on the Rwanda-Zaire border (Jones, 2001: 
144). 
The period between dictatorship and democracy is one of the most dangerous times 
for peacekeeping where any delay or hint of a lack of commitment serves only to 
encourage hardliners who do not want peace (Melvem, 2000: 82). The UN arrived at 
a time when Rwanda was hovering on the edge of the war, where not all parties were 
committed to peace and where the lack of commitment of the UN served to further 
worsen the situation on the ground. UNAMIR's presence and actions (and lack 
thereof) produced a tragic though unintended dynamic within the conflict as the 
reluctance and inability of the UN to undertake more robust action in fact gave 
impetus to the extremists' actions and the further spread of violence in Rwanda 
without the risk of a forceful UN interference (Barnett, 2002: 90). Following the 
outbreak of genocide, UNAMIR thus found itself in a precarious situation in which it 
was "no good to anyone and a danger to itself ' (Bamett, 2002: 99). 
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It has been argued that UNAMIR was never a peacekeeping operation m any 
meaningful sense of the tenn (Clapham, I 999: 39). UNAMIR was inadequate 
considering what was happening in Rwanda. The operation was deployed on the 
assumption that it was being sent to supervise a mutually agreed upon peace and that 
both sides to the conflict would hold to their obligations under Arusha (Melvem, 
2000: 79, Jones, 2001 : 160). However, this was not the case as the security situation 
deteriorated in the country, compounded by the determination of spoilers to derail the 
peace process. Thus, UNAMIR was unable to provide any real security against the 
growing sense of chaos that increasingly gripped Rwanda prior to the start of the 
genocide (Jones, 2001: 113). Rwanda therefore demonstrates the difficulties faced 
when UN peacekeepers enter into a situation in which there is in fact no established 
peace to keep and the infrastructure to ensure peace has not yet been put in place. This 
demonstrates a case for peacebuilding in Rwanda prior to the implementation of a 
peacekeeping operation as the groundwork for peace could have been put in place. 
It is therefore important to implement the appropriate peace maintenance operation 
according to the circumstances found within a specific conflict. The implementation 
of the peacekeeping operation by the UN was inadequate as Chapter VI action was 
too soft for the reality of the situation on the ground. Rwanda required a more 
multidimensional response in the form of peace enforcement, accompanied by 
peacebuilding efforts in order to halt the conflict and establish an environment in 
which peace could be consolidated through peacekeeping. The lack of peacebuilding 
efforts was a major weakness within the framework of peace maintenance in Rwanda 
(Jones, 2001: 166). The UN responded to the symptoms ofthe Rwandan conflict with 
the peacekeeping operation rather than the causes through peacebuilding as massive 
humanitarian efforts were made without addressing the root political and 
developmental factors within the country. No incentives or initiatives were offered for 
disannament or demobilisation and thus there was no prospect presented of a better 
life for ex-combatants. Due to the UN's unwillingness to take any robust enforcement 
action during the beginning of 1994, the organisation "was left as a largely passive 
witness to the continued decline of the political and security situation in the country" 
(Macqueen, 2002: 68). 
112 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Melvem (2000: 212) contends that Operation Turquoise had everything that 
UNAMIR had lacked and desperately needed, particularly the Chapter VII mandate, 
sufficient troops, annoured vehicles, helicopters and a battalion of heavy mortars. 
However, the Chapter VII operation undertaken by France was too unilateralist and 
such action should have taken place within the framework of a multilateral and 
multidimensional operation under the auspices of an official UN operation. France 
compounded the conflict because the glmocidaires were able to move within the safe 
zones created and the French were accused of harbouring the most notorious 
instigators of the genocide during this time. Furthermore, by the time the French 
withdrew the RPF had already become the dominant force in Rwanda and the 
remnants of the old Hutu regime had fled mostly to Zaire (Macqueen, 2002: 79). 
While Operation Turquoise offered the UN time to sort out its operational difficulties 
while the French took on the bulk of humanitarian work the UN did not seize upon 
this opportunity. Considering France' s tainted history in Rwanda, Operation 
Turquoise should never have been given enforcement powers under Chapter VII . 
Chapter VII mandates should be reserved for multilateral UN operations in which 
neutrality and impartiality are likely to be ensured. A Chapter VII mandate should 
have been granted to UNAMIR and the French troops incorporated within this 
operation. 
In order to assess whether UNAMIR was a success or not we must ask the question of 
whether the mandate ofUNAMIR was fulfilled and whether the operation was carried 
out in accordance with the established principles of peacekeeping. The most important 
elements within this being whether the UN was able to create an enviromnent 
conducive to a lasting peace and whether the country had been demobilised, 
demilitarised, combatants reintegrated into society and free and fair elections held. 
For all these questions, the answer is a resounding no. UNAMIR was ineffective in 
creating an enviromnent in which peace could be established or consolidated. The 
most graphic illustration of this is the fact that the genocide broke out while UNAMIR 
was still operative in the country and without the peacekeepers being able to prevent 
it. Demobilisation and reintegration was non-existent and the genocidaires in fact 
escaped, moving alongside the refugees. The refugees thus inevitably faced greater 
risks within the safe zones and became exposed to more danger sitting between the 
UN forces and the genocidaires. The escape of the genocidaires was therefore 
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facilitated, though not intentionally through the humanitarian efforts and exacerbated 
by Operation Turquoise. Thus the UN activities within Rwanda did not facilitate a 
peaceful transformation, and rather contributed to the regional instability and increase 
in security threats within the entire region. 
While the conflicting parties both requested a UN operation in the country to help 
with the implementation of Arusha, the fact that spoilers actively worked to derail this 
process negates the principle of consent for the operation. While UNAMIR appeared 
to maintain impartiality throughout the operation, the role of France and the question 
of French impartiality was a contentious issue following France's history in Rwanda. 
France's credibility surrounding the principle of consent was immediately 
questionable, and rightly so from the side of the RPF. Thus it can be noted that 
UNAMIR did not adhere to the guiding principles of consent, impartiality and the 
non-use of force in peace maintenance operations. The non-use of force principle 
within UNAMIR was one that should have been adjusted with regards to a more 
forceful initiative from the UN as soon as the genocide began, as it was obvious that 
one group was a specific target of hostilities and innocent civilians were being killed 
en masse. The UN had an obligation to prevent and stop the genocide and the 
technicality of using the word genocide was an excuse used to negate the international 
obligation present when genocide occurs. 
It can be concluded that the UN failed in Rwanda. From UNAMIR to Operation 
Turquoise to UNAMIR II there was no sincere international intervention or conflict 
management efforts of any seriousness established or deployed to prevent or stop the 
genocide (Jones, 2001: 126). The Secretary General believed that the international 
community's delayed reaction to the genocide "demonstrated graphically its extreme 
inadequacy to respond with prompt and decisive action to humanitarian crisis 
entwined with armed conflict" (UNDPI, 1996: 351 ). The UN's desertion of R wand a 
in its time of greatest need left a lasting impression, and it is therefore not surprising 
that many African countries are suspicious of the UN and its members ' intentions 
when it comes to the implementation of peace operations on the continent. 
Rwanda offers a typical example of UN peacekeeping failure in tenus of a weak 
mandate, the lack of political will and resources, a lack of understanding of the 
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dynamics on the ground and the lack of will of the parties themselves to cease 
fighting. All these factors plus the difficulties faced by peacekeepers on the ground 
point to a failure of the UN to prevent a great human tragedy. Thus, the lack of action 
by the UN is contrary to its most important mandate of maintaining intemational 
peace and security. The inability of the UN to prevent the genocide once again 
demonstrates the inability of the organisation to act decisively in the post-Cold War 
period when no Westem interests are apparent. However, it is not necessarily the case 
that the UN could have prevented the genocide that gripped Rwanda at the time. But 
Rwanda does demonstrate how the inherent nature of conflict in Africa has presented 
challenges to the UN in the post-Cold War era, and how a lack of understanding of 
such conflict accompanied by a lack of political will on the part of UN members to 
become involved in such situations that they do not adequately understand, can haye 
devastating consequences. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
6.1 Brief Overview 
The nature of conflict in Africa has evolved from the Cold War to the post-cold War 
era. This is evident in the internal and external factors and actors involved within the 
conflict dynamics. During the Cold War era state politics based on power and the 
quest for control of the state, formed the basis for conflicts in Africa from anti-
colonial wars of independence and liberation struggles to secessionist attempts. In the 
post-Cold War era with the loss of external superpower support, this has changed to 
incorporate the primacy of identity politics and conflicts based on the differences of 
ethnicity, religion and the quest for the control of resources and land, characterised by 
extreme violence and the rise of actors other than the state, within failed and collapsed 
states. These conflicts have thus presented challenges to the UN in relation to its 
traditional means of maintaining international peace and security, and the internal 
dynamics of the decision-making processes, political will and accompanying 
resources and financial factors within the organisation. The challenges faced by the 
UN in its attempts at maintaining peace and security in Africa therefore lie not only 
within the nature of conflict and the nature of the African state but also within the 
internal constraints inherent within the organisation itself. 
The nature of "new wars" within the context of the failed state in the post-Cold War 
era has particularly posed a problem to the UN's traditional adherence to the notions 
of sovereignty and non-intervention. In the past, the UN concentrated on collective 
security and state-centred solutions to conflicts. However, the nature of conflict has 
become more internal, accompanied by the rising concern of human rights abuses 
within the context of mass violence of regimes against their own people within states 
that have collapsed. Thus, the notion of collective security is one that needs to be 
addressed, as it is not suited to dealing with internal conflicts, particularly when the 
notion of sovereignty within failed states is a tenuous one as states are losing their 
legitimacy when they are not upholding their sovereign duties. "New wars" thus 
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require new and more robust solutions within the framework of the UN's traditional 
means of peace maintenance. 
The case studies of the conflicts in Mozambique and R wand a each demonstrate how 
the dynamics of conflict have evolved from the Cold War to the post Cold War era 
and how the UN has responded within the framework of such changes both internally 
and externally. While UN peace maintenance was a success in Mozambique, it was a 
failure in Rwanda. It is important therefore to examine how the UN succeeded and 
failed in light of the nature of the conflicts and the internal dynamics within the 
organisation. These two case studies therefore need to be compared and contrasted to 
reach a better understanding of the UN's experiences with peace maintenance 
operations within Africa. The criteria for comparing and contrasting these conflicts 
should include the nature of the conflicts within the Cold War and post-Cold War 
dynamics, the implementation of the peace processes and the outcomes for each 
conflict and the response of the UN in terms of the internal dynamics of political will , 
financial and logistical resources within the organisation and the subsequent 
implementation of an appropriate peace maintenance operation. 
Mozambique was an "old war" starting as a war of independence and continuing as a 
civil war following Portugal 's withdrawal, fought within the context of the Cold War 
bi-polarity and the support of external states and superpowers with both parties 
fighting over the legitimacy and control of the state. R wand a was a "new war" fought 
within the post-Cold War dynamics of ethno-class and political identities and 
inequality within the regional sphere of conflict dynamics, with civilians and innocent 
people being the victims of brutality manifest as genocide by the regime in power at 
the time. As shown in this thesis the UN was able to successfully carry out 
peacekeeping within Mozambique to accommodate an end to the war and a peaceful 
transition within the country, while it was unable to do so in Rwanda. 
6.2 Major Similarities 
Both Mozambique and Rwanda share a colonial legacy, which impacted on the future 
consolidation of peace within each country with the roots of conflict evident within 
the colonial history and the way in which the colonial powers ruled the countries and 
subsequently, how decolonisation occurred. Both Mozambique and Rwanda became 
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one party states with both Frelimo and the MRND respectively, ruling Mozambique 
and Rwanda by the politics of exclusion, maintaining a tight control over the state and 
excluding others within this process. Both countries subsequently suffered economic 
crises and reached the point of economic and political collapse, with their populations 
suffering due to drought, famine and increasing human rights abuses. Thus both 
countries were on the path to becoming failed and collapsed states. 
Resulting from the internal political dynamics within both countries was the rise of a 
dissatisfied group, formed within a neighbouring state, which rose up against the 
regime in power, plunging each country into civil war. Thus both conflicts were 
fought between the government in power at the time and an insurgent group. Both 
conflicts also maintained a regional and international dimension through the support 
of external actors. However, while in Mozambique external actors withdrew from the 
conflict, France continued to play a pivotal role in supporting the Rwandan 
government, even after the genocide had occurred. Thus while the combatants in 
Mozambique lacked the resources to continue fighting, in Rwanda there was still the 
availability of external resources, fuelling the conflict. The support of external powers 
within African conflicts is a factor therefore that has continued through from the Cold 
War to the post-Cold War era, and remains an impediment to peace maintenance and 
the principle of impartiality within peace operations. 
In both Mozambique and Rwanda, the conflict ended through a negotiated peace 
agreement signed as a result of external pressure, with negotiations facilitated by 
international actors. During the negotiation phases of both conflicts, the UN was 
called in at a relatively late stage as a monitor of the process and to verify the peace 
agreement and was subsequently called upon to play a central role within the 
implementation of a peace maintenance operation. However while in Mozambique the 
parties themselves showed the will to implement the agreement, in Rwanda they did 
not. Therefore, while the GP A ushered in peace in Mozambique, the Arusha Accords 
became the catalyst for further violence and conflict, culminating in the genocide in 
Rwanda. 
Both ONUMOZ and UNAMIR were premised on the establishment of a traditional 
Chapter VI peacekeeping operation. While ONUMOZ was a success in Mozambique 
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and UNAMIR was a failure in Rwanda, there are some similarities to observe 
between these two operations. ONUMOZ and UNAMIR both suffered delays in the 
formation of the peacekeeping operation with regards to troop contributions and 
financial resources. However, the delays in the deployment of ONUMOZ in 
Mozambique in fact had positive implications in that it gave Renamo tiine to organise 
itself as a political party and to lay the foundations for the implementation of the 
GPA. However, in Rwanda, time was of the essence and the delayed deployment of 
UNAMIR had devastating consequences as it allowed the genocidaires more time to 
put their plans into action. An important factor lacking in both operations was the 
absence of an adequate demilitarisation effort. Both ONUMOZ and UNAMIR failed 
in establishing an adequate arms embargo to prevent the flow of weapons into the 
conflict zones. Thus while peace operations where underway, there still remained the 
availability of arms to the combatants. This was an essential weakness within both 
operations as the continued availability of anns helped fuel tensions and carried 
further implications for regional security both within southern Africa and the Great 
Lakes. 
However, these similarities are overshadowed by significant differences between 
these two case studies, particularly within the nature of the conflicts themselves and 
the UN response that contributed to the respective success and failure of peace 
maintenance operations. 
6.3 Major Differences 
Macqueen (2002: 167) contends that it was the fundamental nature of the 
Mozambique conflict itself rather than the UN response to it that is a key factor in the 
success of peace operations in the country. He contends that the conflict was by its 
nature resolvable at the particular time at which external intervention took place. This 
can be seen in the fact that Mozambique was a long-standing conflict that had finally 
reached a point of war fatigue whereby the combatants themselves were tired of 
fighting and ready to pursue peace. Therefore by the time the UN entered 
Mozambique the war had run its course and there was an atmosphere primed for 
transformation following the demonstrated internal willingness and international 
support for peace at the signing of the GP A. Subsequent UN operations in 
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Mozambique therefore demonstrate how it is much easier to implement a 
peacekeeping operation when there is an established peace to maintain. 
The conflict dynamics within Rwanda were much more complex and the misdiagnosis 
of the conflict ultimately contributed to the failure of subsequent UN operations in the 
country. In Rwanda the conflict was still on-going, with suspicions running high and 
the combatants still demonstrating unwillingness to pursue peace, even after the 
Arusha Agreement was signed, particularly "spoilers" within the government who 
were determined to derail the peace process. There was therefore no established peace 
to maintain and the implementation of a peacekeeping operation was tenuous in light 
of the nature of the conflict. Mozambique and Rwanda therefore demonstrate the 
importance of the appropriate response to the different time or phase in which a 
conflict is in and the implementation of the appropriate peace maintenance operation 
by the UN according to this phase, as attempts to implement a peacekeeping operation 
within an ongoing conflict can prove unproductive and further exacerbate tensions, as 
was the case in R wanda. 
Ethnicity and ethno-class or political identities were not a central factor within the 
Mozambican conflict, compared to Rwanda where it was the most fundamental 
element. While the RPF had a specific identity in terms of ethno-political leanings, 
Renamo did not have any clear political tradition or ethnic identity and there were no 
clear ethnic or class differences between Frelimo and Renamo. Therefore while 
Rwanda suffered extreme violence manifest as genocide, there was no plan for the 
total elimination of one group by another along the lines of ethno-political or class 
differences in Mozambique. Rwanda therefore demonstrates how it is much more 
difficult to resolve a conflict when such extreme ethno-political tensions are present. 
As shown in Chapter Three, peace maintenance operations require the international 
community to understand the complexities of a conflict and to promote a stable 
framework for peace to address the underlying causes of that conflict, prevent a 
degeneration into more violence and promote development as part of an overall 
conflict resolution strategy within the broader regional framework. Furthermore the 
implementation of a peacekeeping operation requires the adherence to the three 
traditional principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force. Within 
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Mozambique, ONUMOZ was able for the most part to fulfil these requirements while 
in Rwanda; UNAMIR was not able to do so . 
While ONUMOZ ended up being one of the most costly peace operations undertaken 
by the UN, UNAMIR was run on a shoestring (Bames, 1998: 160, Power, 2001: 97). 
Added to the financial resources ONUMOZ also had the political will from UN 
members to allow it to be implemented successfully, with no members actively 
working to block any UN response to the conflict. ONUMOZ also had a clear and 
realistic mandate and the UN insisted on flexible mechanisms to carry out and adjust 
this mandate according to the shifting circumstances on the ground. ONUMOZ 
therefore was successful in meeting the objectives of its mandate, as it worked to 
ensure that the conditions were put in place to ensure a lasting peace in Mozambique. 
This was aided by the fact that ONUMOZ's mandate was in line with the GPA as the 
operation addressed the issues within this agreement and fulfilled the request of the 
parties in helping to implement it. 
UNAMIR on the other hand was unable to do the same. Not only was the UNAMIR 
mandate unrealistic, it was not set out in line with important requests within the 
Arusha Accords and thus was an insufficient response in terms of what it had been 
requested to do by the parties. This was further compounded by the financial and 
logistical constraints on the peacekeepers, as well as the unwillingness of the Security 
Council to adjust the mandate according to the shifting circumstances on the ground, 
rather deciding to downscale the operation at a crucial time, leaving the Rwandan 
people to their fate. This was further compounded by the demonstrated unwillingness 
of the combatants themselves through their violent actions to allow the UN to do so. 
The regional contexts within which these two conflicts were fought and the timeframe 
in which they were coming to an end are important factors within the framework of 
UN operations in both countries. Mozambique was part of a wave of change within 
southern Africa that demonstrated a noticeable atmosphere and willingness within the 
region for peace and reconciliation. However, in R wanda, the regional context of 
conflict was overpowered by the colonial legacy of the arbitrary ethno-political 
divisions across colonial boundaries throughout the entire Great Lakes Regional , with 
not only Rwanda, but also the DRC and Burundi both embroiled within a cycle of 
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internal conflicts of their own. Thus the regional conflict sphere within the Great 
Lakes Region provided for the easy proliferation of arms from one conflict to another 
and the widespread movement of refugees and displaced people within the region, as 
well as the involvement of regional neighbours within all these conflicts. These 
factors fuelled the conflict in Rwanda and decreased the possibilities for peace. 
In Mozambique there was a co-ordinated effort with regards to all phases from peace 
negotiations to peace implementation, while in Rwanda there were major discards 
between the negotiation phase and implementation phases. While ONUMOZ was able 
to establish political control and a central co-ordinating position within Mozambique, 
UNAMIR was unable to establish political control in Rwanda. The UN was therefore 
able to help maintain and consolidate peace in Mozambique, while it was unable to do 
so in Rwanda or prevent the outbreak of further extreme violence as it had in essence 
lost control of the situation. ONUMOZ was able to promote development in 
Mozambique and tackle the underlying causes of conflict through co-ordinated efforts 
to involve both sides of the conflict throughout the operation and promote free and 
fair elections to ensure the establishment of a new legitimate and democratic 
government, while stopping "spoilers" before they could derail the process. In 
Rwanda there appeared very little communication between the UN and the 
government or the RPF and both parties in turn viewed the UN and its motives with 
suspicion. Consequently the UN was unable to tackle the underlying causes of the 
conflict, particularly due to its misunderstanding and simplification of the conflict as 
"ethnic" rather than a more complex understanding of the historical relations between 
the Hutu and Tutsi. The UN was thus unable to allay the animosity between these 
groups or prevent the genocide, and had no capacity to deal with "spoilers". 
Peacebuilding efforts formed a crucial part of peace maintenance in Mozambique 
while in Rwanda there was no implementation of any effective peacebuilding. While 
there was a comprehensive strategy put in place to encourage the combatants to 
demobilise and be reintegrated into society in Mozambique, there were no moves to 
do so within Rwanda. UNAMIR did not even reach the reintegration phase of peace 
maintenance and no efforts were made for the reform of ex-combatants. However, in 
Mozambique there was a willingness of the combatants themselves to cease fighting, 
particularly after the incentives to do so were known. In Rwanda anns were still being 
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shipped into the country even while peace was being negotiated, demonstrating that 
the combatants had no will to cease fighting or be demobilised. No incentives were 
offered to combatants to demobilise and UNAMIR operations on the ground were 
uncertain of the mandate regarding this task, as communication from UN headquarters 
was vague regarding UNAMIR's role in this. 
While the appropriate response and peace maintenance operation was implemented in 
Mozambique, the same cannot be said for Rwanda. Within Mozambique, a Chapter 
VI peacekeeping operation accompanied by peacebuilding was adequate in terms of 
the conditions within the country, namely a willingness of the parties to cease fighting 
and an established peace to enforce and maintain. This meant that a robust peace 
enforcement operation was unnecessary. Within Rwanda, the violent nature of the 
conflict and the presence of spoilers necessitated the implementation of a far more 
robust response, as a Chapter VI operation was inadequate. Mozambique and Rwanda 
therefore demonstrate the importance of an adequate assessment of a conflict and the 
implementation of an appropriate peace maintenance operation in light of the nature 
of the conflict. Rwanda further demonstrates the need for more robust action by the 
UN in contemporary African conflict in the post-Cold War era, while Mozambique 
reveals the importance of peacebuilding efforts to ensure an environment first for 
peace, where combatants are disanned before peace can be kept through a 
peacekeeping operation. 
6.4 The Lessons to be Learnt 
The nature of conflict is evolving m Africa and the traditional adherence to the 
notions of sovereignty and non-intervention based on the primacy of the state are 
becoming outdated principles within the context of "new wars" in Africa and the 
accompanying threat to the human rights and lives of innocent people by regimes 
grappling to hold onto power within failed and collapsed states. Troeller (200 1: 78) 
believes that there is a need for the recognition of the overriding value of human 
security, coupled with the political will to act upon rather than turn away from the 
problems. The failure of operations in Rwanda demonstrates how the lack of political 
will and ignorance of the human rights abuses occurring in the country contributed to 
the failure of UN peace maintenance. The evolving nature of conflict thus requires far 
more robust action and a greater need to understand the internal and external 
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dynamics inherent within these conflicts in order that the appropriate response and 
peace maintenance operation may be implemented. 
ONUMOZ was not without its problems, but the ability and the will of not only the 
UN, but also the parties themselves to overcome these problems demonstrates that 
UN peacekeeping accompanied by wide-ranging peacebuilding and humanitarian 
efforts can prevent and resolve conflict in Africa when the conditions both internally 
and internationally in tenns of the nature of the conflict and the international response 
are met. The process of conflict in Africa is an extended one rooted in the historical 
experiences of the Africa state and therefore initiatives to resolve such conflicts 
should not be expected to be a short-term undertaking (Clarke and Herbst, 1996: 70). 
Mozambique and Rwanda both demonstrate that the implementation of an adequate 
peace maintenance operation within a deeply rooted conflict in Africa requires an 
accurate analysis of the conflict, while encompassing effective follow-through 
mechanisms aimed at implementing not only short-term measures to prevent the 
outbreak of conflict but also long-term measures to address the root-causes of the 
conflict, accompanied by the active engagement of all regional neighbours as well as 
the international community as a whole (Goulding, 1999: 166, Mpungwe, 1999: 24). 
Thus there is the need to create an entire process for preventing and resolving conflict 
as well as putting in place the necessary institutions that can sustain peace. 
Because different members within the UN have different interests and objectives 
within the international arena, there will always be debate and disagreements over the 
deployment of an operation and the necessary resources and political will, and the 
nature and degree of involvement needed within such an operation (Jones, 2001 : 128). 
Thus the implementation of a peace maintenance operation will always be a difficult 
task without the necessary political will of UN members. Political will imperative 
within any response to conflict as the lack of political will affects all aspects of a 
peace maintenance operation from its establishment to completion as it may have an 
adverse effect on the provision of troops and equipment, the adherence to time 
schedules, fulfilment of mandates and the successful implementation of an 
appropriate operation. Related to the issue of political will is the need to address the 
decision-making processes within the UN so that there can be more consistency 
within the organisation and its reactions to conflict around the world (Malan, 2000: 
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184). The UN should not allow failure within one conflict to dissuade members from 
reacting to a tragedy in another or prevent the organisation from fulfilling its intended 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Mozambique shows that UN 
peace maintenance can be successful and positive lessons must be taken from UN 
successes to ensure further success in the future. 
Post war transitions should be properly managed, especially in terms of disannament, 
demobilisation and the reintegration offonner combatants into civilian life (de Waal, 
2000: 51). Rwanda and Mozambique demonstrate from opposing sides of the scale 
the importance of disarmament and demilitarisation within a conflict zone. Weapons 
flood conflict regions, not only contributing to the escalation of the conflict but most 
importantly as Rwanda demonstrates, undermines efforts to embargo arms and 
compel opposing parties to respect human rights (Alusala, 2004: 139). Mozambique 
on the other hand demonstrates the importance of helping former combatants break 
from the conflict and how their willingness to hand in their weapons and the 
incentives offered to them to do this was a major factor in the success of UN peace 
maintenance. However, while ONUMOZ did have a working demobilisation and 
demilitarisation process, it was not sufficient in halting the amount of weapons still 
circulating throughout the region. Therefore for both Mozambique and R wanda, the 
availability of weapons throughout southern Africa and the Great Lakes respectively 
represent continuing challenges for the maintenance of peace and security. This is 
especially the case in the Great Lakes where violent conflict is still rife. Disannament 
and demobilisation are thus imperative within the greater structure of peacebuilding 
initiatives. 
Peacebuilding within the broader framework of peace maintenance is essential within 
any implementation of UN peace operations. Peacebuilding becomes an important 
tool to ensure that conflicts are brought under control before they escalate into 
umnanageable disasters were violence erupts and peace becomes harder to sustain. 
Peacebuilding offers an opportunity to create a framework for peace and lay the 
foundation for further initiatives to consolidate peace within a post-conflict state. 
Peacebuilding should therefore not come as an extension of a peacekeeping operation 
but should fall within the wider and more prominent role of setting the stage for the 
implementation of a peacekeeping operation. Peacebuilding is especially pertinent 
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within the African context of post-Cold War "new wars" as it offers a more realistic 
path to sustainable development as it resolves to address the root causes of conflicts 
and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the state. As Bertram (1995: 389) 
contends: "full-scale peacebuilding efforts are nothing short of attempts at nation 
building; they seek to remake a state's political institutions, security forces, and 
economic arrangements". Rwanda demonstrates how the lack of peacebuilding 
initiatives had devastating consequences for the implementation of a peacekeeping 
operation before there was an established peace to keep. Furthennore, Rwanda 
demonstrates the need for more robust action in "new wars" and peace enforcement 
by the UN within a conflict in which there is a demonstrated lack of will of one side 
of the conflict to cease fighting. 
Internal African conflicts still maintain regional and international dimensions. Thus 
regional efforts following the implementation of UN peace maintenance operations 
are important within the framework of consolidating regional peace and security. The 
cooperative initiatives of Operation Rachal between Mozambique and South Africa 
are an important example of the success of such initiatives. R wanda on the other hand 
demonstrates how the lack of such initiatives has spill over effects with the further 
propagation of conflict within a region as weapons continue to flow throughout the 
Great Lakes. Regional efforts are thus central in preventing the proliferation of anns 
into conflict zones and regional states have a responsibility to prevent the proliferation 
of such weapons. 
6.5 Issues for Future Research 
This thesis has examined the challenges faced by the UN in terms of its traditional 
means of maintaining international peace and security in light of the evolving nature 
of African conflict and the internal factors within the UN as an international collective 
security organisation. From these challenges comes the need to further examine 
probable solutions for the future of UN peace maintenance. Scope still remains for 
further research into how these issues can be dealt with in terms of the internal 
decision-making dynamics within the UN system and how the UN should and can be 
refonned to facilitate the implementation of peace operations accompanied by the 
necessary political will and financial resources . Such refonns could include the 
restructuring of the Security Council as a decision-making organ and the veto power 
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of the permanent members in line with the dynamics of contemporary world politics. 
Furthermore, there is scope to assess the viability of a pennanent peace maintenance 
force within the UN consisting of trained peacekeepers that are able to respond 
immediately to conflicts without having to wait for the generosity of UN members in 
terms of troop contributions and financial and logistical resources 
While the UN remains the principal organisation tasked with the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the viability of regional organisations and regional 
capacity for peace maintenance is an important consideration to address within the 
study of peace maintenance operations. There is a need to determine what possibilities 
there are for the implementation of regional peace maintenance operations and how 
they fit within the broader framework of UN peace maintenance. 
6.6 Final Assessment 
Lessons can be learnt from both successes and failures and should be used for future 
reference so that peacekeeping and the related tasks of peacebuilding and peace 
enforcement can be successful and effective in the future. It is unfortunate that the 
positive lessons that could have been learned from Mozambique did not last long in 
the minds of those within the UN and international community as the crisis in Rwanda 
occurred. Rather, the debacle in Somalia was more prominent in their minds as they 
shied away from involvement in that country. While Rwanda has left a major stain on 
the UN's peace maintenance record, the success of peace operations in Mozambique 
demonstrates that the UN can be successful in resolving African conflicts when the 
necessary conditions both internally and externally are in place. There is a role for the 
UN to play and its existing mechanisms should be enhanced to further extend the 
prospects of peace not only in Africa but globally as well. Conflict in Africa 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security and Africa's security problems 
are global problems, which thus require global solutions (Gambari, 2001 : 20). The 
UN remains the sole global collective security organisation aimed at preventing 
conflict and maintaining international peace and security and it should continue to 
function as such an organisation. 
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